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The phrase “political obligation” has rarely suggested for theorists what it might for the person in 
the street, namely, the kinds and magnitudes of obligations held by our political representatives, 
as opposed to obligations held by citizens. In a related way, despite the existence of widespread 
expectations of political representatives, a theoretical account of these expectations and their 
normative import are subjects that have received surprisingly little attention. In what follows I 
develop an account of obligations and duties specifically belonging to political representatives. I 
argue that the relevant obligations derive in the first instance not from particular political or legal 
frameworks but from the moral relation introduced when one person represents another, or a 
group of persons, and in a complimentary way from the ethical relation introduced in an 
institutional setting where certain roles come to have expectations attached to them. The quasi-
promissory relation thus introduced generates obligations for political representatives. Principle 
among these, I argue, is the obligation to advocate for the interests of their constituents. I thus 
defend the familiar—but often criticized—view that the main activity of political representation 
is interest advocacy, but offer an account of interests sufficiently robust to make sense of the 
sorts of obligations at stake.  
 I go on to argue that the magnified influence of those occupying representative roles 
results in the magnification of their general duties (borrowing traditional language, for reasons I 
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will explain). Political representatives have general duties owed to all other persons just like the 
rest of us do, but, as with the rest of us, what counts as a reasonable notion of the content of these 
duties depends upon circumstance. Demands imposed by general duties upon those occupying 
representative roles should reasonably be thought to be significantly greater than the demands 
posed by such duties upon average citizens. Further, I defend the view that being the bearer of 
such magnified general duties and obligations to constituents is integral to and partially 
constitutive of being a political representative; upholding such duties and obligations to a 
relevant threshold is integral to representing well.  
 Finally, I explore how the normative framework here developed with respect to political 
representation might be applied in the international domain. While representative roles in the 
context of international affairs are complex and often controversial, I argue that certain 
normative elements familiar from domestic circumstances still obtain. Interests, carefully 
considered and qualified, should still form the main content of a representative’s agenda. A 
circumspect account of these interests, however, must take account of unprecedented 
connectivity, of evolving circumstances in geopolitics and of the state of the natural 
environment. With this interpretation of interests in place, I defend the view that the interests of 
constituents and non-constituents harmonize more often—and conflict less frequently—than is 
often assumed to be the case, particularly from the perspective of International Relations, but 
also in a number of philosophical accounts of state sovereignty. Other things equal, as a 
consequence of general duties obtaining it is among a constituent’s interests that the interests of 
non-constituents are not compromised. It follows from this that political representatives can be 
partial to those they represent only in limited ways, and that the interests of non-constituents are 
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For those working in social and political philosophy, the phrase “political obligation” will signal 
something quite specific. On the one hand, political obligation refers to the obligations that 
citizens have (if they do) to obey the law. On the other hand, as an area of inquiry, political 
obligation refers to the constellation of challenging issues relating to what role legitimate 
authority, consent, fairness, benefits enjoyed, and overall utility might have in justifying the 
existence of this obligation. The subject is rightly considered central to political philosophy, for 
it bears upon the fundamental concepts of individual autonomy, political legitimacy, and the rule 
of law, and the tension between these. Literature addressing the political obligations of citizens 
has taught us much about problems with consent and the limitations of fair-play arguments and 
has shown us difficulties with a notion of autonomy that treats citizens as isolated individuals. 
 The subject of political representation has received an equally generous amount of 
attention, though of late this subject has tended to be the purview of political theorists and 
political scientists more frequently than that of philosophers. While classically controversial—
diminished by Plato and reviled by Rousseau, enshrined by Locke and Madison—something of a 
theoretical consensus has emerged in recent decades regarding the centrality of political 
representation and the value in increasing, rather than decreasing, its role in governance. 
Theorists writing in this vein have shown how representation and participation, once thought 
inimical to one another, can be understood as mutually supportive. They have encouraged us to 
reconsider the role of deliberation in representation, to question limiting deliberation only to the 
overall aims of the political process, and to more squarely face practical challenges related to 
greater participation and deliberation at all levels of society. 
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 It is curious, then, that political obligation and political representation are less frequently 
discussed together, and that the phrase “political obligation” has rarely suggested for theorists 
what it might for the person in the street: namely, the obligations held by our political 
representatives. Further, despite the fact that having expectations of our political representatives 
is a commonplace, a theoretical account of these expectations and their normative basis are 
subjects that have received little attention.1 In what follows I develop an account of obligations 
and duties specifically pertaining to political representatives. I argue that the obligations derive, 
first, not from particular political or legal frameworks but from the moral relation introduced 
when one person represents another or a group of persons; and second, in a complementary way, 
from the ethical relation introduced in institutional settings in which certain roles come to have 
expectations attached to them. The promissory relation thus manifested generates an obligation 
for political representatives to advocate for the interests of their constituents.  
 I also argue that the magnified influence of those occupying representative roles results in 
the expansion of their general duties. Political representatives have general duties owed to all 
other persons just as the rest of us do; but, as with the rest of us, what counts as a reasonable 
notion of the content of these duties depends upon circumstance. The demands that general 
duties should reasonably be thought to impose upon a resource-less young man living in the 
shanty-town outside Mumbai are minimal; the demands that general duties should reasonably be 
thought to impose upon powerful politicians are significantly greater. As a generalization, being 
the bearer of such magnified general duties and obligations is integral to being a political 
representative, and upholding such duties and obligations is integral to representing well. 
                                                 
1 One notable exception is to be had in Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012, whose views I take up and compare with my own later on. 
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 This view can be contrasted with Andrew Rehfeld’s account that defines political 
representation minimally in terms of recognition by an appropriate body, with certain other 
conditions met.2 By treating such recognition as sufficient, Rehfeld thus makes representation 
strictly a matter of how (ostensible) representatives are regarded, without reference to the kinds 
or quality of activity they are engaged in. His approach—discussed further in chapter 1—has the 
merit of providing resources to distinguish between representing and representing well and thus 
avoids building legitimate democratic representation into our concept of representation 
simpliciter. It also offers an explanation for the fact that “representatives” who do nothing 
particularly democratic, acting with no apparent regard for the interests of their constituencies, 
are still sometimes regarded as representatives. There are reasons to be critical of this approach, 
however. While it is undoubtedly important to be able to point to examples of representing 
poorly but which nonetheless count as representation, a “general” account like this one gives no 
discernable role to constituents. In an effort to cover all instances of “recognized representation,” 
it removes citizens and their interests from the equation. Further, because this account treats 
recognition, with certain other conditions met, as sufficient, it entails counterintuitive 
consequences. These consequences include, by Rehfeld’s own admission that the dead might be 
regarded as representatives, since it does not matter what representatives do as long as they are 
regarded as representatives. In contrast, my inclusion of obligations that necessarily obtain for 
representatives—merely as a consequence of their voluntarily acting as representatives—
reintroduces the role of citizens and their interests in a normatively powerful way. 
 Thomas Christiano’s democratic theory gives a much more robust role to political 
representation, arguing that it is crucial for a political division of labor wherein citizens and 
                                                 




governments have clearly defined roles. Within this structure, however, the aims of society are to 
be specified by the citizenry, and the means to achieving those aims are to be determined by the 
(representative) government. Arguments for this conclusion include that citizens lack relevant 
expertise for determining appropriate means and that their participation in determining these 
means would require too much of individuals. One reason to be dubious about Christiano’s 
claims here is that the capacities of citizens are contingent and might be improved through better 
education and circumstances of greater social equality. Moreover, and as other theorists have 
argued,3 the political capacities of citizens and the degree to which citizens are well-informed 
can best be improved through their participation in the political process and by their engagement 
in public deliberation. Thus any limitation upon these activities reproduces the problematic 
disparity of knowledge. Finally, the aims of society referred to in this account are best seen as 
malleable and shifting rather than as a fixed point toward which a capable captain steers his 
passengers. Because deliberation about the use of particular means will—rightly—result in the 
ongoing reevaluation and reshaping of aims, an account like Christiano’s that treats these aims as 
static and not susceptible to revision is problematic. 
 While I am critical of the limitations Christiano sets for political participation, his work is 
germane and important because it brings attention to the roles and obligations of both citizens 
and political representatives. He is well aware that the value of political participation is bound up 
with the achievement of a sufficiently informed electorate (or lack thereof), and he justifies 
limitations upon the kinds of participation that are desirable in terms of the level of popular 
political wherewithal that seems feasible. On this basis I argue that individual political 
                                                 
3 See Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970; The Problem of 
Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory. Chichester: Wiley, 1979. See also Gould, Carol 
C. Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1988, esp. chapter 1. 
 
5 
representatives are obliged to promote an informed electorate to the best of their ability, for only 
in this case could one be said to be pursuing a constituency’s interests in a robust way. The 
relevant sorts of informing should consist not only in increasing familiarity with significant 
ongoing political issues but also in sharing the representative’s (and government’s more 
generally) reasons for particular strategies and decisions.4 I further argue that representatives 
should work within their respective political structures (or “spheres”) to increase opportunities 
for public deliberation. This requirement is bound up not only with the previously mentioned 
educative function of such deliberation, but also with recognizing citizens as situated in relations 
with their fellow constituents, as opposed to being isolated individuals.5 Put differently, 
encouraging deliberation is a way of appropriately heeding the importance of relations between 
persons, and acknowledging that the attitudes and opinions of citizens are created and 
conditioned through interaction with one another. 
 Among the widely recognized constraints upon both the ends political representatives can 
pursue and the means used to pursue them, human rights have been appealed to by a number of 
theorists.6 A carefully constructed account of human rights that includes an ontology of persons 
and agency might justify a moral requirement to observe these parameters on its own. I argue, 
however, that parallel consequences can be derived from a robust account of political 
representation. This approach makes novel use of the so-called particularity problem: it has been 
argued that if legitimate authority is sufficient to ground an obligation to obey the law, it is not 
clear why citizens of one state as opposed to another have this obligation—that is, why the 
                                                 
4 See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples; With, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 
1999, esp. 135. 
5 See Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, esp. 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
6 See Buchanan, Allen. "Political Legitimacy and Democracy." Ethics 112.4 (2002): 689-719; Justice, Legitimacy, 
and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.  
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obligation would obtain specifically for citizens of that nation as opposed to others. Turning this 
around, I will argue that because the obligations of political representatives are owed first and 
foremost to persons, and who their constituencies are is contingent in the sense that they might 
have been born elsewhere and come (or failed to come) to represent citizens of a different nation, 
they cannot act in ways that would undermine the possibility of political representation for 
others. As I elaborate below, general duties dictate that moral concern cannot be confined within 
political borders. Because political representatives have obligations and duties specific to their 
roles, these general (or “universal”) aspects of morality obtain for them in ways specific to the 
activity of representation. This leaves room for the special obligations held by representatives to 
the constituents they are understood to represent, and the prioritization of their interests to a 
certain degree, but also suggests limits to this prioritization. 
 I argue on this basis that political representatives face the challenge of upholding 
obligations of partiality (those owed specifically to their constituents) and of upholding demands 
of impartiality (best seen as a hybrid of duties and obligations) in unique ways. Given Kant’s 
careful attention to the notion of duty, it might seem tempting to appeal to his taxonomy of duties 
in this regard. It should be remembered, however, that though he recognized their importance, 
Kant did not intend for his lengthy discussion of duty in the Metaphysics of Morals to apply to 
those duties pertaining to relations emerging from social institutions.7 Thus while the notion of 
general duties appealed to here is significantly indebted to Kant, my focus upon the intersection 
of these duties with complex social and political associations largely removes them from his 
frame of reference: the specific ways in which general duties might be enhanced as a 
consequence of occupying an obligation-bearing role, like that of the political representative, are 
                                                 
7 See Wood, Allen W. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999, Chapter 3. 
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little discussed in Kant or indeed elsewhere. A significant contribution of what follows, then, to 
my knowledge not specifically addressed by other theorists, is an analysis of the relation between 
duties and obligations specific to political representatives, once each of these has been 
sufficiently spelled out. 
 Discussions of interests as they relate to political representation have been reserved in the 
main—tacitly or otherwise—to national interests, and there has long existed a presumption in 
favor of conceiving of citizens’ interests in nationalist terms. Allen Buchanan offers a critique of 
this tendency by appealing to human rights and a Natural Duty of Justice.8 That there is such a 
duty, he argues, undermines the justification for the pursuit of narrowly conceived national 
interest at any cost to outsiders. While friendly to this view and its conclusions, I argue that 
something is missing in this account when, in response to concerns raised by David Luban,9 
Buchanan explicitly avoids exploring what specific justifications are available for using state 
power for the pursuit of progress toward greater justice in the international domain.10 The 
problem is framed by him, in other words, as one of discovering when and how those in 
positions of power can be justified in temporarily setting aside or overriding the (national) 
interests of their constituents, rather than framing constituent interests more inclusively. In order 
to make this case, I develop an account of these interests and defend their centrality to an account 
of political representation. 
 Given that persons have interests across a vast range of eccentric issues, an obligation to 
represent their interests must be qualified. In liberal democratic societies the difficulty of 
                                                 
8 Buchanan, Allen E. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004, 97-105. 
9 Luban, David. "Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War." Global Justice and 
Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization. Ed. Pablo De Greiff and 
Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002. 79-115. 
10 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, 104-5. 
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representing diverse individuals has typically been addressed by making a distinction between 
public and private interests and by assuring sufficient individual liberty for the pursuit of private 
interests. However, the classical distinction does little to explain or justify what makes some 
interests public and others private, and thus which are rightly the purview of political 
representatives, which are rightly the purview of citizens, and how these categories might 
overlap or interface. Because in my account the obligations of political representatives arise in a 
promissory context, they answer to the interests of constituents in a broad, thoroughgoing way, 
and specifically in a way that recognizes their interests qua persons prior to their interests qua 
citizens.  
 I thus argue that interests are a proper and central (but not necessarily the only) subject of 
political representation,11 and that treatments like Buchanan’s frame national interests too 
narrowly. Other things equal, it is among a constituency’s interests that others—inside or outside 
their constituency—do not to suffer injustice. More specifically, constituents have an acute 
interest such that others do not suffer injustice as a consequence of things done in their name12 or 
in the pursuit of constituents’ other interests. My country’s economy might be strengthened by 
unfairly orchestrating trade deals that work to its advantage. In whatever ways my interests are 
furthered by this more robust economy, however, my interest in not having such unfairness be 
perpetrated would have been comprised en route. A contemporary focus on game-theoretic 
approaches and social contract theory, with their characteristic assumption of individual 
rationally-self-interested actors, has tended to obscure the relevance of interests in the well-being 
of others. But this is to theorize as though our interests could be characterized independently of 
                                                 
11 In one sense I thus follow the classical view of Hanna Pitkin (Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of 
Representation. Berkeley: U of California, 1967, 155), though of course my reasons for emphasizing interests as the 
subject of political representation substantially differ from hers. 
12 See Beerbohm, Eric Anthony. In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. 
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our values, and specifically as independent of a commitment to justice, which is misleading. If 
general duties as invoked here—the demands of which are owed to all other persons—obtain for 
all persons, then promoting my interests, as my political representative is obligated to do, 
includes assisting me in the performance of my general duties. Put differently, upholding my 
general duties forms part of my interests; other things equal, my political representative ought to 
promote the fulfillment of my general duties. I in turn argue that the pursuit of justice and 
advocacy for human rights stand as reasonable approximations of what promoting these general 
duties consists in. 
 This does not mean, of course, that tensions between interests will not arise or that 
mediating between narrower national interests and the wider interests I am gesturing toward is 
not a complex affair. Rather, it is to suggest that fulfilling a Natural Duty of Justice is better seen 
as substantially within the category of national interests, not as external and oppositional to them. 
That the pursuit of justice may be a source of conflict with other cherished interests makes it no 
different from other, more traditionally recognized, interests that populate the category. A 
parallel point can be made with regard to the possible tension between popular sovereignty and 
the wider pursuit of justice. As I will argue, to the extent that political representatives are at 
times justified in acting independently, as trustee rather than as delegate, they are so justified 
because they pursue the interests of their constituency broadly construed, not because they have 
found it necessary to abandon those interests. Further, because political representatives have a 
duty not to undermine structures necessary for representation more broadly, they are constrained 
 
10 
in the means they may employ to further the (national) interests of their constituents13—a subject 
I take up in chapter 3. 
 Having argued throughout for a robust conception of political representation, and that 
there are strong normative reasons for working toward greater participation and deliberation with 
an eye to rendering political representation more both more effective and more legitimate, I 
conclude by considering the implications of this view in the international domain. Philip Pettit 
has argued that global governance threatens domination and arbitrary uses of power and that if 
individual states function in nondominating ways, a desire for citizens to exercise a degree of 
democratic control over the international order individually rather than through the influence of 
their respective states seems unmotivated.14 Further, he characterizes one dimension of 
legitimacy in terms of nondomination, arguing that the legitimacy of the international order turns 
significantly upon the legitimacy of states making up this order. What is largely absent from this 
account is an explanation of how domestic legitimacy relates to state activity in the international 
arena.  
 Pettit’s recommendation for a “system of fair democratic association” of states remains 
largely at the level of the procedural, offering little with regard to the content of what counts as 
justifiable conduct between states. In the account developed here, the conduct of governments is 
constrained by the obligations belonging to political representatives, as they cannot consistently 
act in ways that prevent either citizens or noncitizens from having opportunities for political 
                                                 
13 See Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. As I 
discuss below, Dovi focuses upon procedural elements of democracy in defining what makes ”good 
representatives,” with their function being “…to advocate on behalf of their constituents in ways that allow for the 
fair and peaceful resolution of political disagreements within a pluralist society” (7). While friendly to these 
arguments, I argue that they are incomplete without the inclusion of further (not merely procedural) normative 
parameters of the sort I am pressing. Further, for reasons already suggested, I argue that political representation 
cannot be sufficiently analyzed without reference to both domestic and international domains simultaneously. 
14 Pettit, Philip. "Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-Republican Perspective." Ed. John Tasioulas. The 
Philosophy of International Law. Ed. Samantha Besson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 139-60. 
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representation. I thus argue that both international and domestic legitimacy are threatened when a 
government exercises domination in the international system, which need not follow in the 
account of nondomination defended by Pettit. I in turn show that Pettit’s view, while valuable, 
should be augmented with a more reciprocal, rather than one-directional, understanding of 
legitimacy. Non-domination is an important tool for criticizing the sorts of internal injustices 
allowed by a Westphalian conception of sovereignty, and in this regard it harmonizes with 
advocacy of human rights. It also, in turn, offers resources for criticizing an international order 
where significant forms of domination persist. It is less clear, however, how a state’s behavior 
abroad affects domestic legitimacy, spelled out only in terms of nondomination. According to the 
understanding argued for here, the two “tiers”—domestic and international—of legitimacy 
cannot be considered in isolation from one another, in part because the normative demands that 
obtain for political representatives apply to both domains. 
 Because domestic political representatives have an obligation to pursue the interests of 
their constituents, and because these interests encompass the consequences of their government’s 
actions for non-constituents, there are stronger reasons for more citizen control of international 
policy—through increased participation and more effective democratic procedures specifically 
oriented to the international domain—than Pettit allows. Further, as suggested above with regard 
to deliberation in a domestic context, the path to a better-informed, more engaged global 
citizenry is via greater, rather than lesser, participation. As in domestic settings, representative 
structures are necessary for aggregation, creating deliberative fora, and mediating diverse 
conceptions of the good life at the global level. Progress on this front requires greater 
participation and deliberation not only concerning the democratically chosen aims of society—
including how this society engages in the international system—but also concerning the means 
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through which these aims are pursued. In both global and domestic political arrangements, 
however, the ideal of political representation as elaborated here is better approximated to the 
extent that obligations to uphold the interests of persons are pursued.15 While the utilitarian 
goods of robust representation are numerous and significant, it is the duties and obligations of 
political representatives that are essential to the activity of representing. 
 It might be worried that I write about “political representation” as though it were a notion 
that is fixed in time and space, when this is of course not so. The arguments made here apply to a 
limited domain in at least the following sense: I simply take on board a host of moral and 
political concepts inherited from our (predominantly Western) tradition, without, for example, 
considering a view that is critical of (the existence of) duties, or that doubts the value of any 
familiar political institutions. I proceed in this way not because I hold this tradition up as 
exemplary or because I doubt the existence of other possible conceptions of value, but because of 
its status and continued influence in our social and political thought. The project can thus be 
characterized as taking (Western) political philosophy largely “as it is” and arguing that the roles 
and responsibilities I assign to political representatives should be understood as entailed by this 
tradition. 
 There are, however, three interrelated normative points that I take to apply quite 
generally and that form the basis of an argument for what political representation is and should 
be. First, if a person claims (or otherwise insinuates) to speak or act for another, or for a group of 
others, in a context where this claim is likely to be taken seriously and where there will likely be 
consequences for those on whose behalf the first individual speaks or acts, then the speaker or 
                                                 
15 Chapter 3 is largely dedicated to analyzing what political representatives owe to constituents as well as what they 




actor bears a degree of responsibility for the resultant welfare of those spoken or acted for. A 
sufficiently wide understanding that this is so generates reasonable—and normatively 
important—expectations of constituents that political representatives advocate for their interests. 
 Second, I will argue that there is no reason to assume that the interests of “insiders” and 
“outsiders” are fundamentally at odds with one another; because, ceteris paribus, all persons 
have an interest in the well-being of others, at least one important set of interests is held in 
common. Finally, I take it as uncontroversial that those in voluntarily occupied positions of 
relative influence and power bear a greater responsibility for their decisions than those not 
occupying such positions, given the greater consequences of these decisions. It is less frequently 
appreciated, however, that this responsibility should amplify and ramify general duties belonging 
to political representatives, not the least of which is acting in ways that harmonize with the 
general duties of their constituents. Taken together these points impugn political representation 
as it exists in many of its current incarnations and offer a foundation from which it is reasonable 
to demand better. 
 In defending a normative account of political representation I follow a trajectory that 
moves roughly from circumstances of less to more political structure. In chapter 1, I argue that 
the duties and obligations of political representatives obtain even in circumstances of minimal 
structure, and defend this claim against arguments to the contrary. I also argue, however, that 
paradigm examples of political representation include democratic procedures, and that these 
procedures provide additional justification for representative practices. In chapter 2, I show that 
greater political participation and deliberation are valuable primarily because they help to define 
and refine the interests of citizens, and participation, in particular, provides a conduit for 
transmitting these interests to representatives, who in turn are obligated to advocate for them. 
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Upon this basis I argue that, all else equal, greater participation and deliberation is desirable at all 
levels of the political process. Representatives thus have an obligation to work for more and 
better participation and deliberation. Then in chapter 3, I argue for a number of specific 
constraints upon the activity of representatives as a consequence of their general duties. I provide 
an account of how these duties owed to all persons interface with the particular obligations 
representatives owe to their constituents, and argue that the tension between partial obligations 
and impartial duties is often exaggerated. Finally in chapter 4, I explore the implications of the 
first three chapters for the international domain. I argue that, while a great deal remains to be 
done to create a responsible political order at the global level, matters would be significantly 
improved if representatives better understood and more fully met the duties and obligations 









An Argument for Representational Obligations 
 
I. Introduction 
Since Hanna Pitkin’s seminal work on representation,16 disputes have continued concerning how 
to balance obligations to enact the popular mandate (as delegate) and, when appropriate, how to 
act as an independent maker of decisions (as trustee). While much has since been written 
regarding the forms through which popular mandates might be best realized, and—though 
considerably less—about those occasions on which representatives are empowered to act 
independently of such mandates, surprisingly little has been said about the normative grounding 
of the obligations of representatives to act in any way at all. More recent work in political 
philosophy has even proffered something approaching a purely descriptive account of political 
representation, suggesting that normative aspects play a role only with regard to a decision rule 
being used: if a relevant audience in the right circumstances recognizes an individual to be a 
representative, he or she should be understood as a representative.  
 Such an approach undervalues normative dimensions that I argue are central to our best 
understanding of political representation. As I shall argue, an account that identifies 
representation with democratic legitimacy would be too narrow, yet an account that says nothing 
about obligations held by representatives both with regard to those they represent and with 
regard to the frameworks within which representation occurs remains inadequate. Considerations 
                                                 
16 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: U of California, 1967. 
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invoked in a wide, general account like Andrew Rehfeld’s17 regarding what constitutes 
representation—determining the relevant audience, specifying appropriate circumstances, and 
providing criteria for the selection of representatives—end up requiring judgments that are best 
seen as irreducibly normative after all. We can better begin to discern normative features of 
political representation by considering the role of representative and the practice of 
representation more carefully.  
 The principal aim of this chapter is to motivate the analysis of obligations I take to obtain 
in the context of political representation. Near its end I discuss two sources of obligation that will 
be further elaborated and analyzed in following chapters, but a prior task is to show that 
normative elements, including obligations and duties, are integral to a robust account of political 
representation. The complex relations between those represented and their representatives are 
thus given greater attention here than is typical in the literature on representation.18 While there 
has been a trend to minimize or ignore these normative relations, I propose that evaluating 
instances of political representation as better or worse in terms of the performance of obligations 
and duties illuminates our understanding of it far more than attempting to understand political 
representation stripped of its normative dimensions.  
 In addition, I argue for the stronger claim that normative elements are constitutive of a 
coherent and widely shared concept of political representation. Specifically, while assumptions 
relating to obligations held by representatives may not be universal or timeless, I argue that they 
are paradigmatic and thus deserve to be understood as central, rather than peripheral, to a salient 
                                                 
17 As mentioned in the introduction, and further discussed below. See Rehfeld, Andrew. "Towards a General Theory 
of Political Representation." The Journal of Politics 68.01 (2006): 1-21. Print. 
18 An exception might be, for example, the notion of “joint commitment” in Gilbert, Margaret. A Theory of Political 
Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. A substantial difference 
is that Gilbert does not take political obligations to count as moral considerations. 
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concept of representation. Finally, I make the case that what constitutes the relevant criteria for 
evaluation might shift with regard to the sort of representation under discussion, but also that 
something like an “all-things-considered” evaluation is both possible and desirable. In this vein it 
is reasonable to suppose that both democratic and non-democratic categories of representation 
should be recognized. According to the view defended here, better and worse instances of 
representation can occur within both these categories depending in part upon performance related 
to obligations and duties. Also and crucially, however, from an all-things-considered perspective, 
democratic representation has clear normative merits that are unrealizable in non-democratic 
contexts, for many familiar reasons, some of which are considered in the following chapters. 
Less frequently noted, however, is the complex set of relations between obligations, duties, 
representation, and democracy. On the one hand, the relevant notion of representative duties, 
though applicable to non-democratic instances of political representation, is significantly bound 
up with democracy. 19 On the other hand, longstanding discussions of the value of democracy are 
enhanced by considering the ways in which obligations and duties figure into its practice, as I 
argue below. 
 The chapter is organized into three parts. In part one, I examine an account of political 
representation by Andrew Rehfeld that gives a narrowly circumscribed role to normative 
considerations, outlining a few salient features that characterize this approach. 20 This account is 
defined by its author as “general” in the sense that is meant to accommodate a wide range of 
(what he takes to be) representational phenomena, including non-democratic ones. In part two, I 
                                                 
19 To telegraph: general duties (classically) are owed to all by all. Representatives have enhanced versions these 
duties given their large spheres of influence. But the nature of their duties is also informed by their roles within 
political practices, because often their most efficacious means of realizing their general duties will be through 
respecting and enhancing representative structures, including but not limited to those structures within which the 
given representative works. The goods conferred upon individuals by democracy can hardly be left out of account 
when their welfare is understood to be the subject of general duties. 
20 Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation." 1-22.  
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highlight two shortcomings of limiting appeals to normativity to the extent that Rehfeld does. 
First, I argue that the sorts of considerations he argues to be involved in deciding what 
constitutes representation—even those considerations characterized as free of normativity, such 
as determining the relevant audience, specifying appropriate circumstances, and providing 
criteria for the selection of representatives—unavoidably end up including appeals to value. 
Second, I argue that structural components of formal political representation, by which I mean 
the practice(s), practice-defined roles, and institutional rules associated with it, even while they 
vary widely, are integral to our conception of it, and are underappreciated in a general account. A 
general account of political representation, like that of Rehfeld, under-appreciates these 
structural dimensions and also gives no role for the obligations and duties of representatives. 
Without these conditions in place, and by aiming at such a wide swath of phenomena, the 
sufficiency criteria of such an account thus end up being too weak. In contrast, providing an 
account of roles relevant to political representation tightens these criteria and rules out a number 
of problematic cases.  
 Further and crucially, it is the occupation of such roles in the context of established 
practices that generates new obligations and amplifies other preexisting duties. That is, 
obligations obtain in circumstances of political representation partially as a consequence of 
justified expectations relating to widely shared understandings of the role. These obligations can, 
with appropriate qualification, be analyzed in terms of tacit agreement or a promissory context, 
as I argue shortly. Further, the kinds of power typically manifested by political representatives 
provide them with greater opportunities to uphold or fail to uphold general duties, given the large 
number of people affected by their actions within their role. 
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 In the third part of the chapter I distance the view being advocated here from two other 
distinct positions. First, I concur with Rehfeld that it is unacceptable to conclude that 
representation only occurs when strict democratic procedures are upheld. Building too many 
formal requirements into an account of representation limits its scope unnecessarily.21 With 
certain conditions met, it is reasonable to suppose that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
sometimes represent those on whose behalf they advocate. At the limit, it may also be reasonable 
to characterize the activity of celebrities intending to act on the behalf of impoverished or 
otherwise imperiled peoples as representation, though the conditions to be met for this to be so 
will be greater.22 Specifying these conditions is both difficult and important. In the case of 
NGOs, the formal recognition typically required for them to operate offers some assurance of 
their legitimacy as representative bodies. An intuitive reason for this is that, in the ideal case, an 
NGO might perform a representative function in circumstances where the democratic structures 
needed for authorization by those in need of representation are unavailable.23  
 A celebrity, on the other hand, does not represent “the impoverished peoples of Africa,” 
for example, merely by claiming to do so. Here the absence of authorization is more problematic 
because it is compounded by the lack of appropriate procedures and formal recognition. Indeed, 
as I will discuss in chapter 2, it is a commonplace for radicals to claim—dubiously—that they 
represent of some group of people when attempting to justify acts of violence. Thus to argue that 
a celebrity serves as a political representative would seem to require a convincing narrative about 
                                                 
21 Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 53-62. The 
following citations—and others not listed here—cast doubt on Rehfeld’s claim that the identification of 
representation with robust democratic procedures represents the theoretical status quo. 
22 A status claimed for Bono and, separately, Angelina Jolie, in, respectively, Dryzek, John S., and Simon Niemeyer. 
"Discursive Representation." American Political Science Review 102.04 (2008): 481, and Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The 
Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 62-3. 
23 The slogan of the legal / conservationist non-profit Earthjustice—“Because the Earth needs a good lawyer”—
though admittedly an extreme case, is suggestive in this regard. 
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that individual’s relation to the group ostensibly represented and the ways that she advocates for 
what are believably framed as their interests, perhaps in addition to other criteria. 
 Where I agree with Rehfeld, then, is in his assertion that in special cases political 
representation can operate in the absence of robust democratic procedures and the authorization 
they afford. I argue that it is a mistake, however, to take the further step of thinking that 
representation can be sufficiently analyzed with no appeal to value; to whatever extent the 
obligations of representatives are realized or fail to be realized, and however the values 
underpinning these obligations are characterized, such values and obligations remain irreducible 
elements in a viable account of political representation. Put differently, political representation as 
developed here could not obtain Feinberg’s “Nowheresville,” where rights and correlative duties 
are entirely absent; constituents paradigmatically have valid claims against their political 
representatives that the latter are obligated to fulfill.24 
 The second position from which I distinguish my own is that of “role realism”—the view 
that the role of a representative (or any other role) is somehow preordained with particular duties 
or obligations constitutive of it.25 On the contrary, the socially and culturally determined nature 
of obligations for representatives will be central to my account of them. Nonetheless, 
understanding political representation as the (voluntary) occupation of a role that in turn forms 
part of a practice sheds significant light on the nature and content of these obligations. I thus aim 
to set out an account of political representation in which values are not intrinsic to the role in a 
                                                 
24 Feinberg, Joel, and Jan Narveson. "The Nature and Value of Rights." The Journal of Value Inquiry J Value 
Inquiry 4.4 (1970): 243-60. 
25 Following Applbaum, Arthur Isak. Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999. 
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strong (preordained) sense but are inextricable from the role as a consequence of established 
practices and justified expectations.26  
 Before proceeding, it is worth setting aside one interpretation of these matters that would 
make them merely a matter of verbal dispute. If there were simply two alternative accounts of 
representation under consideration, a descriptive one that outlines criteria for political 
representation to occur, and a normative one that outlines criteria for representing well, little 
more would need to be said. On the contrary I will argue that normative commitments constitute 
an aspect of representation. If this is correct, then to describe an occurrence of political 
representation is in part to describe the normative relations in which a representative is 
enmeshed. Rehfeld introduces the example of Libya’s emissary, Najat Al-Hajjaji, being present 
at the convening of the World Trade Organization in order to suggest that, if asked who 
represented Libya on that occasion, Al-Hajjaji would be the correct answer, in spite of her not 
being elected and the unlikelihood of her having the interests of anyone other than Muammar 
Gaddafi, then in power, in mind. And similarly for Khrushchev at the United Nations (UN), who 
certainly was not democratically elected but (according the Rehfeld) was unmistakably the 
representative of the Soviet Union in those particular circumstances. 
 The potential for a kind of ambiguity arises because what counts as representation in a 
recognition-dependent theory like that provided by Rehfeld depends upon the nature of this 
recognition and how it comes about. Suppose I was naively wondering whether Vladimir Putin 
or Dmitry Medvedev had appeared before the United Nations. When I inquire who represented 
                                                 
26 I will say more about the normative weight of these expectations further along. As put to use here, they refer 
specifically to expectations attached to particular roles situated within recognized practices; they are related to the 
justified expectations of those that have been given promises, but in the case of formal political representation they 
are informed by their institutional circumstance. For instance, individual promises are personal in character, while 
political obligations, as I am characterizing them, belong to whomever occupies the position of representative. 
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Russia at last week’s UN summit, the reply Putin would be the correct answer. To the question 
does Putin represent Russia, however, it would be coherent for me to respond no. Clearly the 
first question is seeking a referent, while the second is reasonably interpreted as seeking a 
qualitative judgment. A person affirming both that Putin represented Russia last week at the 
United Nations and that Putin does not represent Russia is not confused or being inconsistent, but 
using “represent” in differing senses.  
 Consider a related example. Suppose I believe A to be the father of B on the basis of 
thorough, competent DNA testing. It might still be coherently claimed, again using the word in a 
different sense, that A is no father to B.27 Roughly speaking, the latter sense in which “father” is 
being used presupposes some threshold of obligation performance and hence something like a 
normative account of fatherhood. The present dispute would be merely verbal if a general 
account of representation invoked the first, descriptive sense, and a normative account invoked 
this latter, qualitative sense.  
 It is not clear, however, that there is an analogous “DNA test” in the case of political 
representation that might provide a similarly objective basis for determining when it occurs. It 
seems instead that the determination of who counts as political representatives involves 
judgments of a different kind than those made in the biological case. Note that it is a 
commonplace for substate groups to claim someone who is not recognized by the United Nations 
or other elite international institutions to be their representatives; and further that in many cases 
it is controversial whether such institutions are the “relevant bodies” that should be empowered 
                                                 
27 Hence Fetyokovich in his defense of Dimitri Karamazov: “Gentlemen of the jury, what is a father?...What is the 
meaning of that great word? …the murdered old Karamazov cannot be called a father and does not deserve to be…” 
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov: The Constance Garnett Translation Revised by Ralph E. Matlaw: 




to recognize (or refuse recognition of) representatives. This suggests, borrowing a familiar 
distinction, that—even prior to addressing the question of de jure representation—a de facto 
account of political representation is fraught with questions of judgment.28 
 If this is correct, it is not just that “representative” is being used in two different senses—
though this of course may be true—but that a purely descriptive sense is unavailable in the way 
that it is (perhaps) available in the scientific case. Because judgments about when representation 
takes place are significantly qualitative judgments, part of what is needed to better comprehend 
political representation is an analysis and fleshing out of the content of these qualitative 
judgments and the values that underlie them. Opposing the idea that representation occurs 
whenever an individual is taken to be or receives recognition as a representative, I argue that 
representation occurs when an individual—the representative—enters into a particular kind of 
relation with another person or persons—the represented. In the paradigmatic case, one 
(knowingly, voluntarily) occupies a role within a structural framework required for 
representation and to some minimal degree engages in the activities associated with that role. 
Obligations relating to the performance of these activities, in turn, are informed by the justified 
expectations of the represented. Below, I argue that, with other things equal, constituents are 
justified in expecting representatives to advocate for their interests. 
 Importantly, however, the required framework might vary widely in its formality, and at 
the limit might be absent altogether. If, for example, a military coup deposed a democratically 
                                                 
28 See Wolff, Robert Paul. "In Defense of Anarchism." The Journal of Philosophy 68.18 (1971): 561ff. Wolff’s 
subject, viz., political authority, is of course importantly different from political representation, and one need not 
concede his conclusions to find useful his de jure / de dicto distinction with regard to normative concepts. Whereas 
he is—safely—able to assume the normative character of authority, the role of normativity in political representation 
is central to the present debate. In certain regards my arguments mirror his structurally—being regarded as if one is 
an authority does not bestow authority, and I claim that being regarded as a political representative does not bestow 
representative status. Nonetheless, this latter position requires defending with reasons for thinking that other criteria 
obtain in the case of political representation. 
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elected leader who still had the widespread support of the people, and was nonetheless able to 
continue advocating for their interests in various ways, it might reasonably be thought that she 
remains their representative. As previously suggested, less formal instances—the activities of 
unelected NGOs and, perhaps, well-intentioned celebrities—might also rightly be thought of as 
representation, but in any case it is the relation between represented and representative that is 
definitive on this account. The right relation to relevant obligations and duties can, in principle, 
confer representative status outside a role established in a formal setting, as I will argue for 
shortly. Again, however, it must be borne in mind that democratic values inform the relevant 
obligations and duties, since representatives act not on the basis of individual wills but on the 
basis of aggregate interests and opinions. As will I argue with regard to marjoritatianism below, 
the obligations representatives owe to individuals strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
justification for democratic procedures. 
 One further aside regarding the use of the words “recognize” and “recognition” is in 
order. There is at least one sense in which the concept of recognition implies the truth of what is 
recognized, as “…expressing the fact acknowledged,”29 or when to recognize is understood as 
“…to perceive clearly, realize.”30 Note that if used in this sense, recognition of political 
representatives would after all imply their being such, as the prior fact of their being 
representatives is required for them to be so recognized. In the present context this sense of 
recognition is unavailable, however, because whether certain individuals in the contexts 
considered are representatives is precisely the question being debated. The relevant sense must 
instead be, “To acknowledge by special notice, approval or sanction; to treat as valid, as having 
                                                 
29 The (Complete) Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 3b. 
30 Ibid., 5c. 
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existence or entitled to consideration.”31 This latter sense does not presuppose factual basis in the 
same way as the others considered, but describes actions based on judgments. The distinction is 
important to the account of political representation being developed here, since interpreting 
recognition in the second way implies that the “recognized representative” is not redundant—one 
might represent yet fail to be recognized as representative, or might receive recognition for 
having such status mistakenly.  
 While I use Andrew Rehfeld’s so-called general account32 in order to focus my initial 
discussion in this chapter, my intent is to elaborate a dimension of representation he chooses not 
to explore and to emphasize (what I take to be) its centrality. The point is not that it is impossible 
to provide a non-normative account of representation33—a version of Rehfeld’s approach may 
succeed in doing so, though as the DNA analogy suggests certain difficulties arise. Rather, when 
we appreciate what such an account leaves out, we can notice aspects of representation that 
deserve much more analysis than they typically receive.34 
 
II. Non-Normative Political Representation 
In his “Towards a General Theory of Political Representation,”35 Andrew Rehfeld resists (what 
he takes to be) widespread identification of political representation with democratic legitimacy. 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 4a. 
32 Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," 1-22.  
33 To be clear, Rehfeld argues that “…political representation has a robust non-normative descriptive sense,” but 
also that “…normative judgments play a part in the recognition of political representation” because “…it is the rules 
that audiences use to recognize representatives rather than the institutions or practices of representatives themselves 
that explain why they are, or fail to be legitimate or just.” Ibid., 5. I argue that the first claim here is dubious, and 
that the second claim introduces normativity in a way that is too narrow: normative judgments are present elsewhere 
in the process where Rehfeld hopes to purge them. 
34There may be good reasons to compile statistics about twitches of the eye—a study of the evolution of facial 
musculature in primates, for example—but this will not provide us with a satisfactory theory of winking and its 
communicative goal.  
35 Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," 1-22. 
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Construed so narrowly, Rehfeld complains, “representation” would be very rare indeed, contrary 
to a wide swath of familiar usage: anyone not placed in his or her position by free and fair 
elections, through procedures embodying authorization and accountability, fails to be a 
representative at all. This leads to two grave difficulties. First, if the above identification is made, 
imbuing our concept of political representation with this highly specific normativity, the useful 
notions of bad representatives, representing poorly, and the idea of illegitimate representation all 
seem unavailable—to represent would be to represent well (legitimately) by definition: “By 
simultaneously defining conditions by which someone becomes a political representative and the 
conditions for her legitimacy we are unable to explain how…cases of illegitimate 
representation…arise.”36 Second, free and fair elections, authorization, and accountability are all 
known to be problematic concepts and are perhaps best thought of as ideals to be sought but 
unlikely to be reached, in which case—though Rehfeld does not go so far—one might worry that 
such criteria are simply never met, entailing that representation never occurs. 
 As an alternative that avoids such difficulties, Rehfeld provides an account of political 
representation according to which “…political representation arises simply by reference to a 
relevant audience accepting a person as such.”37 In this conception, a representative must come 
from a qualified set and be chosen in accordance with the decision rule of a selection agent, with 
the decision rule and selection agent being recognized as appropriate by a relevant audience.38 
This structure allows for sufficient generality to explain both familiar instances of legitimate 
                                                 
36 Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," 3. 
37 Ibid., 2. 
38 Ibid., 10. 
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democratic procedures and a monarch (the selection agent) selecting who he likes (the qualified 
set) because he likes them (the decision rule) as cases of representation.39  
 While there is clearly a great deal to unpack here, and I do not analyze Rehfeld’s 
technical account in any detail, three preliminary criticisms can be made. First, as already 
mentioned above, his characterization of the status quo as treating robust democratic procedures 
as synonymous with political representation is misleading, as a number of theorists argue that 
less formal and undemocratic forms arrangements may count as political representation.40 This 
leads to a second criticism, which is that, if one grants the wide understanding of political 
representation pressed by Rehfeld, it is not clear what makes instances of such representation 
better or worse on his account. Put differently, if legitimacy is only one measure of 
representation, we are left wanting alternative criteria for evaluating circumstances of 
illegitimate representation. Absent the provision of such criteria, it seems likely that democratic 
values (and related questions of legitimacy) sneak back in as a means to defining effective 
representation. A third criticism is that a particularly troubling sort of counterintuitive result 
emerges as a consequence of his theorizing, because on Rehfeld’s account, with these 
background conditions in place, recognition by an appropriate audience (via a selection agent) is 
sufficient to confer the status of representative.41 
 Such a wide definition of political representation avoids the untenable result that only 
idealized democratic elections can result in representation (rather than legitimate representation) 
and accommodates a broad range of apparently representative phenomena. It offers one 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 5. 
40 See n. 3 and n. 4 above. 
41 Also worth noting in Rehfeld’s own example involving the monarch is the divergence of a “selection agent” from 




explanation, for example, of how it comes to be that in the above-mentioned cases Hajjaji and 
Khrushchev find themselves in ostensibly representative contexts. It does so, however, at a high 
price. Because recognition, properly qualified, is sufficient on Rehfeld’s account, he is forced to 
concede that if a relevant audience chose a dead person as a representative, or used random 
selection as their decision rule, or a local book group was deemed the appropriate set of agents 
for selecting national leaders, “…then of course, representation would obtain.”42 Rehfeld thus 
encounters the opposite difficulty to the one faced by the theorist who identifies representation 
with democratic legitimacy: representation obtains anywhere a relevant audience recognizes 
representatives as such according to their decision rule, no matter how dubious the audience or 
whimsical the decision rule. It is worth noting a radical consequence of this account with regard 
to interests. Theorists differ over the centrality and usefulness of constituent interests in accounts 
of representation, as I discuss—ultimately defending their centrality—below. Rarely, however, 
do theorists go so far as to suggest constituent interests are simply not relevant to representation. 
The Hobbesian monarch gets a very low score by the standard of liberal democratic 
representation, but he is justified (by Hobbes) precisely in terms of his fiduciary obligation and 
capacity to promote the interests (as conceived by the monarch) of the people. Corpses do not 
occupy a position further down a continuum of responsiveness to a constituency but belong to 
another category altogether, and thus theoretical parameters that permit their inclusion should be 
seen as troubling. 
 While in Rehfeld’s account it is also possible for a relevant audience to deny the 
representative status of one it should acknowledge according to their own decision rule, or for a 
relevant audience to accept an individual to be their representative when they should not 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 12 n.22. 
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according to their own decision rule, recognition confers the status of representative nonetheless. 
By contrast, in the account I develop here, if a would-be representative does not occupy the right 
sort of role and does not perform—to some minimal, context-sensitive threshold—the activities 
informed by obligations tied to this role, she would fail to represent and in turn fail to be a 
representative, regardless of her being taken to be a representative by an audience. While I 
elaborate the point below, distinguishing this position from the “status quo” criticized by Rehfeld 
early on is crucial: rather than equating representation with robust democratic representation, I 
argue that representation has to be understood in the normative context of relations between 
representatives and those represented, and paradigmatically in the context of roles, practices, and 
attendant responsibilities.  
 Questions of legitimacy, while ultimately related to the moral demands I am focusing 
upon regarding obligations and duties, represent a significantly distinct, further set of criteria for 
evaluating representation. To oversimplify for the moment, an individual in a representative 
position who was not elected or who has arrived at this position by procedures of questionable 
legitimacy might represent, and might do so well or poorly with reference to upholding 
obligations and duties. These obligations and duties, in turn, can be understood in terms of the 
interests of the represented. These constituent interests can be better formed, understood, and 
promoted in circumstances of democratic legitimacy, where representatives are in fact 
empowered by those they represent, but representation can occur absent these desirable 
attributes, and can still manifest a range of quality and effectiveness. 
 The additional requirements relating to obligations imposed in my account thus create a 




[O]ne coherent but imprecise response to a case in which an Audience makes a mistake 
would be, “That person should be considered a representative,” or “That person is no 
representative at all.” The reason such a statement is coherent is because we understand 
colloquially what the claim means. But it is imprecise because, consistent with this 
account there is no representation so long as the audience fails to recognize that a case 
conforms to its rules. Representation depends formally on the recognition by an audience, 
not on the coherence (or lack of coherence) of a purported case to a set of rules that the 
audience uses. In short, it is the beliefs of the Audience that matter, not whether those 
beliefs are true.43 
 The obverse entailment is also true for Rehfeld as we have seen, viz., that representation 
just does obtain when an audience recognizes that a case conforms to its rules—and even if they 
are mistaken in the belief that it does, their (mistaken) recognition is sufficient: the imposter is a 
representative (and no longer an imposter?) if the relevant audience takes her to be so. 
 It is easy to admire the parsimony and wide applicability of a general account like the one 
being examined, as avoiding normative analysis saves one from a great deal of additional 
complexity.44 Obligations are notoriously controversial and difficult to specify, and talk of 
obligation performance thresholds inevitably introduces a degree of imprecision. For all these 
difficulties, a fuller understanding of political representation requires that we address just such 
challenges, as I hope to now show. 
 
III. Problems with Non-Normative Political Representation 
Three things are problematic in the general account as described. First, it ushers in what I call the 
fallibility problem: if—even qualified—recognition were sufficient, it would entail that a 
relevant audience cannot be mistaken about whether an individual is a representative or not. 
Second, there is insufficient acknowledgment of background conditions required for 
                                                 
43 Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," 15. Emphasis original. 
44 Rehfeld concludes by arguing that there is, after all, a normative or “substantive” dimension to political 
representation, but that this is entirely independent from the “formal” dimension. I argue that this separation cannot 
be made as completely as his account requires. 
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representation to occur—a structural problem. By viewing political representation as a role 
exercised within sets of established practices, my alternative account characterizes and 
emphasizes the context required for representation to be possible. Third and finally, on 
examination this role and the set of practices within which it is situated show themselves to be 
steeped in normativity. To the extent that political representatives act on behalf of others (and are 
very often assumed to do so), and to the extent that their decisions and actions have an outsized 
effect on the lives of the many, they wield a kind of super-agency that carries elevated 
responsibility and moral obligations. I take up each of these three problems in in turn. 
 
1. THE FALLIBILITY PROBLEM 
Consider two cases of mistaken beliefs, the first bearing upon the fallibility problem, the second 
raising questions about relevant audiences and their selection agents. In the first, suppose fellow 
legislators (collectively a selection agent) mistakenly acknowledge a disoriented banker who has 
wandered into their chambers as one of their own and hence as a representative. It is perhaps 
possible that, if undiscovered, the banker will eventually “fall into the role.” At such time, the 
obligations and offices required of him or her will obtain, and with a certain threshold of these 
performed and other conditions met it may become appropriate to deem her a representative. On 
the first day, however, the mistaken beliefs of the other legislators would be a strange ground for 
deeming her such. Further, if the delusional banker continued to balance accounts and do 
banking tasks but engaged in none of the activities associated with the role of legislator, and her 
colleagues somehow remained oblivious to these facts, their (still mistaken) beliefs should not be 
seen as conferring the status of representative. That is, the bankers should be seen as fallible. 
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 To be clear, I mean to say that the other legislators are—ex hypothesi—mistaken in their 
beliefs about the origins and activities of the person in question—not to directly claim that they 
are mistaken in believing the banker to be a representative. This is, of course, just the conclusion 
for which I am arguing, but to claim this directly would be to beg the question against Rehfeld or 
others who just do take the legislators’ belief—assuming them to be the selection agent in 
question, and their belief to be based on their decision rule—to confer representative status. The 
fallibility problem suggests, however, that something has gone wrong in a general account 
because it implies that no kind or magnitude of factual error could imply that an audience (or 
their selection agent, in this case the other legislators) is mistaken about who is a representative 
or whether one is a representative if they follow their decision rule. This condition met, the 
question of whether some individual is a representative is one about which they cannot be wrong. 
As already suggested in the discussion of the corpse, however, this view seems untenable. 
It will be useful to compare this case with others in which institutional facts, as defined by 
Searle, play a role.45 For Searle, when there is sufficient collective agreement to uphold an 
institution, facts manifested within that institution become equivalent to brute facts: saying “I 
do” when prompted by an ordained minister in a particular context changes one from a single to 
a married person. Despite the fact that the individual in question became married through an 
institutional practice, that he or she is married constitutes a brute fact in the world. Searle’s 
related distinction between epistemological objectivity and ontological objectivity is useful to 
my current purposes: certain pieces of paper come to count as money on the basis of a critical 
mass of subjective agreement that it counts as such, making it epistemologically objective. It 
                                                 
45 Searle, John R. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge UP, 1969. 
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remains ontologically subjective, however, for in the absence of the institution, money is only 
pieces of paper after all.46  
 Applying this reasoning to representatives, when such status is attained it, too, is a matter 
of epistemological objectivity. That is, the institutional fact and its underlying concept or 
concepts of political representation are constituted by the collective judgments of people. 
Although it is true that paradigm cases of political representation take place within certain 
structures and established institutions, what makes these paradigm cases is once again a set of 
social and institutional facts.47 Thus a person meeting the criteria of such a concept counts as a 
representative, regardless of any one person’s denying it. What this leaves open is the content of 
the concept;48 if there were sufficient collective agreement that any institution of representation 
includes advocating for the interests of those represented, for example, then this would be 
epistemologically objective. It would follow that it is an institutional fact that to be a 
representative is to advocate for the interests of constituents. Of course, to make such a case 
soundly would require a highly impractical empirical investigation of beliefs and judgments 
surrounding the concept(s) of representation, specifying the degree of collective agreement 
required for the existence of a stable concept, and so on. For the moment we must be contented 
with the observation that those deemed political representatives frequently come in for 
criticism—across widely disparate spatiotemporal circumstances—for failing to advocate for the 
interests of those supposedly represented. 
 A related argument from Searle helps to cast further doubt upon the view that recognition 
is sufficient to make one a representative. Here, Searle makes a crucial distinction between types 
                                                 
46 Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free, 1995, 7-13. 
47 I discuss the importance of established (institutional) practices and the roles they designate below. 
48 I am using “concepts” here as mental representations, roughly in their “prototype” sense. See Prinz, Jesse J. "Can 
Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31.1 (2007): 271-91. 
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and tokens as they relate to institutional facts, and this distinction bears directly upon what I am 
calling the fallibility problem:  
A single dollar bill might fall from the printing presses into the cracks of the floor and 
never be used or thought of as money at all…In such a case a particular token instance 
would be money, even though no one ever thought it was money or thought about it or 
used it at all. Similarly, there might be a counterfeit bill in circulation even if no one ever 
knew that is was counterfeit, not even the counterfeiter. In such a case everyone who 
used that particular token would think it was money even though it was not in fact money. 
About particular tokens it is possible for people to be systematically mistaken. But where 
the type of thing is concerned, the belief that the type is a type of money is constitutive of 
its being money…49 
 The same logic can be applied, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the practices or 
institutions of political representation, on the one hand, and token political representatives on the 
other. The imposter (banker) in my above example remains a “counterfeit” in spite of the 
recognition he is afforded by fellow legislators or by anyone else for that matter. Conversely, if 
an individual meets the conceptual criteria of “representative” to some sufficient degree—
acknowledging that this set of criteria is itself socially constructed just as it is in the case of 
money—he or she will be a representative even if disdained or doubted by her peers. Note that a 
univocal notion of representation is not implied here and is not required for my argument, any 
more than a single form of money is required for the institution(s) of money: the monetary 
system of Yapese people involves large wheel-like stones that gain value relative to how far they 
have traveled, but the same analysis vis-à-vis counterfeits and genuine articles can be applied. 
 This analysis of concepts is central to my overall argument in this chapter, and it points to 
an important difficulty in Rehfeld’s account: while in certain circumstances a selection agent 
does have the power to anoint individuals with one kind of status—the other legislators might 
put the banker on the payroll, give her a desk and a title, etc.—they do not have the power to 
                                                 
49 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 32-3. My emphasis. 
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determine concepts. They are in a position analogous to the selection committee for an orchestra 
that chooses an individual with no interest in music and who has never played an instrument to 
lead the string section: first chair violin she may be, but a musician she is not. We might yet 
countenance the claim that there is no one “covering concept” of representation that will 
satisfactorily account for the wide variability of the phenomena of representation and that instead 
there are many concepts of representation.50 It would seem strange, however, were there not 
some shared content—some family resemblance—across these concepts, as I take it there would 
be if we choose to countenance differing concepts of “money” or “musician.” I am arguing that 
in the case of political representation obligatory relations between representatives and those 
represented constitute some of this core content. 
 As a second case of mistaken belief, suppose that a group of subjects forming a remote 
constituency is simply uninformed. Dwelling in rural stretches of a large country with little 
infrastructure, they have not heard of the recent political shifts in their country and believe that 
the premier who was impeached a year earlier is still in power and hence their legitimate 
representative. It would be strange to consider the impeached premier still a representative based 
on the beliefs of a constituency, if she is no longer engaged in the activity of representing them 
and no longer formally recognized as a representative. Note that in this instance the defender of a 
general account of political representation like Rehfeld’s should come to the same conclusion: 
the formal institutions with the power to elect or appoint the premier constitute the selection 
agent whose recognition is sufficient for her to be a representative, so impeachment implies an 
end to this recognition tantamount to a withdrawal of status. Members of the constituency (the 
audience) are indeed wrong about who their representative is, but it is not their beliefs that 
                                                 
50 Rehfeld, Andrew. "The Concepts of Representation." American Political Science Review 105.03 (2011): 631-41. 
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matter, as the selection agent (those with powers of impeachment) is distinct from the 
constituency.  
 Disagreement arises because a general account takes the fact of official withdrawal of 
representational status to be doing all the work, while in a normative account the cessation of the 
activity of representing—understood to include advocating for the interests of constituents—is 
also relevant. Put differently, the formal and substantive dimensions of political representation 
are conceptualized as independent of one another in a general account like that of Rehfeld. The 
mechanisms and procedures that place a person in office, for example, are one thing, the interests 
of those within the domain of that office are something else. Normatively viewed, certain roles 
are inextricably associated with the interests of those with whom they are related as a function of 
occupying those roles. The point, again, is not that a thin description could not be given—the 
water-averse son of a wealthy resort owner might be given the position of lifeguard—but that 
there are reasons for thinking that the substantive aspects of the role are significantly constitutive 
of it.51 
 In principle, if rarely in practice, a representative might remain a representative in a 
normative account, even if impeached or otherwise removed from office by the relevant 
institutional powers, as interest advocacy is partially constitutive on this view. I take the 
previously mentioned example where a democratically elected leader is deposed by a military 
coup to be one such case.52 More frequently, an individual recognized by such institutions can 
yet fail to qualify as a representative based on her (inadequate or misguided) activity—as I 
                                                 
51 Lifeguards are an intriguing case for considering tacitly understood obligations. Having signed no contracts and 
taken no oaths they are frequently left to guard the lives of children whose parents leave them in the lifeguard’s care. 
52 Interest advocacy is necessary—as the primary way of fulfilling a representative’s obligation to constituents—but 
not sufficient to make one a political representative on this account. The previously mentioned problems with a 
celebrity who claims to represent offers one explanation of why this is so. Further, a case can be imagined where an 




argued to be the case with regard to the disoriented banker, and, a fortiori, the dead person. At 
this point, it might seem appropriate to wonder what really turns on whether an individual 
qualifies as a representative or not. As I explain next, the nature of the relationship between 
representative and constituency is entirely different in a general account such as Rehfeld’s—
again understood here as a wide account wherein recognition is sufficient—from a normative 
account. It follows that the attribution of the title of political representative in these differing 
theoretical approaches has profoundly different implications for both peoples and nations 
affected by representational activity. 
 Recall as a point of agreement with Rehfeld that the requirement of authorization—
understood in one sense—by those being represented is too strong a condition: strict, i.e., 
explicit, individual authorization is not necessary, as it is possible for me to be represented in 
many scenarios where this is absent.53 Nor is authorization sufficient, both on my account, 
because I may authorize an inappropriate entity (an impeached—and thus inactive—premier, or 
a long dead tribal ancestor, for example),54 and on Rehfeld’s account, because the selection agent 
that confers the status of representative need not be the constituency (the “selection agent” being 
the body, should there be any, that can give such authorization).  
 A difficulty here is that there are two relevant senses of “authorization” that, if run 
together, confuse matters. The sense just appealed to refers to explicit authorization, which can 
be brought about only via certain kinds of procedures and my active participation in them. In 
addition to the reasons given above for thinking this understanding of authorization is too strong 
                                                 
53 Again, depending upon how authorization is taken, persons not of legal age to vote, those oblivious to politics 
who did not vote, and minority voters whose candidate or proposal did not win the day might be seen in this light. 
Appeal to democratic procedures, of course, can obviate at least some of these difficulties, though I maintain such 
procedures would not be sufficient without the substantive elements for which I am arguing also being in place. 
54 The trouble with the dead as political representatives on this account is specifically that they are (I take it) not able 
to uphold the obligation of actively advocating for the interests of those they represent. Specifying the “qualified 
set” from which representatives might be chosen is guided by such considerations but is by no means trivial.  
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a condition, note that it arguably rules out the possibility of familiar democratic procedures like 
majority voting. For all the well-known difficulties of such procedures, the dominant (and, I 
believe, correct) view is that in many familiar contexts they approximate the conditions for 
legitimate representation—perhaps with other qualifications in place—as nearly as possible. 
Those whose candidate of choice lost the election would necessarily lack representation if 
authorization in this explicit sense were required, but this seems mistaken.55 
 A second sense of authorization removes the requirement of explicitness but still 
“…involves recognizing that representatives have no original or autonomous power or right to 
make decisions for those whom they represent.”56 As representatives do not inhabit their roles by 
divine right, many of their activities in those roles require justification by other means—the null 
hypothesis being that competent adults ought never to have decisions made for them, unless 
compelling reasons for doing so are given.57 As Gould continues, “…their very nature as 
representatives requires that they be authorized in some way to act in this capacity.”58 
Understood in this sense, authorization is required after all. But note that this remains consistent 
with the characterization above: I might be represented without knowing it, ruling out the 
possibility that I explicitly authorized a representative to serve my case, but only if the 
representative in question is justified in acting on my behalf. If this justification is not garnered 
by (explicit) authorization from me, it might still be had by conforming to the moral 
requirements of the role in question and meeting relevant obligations and duties.  
 Part of what is at issue here is the difficult relation between individual constituents and 
those aspects of political representation that are necessarily aggregative. A constitutionally 
                                                 
55 I develop these considerations further shortly. 
56 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, 224.  




provided structure and the democratic procedures it specifies authorize representation of the 
aggregate (i.e., a constituency) in the paradigm case. Because of the need for aggregation, 
democratic theory typically does not and could not require individual, explicit authorization of 
representatives. As I elaborate below, however, when these structures are unavailable or fall 
significantly short of the ideal case, there may be reason to believe that some individuals are 
insufficiently regarded by them. In such a case, even if one accepts majoritarianism, there may 
be reason to doubt that the structures and procedures authorize representation for those 
individuals. I propose that upholding obligations and duties pertaining to representatives obviates 
this difficulty. By focusing upon these moral demands and hence a more personal aspect of the 
relation between a constituent and her representative, the representative might better realize what 
is owed to individuals, in addition to what is owed to the aggregate. Oversimplifying, of course it 
is important that the person for whom I did not vote, but who nonetheless won the election did so 
through proper democratic procedures. My greater individual consolation derives not from these 
procedures, however, but from the belief that the elected representative will appropriately 
advocate for my interests, as her new role obliges her to do. It is this belief, rather than a belief 
that the majority chose correctly, that suggests she is still authorized to act on my behalf. 
 A staunch advocate of the mandate conception of political representation—one 
theoretically inclined to the far mandate-end of the mandate-independence spectrum—might be 
dubious about my use of “authorization” here, equating it (its non-explicit sense) as I do to the 
kind of justification incumbent upon political representatives. But note that the ideal of explicit 
authorization is often not to be had. Even adamant mandate theorists acknowledge occasions of 
appropriate trusteeship on the part of political representatives, if only because of the extreme 
impracticality of alternative arrangements. More frequently, it is a commonplace of political 
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theory that, in addition to matters of practicality, the relevant knowledge base and wherewithal 
possessed by a political representative justify their making certain decisions on behalf of their 
constituents, including, occasionally, those that overrule the expressed wishes of a constituency. 
 From the point that authorization is required for representation, then, conjoined with the 
acknowledgment of circumstances where explicit authorization is lacking or simply unavailable, 
it follows that such authorization can derive from elsewhere. My suggestion is that in some cases 
such authorization can be realized when representatives shoulder relevant obligations and duties 
and perform them to some reasonable threshold, understanding themselves to act on the behalf of 
those they represent. It will rightly be worried that this explanation invokes something like 
indirect or tacit authorization; democratic procedures are imperfect, but they offer some support 
for the notion that representatives are authorized to act on the behalf of constituents. Absent 
these procedures, the above-discussed “celebrity problem” recurs, leading us to ask who gives 
them such authorization.  
 On the other hand, however, it is unlikely that the common person views herself as 
having authorized a set of constitutionally enshrined procedures and whatever outcome they 
produce. She is instead likely to believe, in the best case, that her political representative is 
authorized to act on her behalf because the representative has the right sorts of regard for her 
interests. If this is so, even within the context of democratic procedures, cases of trusteeship and 
cases where one’s preferred candidate is not elected countenance one kind of tacit authorization. 
My view, then, is there are special cases where authorization can obtain in the absence of these 
procedures.  
 Before moving onward, a word about the relation between substance and (democratic) 
procedure is in order. Democratic theorists will worry that I have already followed Rehfeld too 
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far down a dark path in attempting to provide an account of representation that is equally as 
broad—or nearly so—as his, while at the same time being substantively normative and 
abandoning all consideration of procedures along the way. A distinction should thus be made 
between democratic and non-democratic representation, with the former being a narrower 
category than the latter. My main separation from Rehfeld, to briefly reiterate, is that he achieves 
a very wide definition of political representation only at the cost of countenancing minimal 
normative features—in the context of either democratic or non-democratic representation. I 
instead argue that even in a non-democratic context, obligations and duties obtain if 
representation obtains.59  
 Despite my focus upon establishing this lower boundary, nothing stated thus far should 
be taken to diminish the normative contribution to political representation made by a 
constitutional structure enshrining democratic procedures. Even noting the preceding concerns, 
elected officials in this context have, at the very least, a greater claim to legitimately represent 
citizens who do not vote for them, for example. This is because, for all its difficulties, majority 
democratic voting instantiates fairness in a way that no other system appears able to do, as soon 
as it is acknowledged that any process of aggregation requires compromise. Further, the 
deliberative aspect enabled by democratic procedures refines the interests of constituents, 
including the interests of those for whom the vote did not turn out as they would have liked. I 
defend these claims and take up deeper questions regarding majoritarianism, specifically, and 
challenges associated with it in the following chapter. Here it will suffice to say that while I have 
so far been at pains to show there is a role for robust normative analysis even when the beneficial 
                                                 
59 The quality of performance of these obligations and duties are, again, another matter. I emphasize that I am not 
arguing for the biconditional relation between representation and obligations here. Obligations and duties are 
necessary to political representation, in the sense that the former obtain whenever the latter exists. That obligations 
and duties obtain is not sufficient for political representation without other conditions met. 
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additions of democratic procedures are largely absent, the benefits conferred by these procedures 
are hardly to be ignored or underestimated; future chapters both rely upon and elaborate these 
benefits. Further, there is reason to think that even removed from a context of democratic 
procedures, the relevant obligations and duties are in some ways parasitic upon the way these 
notions are framed in a democratic context. How else might the “interests of a constituency” be 
framed in any detail—beyond avoiding merciless exploitation, for example—if not by one kind 
or another of appeal to democratic theory? I will argue, however, that part of what gives 
democratic authorization the authority it has is the moral relation it establishes between 
represented and representative. I thus argue that the importance of a representative’s obligations 
and duties remains undiminished in democratic contexts. 
 A challenge for Rehfeld’s account considering the foregoing is that with no clear and 
necessary role for the interests of constituents whatsoever, and with no appeal to the obligations 
of political representatives, and in the absence of any procedural requirements, no constraints 
upon the activity of an ostensible representative remain. This absence of constraints is in large 
part why, in such a general account of political representation, representation can obtain despite a 
radical disconnect between those (supposedly) represented and their (supposed) representative. If 
a formal venue treats the brutal dictator or his emissary as a representative of a given nation, then 
representative he is. By contrast, in a normative account of political representation, the 
conceptual connection between those represented and their representative is maintained—even in 
the absence of (explicit) authorization, and even in the absence of formal recognition—because 
of obligations owed the former by the latter. A distinction between “formal” and “substantive” 
dimensions of political representation is thus not as easily made out as suggested by a general 
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account: it is a formal aspect of political representation that representatives are enmeshed in 
substantive (obligatory) relations with those represented.60 
 The problem with conceiving of the dead or severely delusional as political 
representatives, according to my account, should also now be clear. It is not because they fail to 
advocate for constituent interests to a sufficient degree, but because they are not the sorts of 
entities capable of regarding such interests at all. If the role of political representative is partially 
constituted by its relation to the interests of constituents, claiming such an entity to be a political 
representative amounts to a category mistake.61 This leaves open a wide range of what we have 
reason to think counts as political representation, as there is no doubt some vagueness 
surrounding the category, but also, and importantly, there are cases in which political 
representation could not obtain.  
 Thus, in the above example of a rural population cut off from the realities of political 
representation in their country, we might with good reason worry about how and to what extent 
the interests of these people can be known and hence regarded and for related reasons the degree 
to which they are represented. Before I address these concerns, however, the point is that there is 
a minimalist sense in which political representation obtains if the interests of constituents—even 
                                                 
60 Rehfeld writes: “The acknowledgment that representation will always admit degree—that we can say John was a 
bad representative relative to some goal and using some normative standard—is a separate matter from specifying 
the particular goal or standard that he will have to uphold. These standards are not part of the formal concept of 
representation, any more than ‘going really fast’ is part of the formal concept of ‘automobile’ ” (Ibid., 18. Emphasis 
original). Leaving aside precisely how we are to take “formal concepts,” it is part of a very widely shared concept of 
“automobile” that it does not travel across the surface of water of varying depths, powered by suspended squares of 
canvas catching the wind. It can be debated whether advocating for the interests of constituents with regard to the 
conceptual content of “political representation” is more like “going really fast” or “not being a sailboat” with regard 
to the conceptual content of “automobile,” but merely giving an example of a poor candidate for the content of a 
concept does not show that there is no conceptual content. 
61 Perhaps there is an abstract sense in which the symbol of Lincoln, for example, serves the interests of an 
American constituency and their upholding of certain ideals, and thus might be claimed to ‘represent’ them in this 
way. My inclusion of minimal relevant activity in the criteria of the role of political representative is intended to rule 
out such a case as counting as political representation, but it is noteworthy that this abstract explanation would seem 
more tenable to me than leaving it merely that Lincoln is a political representative of some constituency because a 
selection agent has recognized him as such. 
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little known or ill defined—figure into the reasons for acting of those tasked with representing 
them. The understanding is minimalist but more robust than a general account, for it prefigures 
obligations and regard for the interests of constituents as constitutive of political representation, 
even if many details remain in the working out of how interests are eventually individuated and 
characterized. The account given so far is thus intended merely as a preliminary step away from 
political representation understood as entirely separable from interests and obligations. 
 As I will explain in chapters 2 and 3, the precise nature of the obligations that 
representatives owe to their constituents is complex and requires careful elaboration. Here I leave 
it that these obligations are best seen as composite and as a hybrid of obligations and duties as 
traditionally conceived. The occupation of certain roles entails a lesser species of promissory 
obligation but does not limit—and indeed amplifies—general duties that do not apply to a 
particular set of persons in the way that promissory relations are typically taken to be. 
 It will be noted that I have thus far said almost nothing about the interests of constituents, 
how these are to be conceptualized, or the nature of the relationship a political representative 
bears them. A more detailed analysis of interests will emerge in the following chapters through 
an examination of participation, deliberation, impartiality, and partial obligations, but the 
following considerations are relevant here. Capable theorists have dismissed interests as a useful 
description of the content of political representation for at least two reasons. First, the notion of 
“interests” is ambiguous. Do they refer to what a constituency wants, to what would count as 
justifiable claims made by a constituency, to what would result in greater pleasure for a 
constituency, or to something else?62 Second, there is a problem “…identifying who is and 
                                                 
62 Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 69. See 
Barry, Brian M. Political Argument. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990. 
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should be represented by a particular representative.”63 Both sets of criteria—how interests are 
framed, and what constituency or constituencies belong to a given representative—set up 
possible conflicts. In the first case, what constituents want might conflict with what will result in 
their greatest happiness, for example; in the second case, allegiance owed to community or party 
interest might conflict with allegiance owed to national interest.64 
 Two brief points can be made in response to these indictments of interests framed as the 
content of political representation. The first is that the kinds of difficulties mentioned above and 
suggested by Brian Barry65 and reiterated by Suzanne Dovi recur not only elsewhere in politics 
but in life generally. The process of wrestling with conflicting directives given by untutored 
desires, a goal of long-term welfare, and an aspiration for (some form of) moral rectitude is 
surely central to human endeavors. The point is that the presence of such conflict does not place 
“interests” in any worse stead than many other concepts related to the goals and welfare of 
persons. Dovi is partially right to complain that interests offer little straightforward objective 
criteria by which to evaluate representatives.66 According to the account being developed here, 
however, this is evidence for the demanding nature of political representation, not for the claim 
that interests are not relevant to its evaluation. Interests, especially of a large pluralist collective, 
are dizzyingly complex and frustratingly protean. Still, as I shall argue next, it does not follow 
that interests are inaccessible altogether, or that there is little hope in framing interests in a 
meaningful way, as an account like Dovi’s suggests. 
 Cases where representatives have failed miserably to promote the interests of constituents 
can be pointed to with some confidence, an observation that blunts arguments to the effect that 
                                                 
63 Dovi, Ibid., 70. 
64 Dovi, Ibid., 70. 
65 Barry, Political Argument. London: Harvester.  
66 Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 70-1. 
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interests can offer no guidance for evaluating representation. Examples of such failure are 
enhanced when there is also a democratic mandate for change that would almost certainly 
promote constituent interests. The lack of gun law reform in the US in spite of broad public 
support for such measures stands as a case in point. Indeed, this particular case might reasonably 
be thought to illustrate that what a constituency wants, what would be a justifiable claim, and 
what would promote their happiness can sometimes harmonize. Even if one grants the ambiguity 
of interests Barry points to, then, the differing interpretations will not necessarily conflict.  
 Rather than describing interests as ambiguous, however, I suggest that they are manifold. 
The wants, justifiable claims, and bids to promote happiness, inter alia, of a constituency are as 
easily described as distinct categories of interests, rather than differing interpretations of an 
ambiguous term. To be sure, such interests can conflict; constituents want to live large carbon-
footprint lifestyles, but will ultimately be happier with a livable environment for themselves and 
their children. When such conflicts arise, it falls to political representatives to prioritize interests 
and to advocate for whichever is then deemed most important on the basis of their mandate from 
constituents, their judgment, and all available wisdom. The task described is difficult, but 
nothing considered here suggests that interests are somehow incoherent, or that they are not a 
reasonable candidate for the content of political representation. I thus take it that specifying 
interests is both possible and important. 
 The second point to be made defending the role of interests is one that Hanna Pitkin has 
explicitly addressed in ways that, 50 years on, still seems clear and reasonable: it is true that 
there will be conflicts among what she calls initial-interest-claims, which should not be ignored. 
But working out the tensions among these conflicting claims, while acknowledging the necessity 
of compromise, is emblematic of politics at every level. In Pitkin’s words, “Politics entails the 
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reconciliation of conflicting claims, each usually with some justice on its side; the harmony of 
final-objective-interests must be created.”67 I take up the subject of conflicting interests with 
regard to domestic and international concerns, and the possibility of creating solutions to these 
conflicts in more detail in chapter 3. 
 
2. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional contexts within which political representation typically occurs are integral to it, 
and one aspect of obligation pertaining to political representatives substantially derives from the 
existence of such institutions. While I have argued that theoretical space should be available for 
political representation to occur without this structure, institutionally realized political 
representation stands as the paradigm. In what follows I will argue that this paradigmatic quality 
justifies the expectations constituents tend to have with regard to the performance of those 
occupying roles within political institutions. The character and sophistication of political 
institutions vary widely, but a minimal framework will typically include the represented, the 
representative(s), and a body that designates the representative(s)—dubbed the selection agent in 
the general account above. The familiarity of such a minimal framework, the relative stability of 
a notion of such frameworks, and the sorts of expectations frequently associated with them are 
all relevant to a normative understanding of political representation. There is a strong case to be 
made for obligations that in part derive from the justified expectations of those represented—and 
these expectations, in turn, being justified by the defined roles and particular sorts of (sometimes 
tacit) agreements, including promises understood in a certain way.  
                                                 
67 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 218. Emphasis original. 
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 Analyses of obligations tend to treat conventionalist approaches68—those appealing to 
systems of rules and practices for their grounding—and expectationist approaches69—those 
appealing to engendered expectations for their grounding—as distinct or even opposed to one 
another. In the domain of political representation, both components are present and bear a 
complex interrelationship. This is because the kinds of justified expectations citizens have of 
their political representative are (often) partially consequent to the existence of structured 
political institutions embodying rule-governed practices. While there is much to an expectationist 
account of obligations beyond the scope of my arguments here, I consider below what is likely 
the principal expectationist case as a source of obligations.  
 The expectationist theory of T.M. Scanlon, while not related directly to political 
representation by him, is highly suggestive. He considers promissory obligations to be “[O]ne 
special case of a wider category of duties and obligations regarding the expectations that we lead 
others to form about what we intend to do. These duties are in turn a special case of more general 
duties not to lie or to mislead people in other ways.”70 To break a promise on this account is to 
engage in a special kind of deception, viz. to deny someone access to knowledge by one’s 
actions. Because a (credible) promise made provides the one given a promise with action-guiding 
knowledge about the future, to break the promise undermines his or her agency.71 In what 
follows, I argue that political representatives very often have a species of such promissory 
obligations. 
                                                 
68 As perhaps best exemplified by Rawls: Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard 
UP, 1971. 
69 Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 1998, is a seminal 
example. 
70 Scanlon, Ibid., 295. 
71 Ibid.  
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 Perhaps the most direct and familiar way obligations are incurred by representatives is 
through oaths of office. If oaths are interpreted as a species of promises, and so long as the oath 
is made voluntarily,72 the moral demands outlined by Scanlon above should obtain for political 
representatives who have given them.73 Importantly, however, while to take an oath is sufficient 
to impose the relevant obligations and duties, doing so is not necessary for these moral demands 
to obtain. To make this case, I will argue that particular roles within defined practices impose 
obligations upon those who voluntarily inhabit them. Many instances of political representation 
can be viewed as part of a practice, with roles, rules, and relevant expectations attached to them. 
 A first step in this argument is to characterize a practice in the relevant sense, and to 
show that political representation fits this description. The establishment of a practice—baseball 
or law, for example—creates the possibility of particular acts or moves that are not possible in 
the absence of the practice. As Rawls observed, one cannot “strike out” absent the conventions 
of baseball or be “found in contempt” in the absence of structured legal practice. In this sense 
“…the rules of practices are logically prior to the particular cases.”74 Democratic representation 
in particular fits this mold, because it creates the possibility of formal authorization that could 
not obtain in its absence, as previously discussed. 
                                                 
72 A useful contrast can be drawn here with political obligation as traditionally understood. While any notion of 
voluntary action is complex, the circumstances of occupying a representative role differ significantly from the 
circumstances of other (mere) citizens and the dubious freedoms required for their genuine consent. See Simmons, 
A. John. Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2001; 
Pateman, Carole. The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory. Chichester: Wiley, 
1979. 
73 It is, of course, far from trivial how even explicit promises generate obligations. I take the broad literature with its 
various approaches to justifying promissory obligations as evidence that they align with some of our deepest and 
most widely shared moral intuitions and rely upon this as a point of departure, lacking space to further explore these 
issues. See Scanlon, T.M., 1990, “Promises and Practices”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(3): 199–226; Raz, 
Joseph, 1977, “Promises and Obligations”, in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society: 
Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford: Clarendon press, pp. 210–228. For a thorough survey, see Vitek, 
William. Promising. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1993. 
74 John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-22. My explanation of roles and 
practices owes a significant debt to Applbaum, Arthur Isak. Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public 
and Professional Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999, esp. 82-109. 
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 Now, although I have argued that, in special cases, political representation can take place 
outside a structured (democratic) practice, the establishment of a practice also creates the 
possibility of roles that could not exist in its absence, so that there could be no lawyers absent a 
system of law, or senators absent a larger political structure, for example. Roles, in turn, can be 
understood as “…positions with some degree of regularity and durability, and where there are 
collective expectations, however informal or contested, about the content of the position’s duties, 
values, and virtues.”75 Two significant consequences emerge from the existence of roles and 
practices thus characterized. The first, already noted, is that the expectations of a role are largely 
determined by the practice. As Rawls argues, the batter in a game of baseball who sincerely 
demands a fourth strike is no longer playing baseball, given that what counts as baseball and a 
batter’s role within it are (largely) settled. I have suggested and offer more evidence below for 
the claim that, there are analogous parameters for what should be counted as political 
representation, though they will inevitably be looser. The second consequence of a practice and 
roles thus understood is a kind of predictability that serves as a basis for reasonable expectations. 
Keeping to the sports analogy, the pitcher develops a carefully considered strategy based on the 
assumption of three strikes resulting in an out. Were it in the power of the batter to alter this rule 
and demand a fourth strike, the pitcher’s capacity for such strategizing would be eliminated, or at 
the very least require major reformulation.76  
 If one accepts the above descriptions, when one becomes a political representative in the 
paradigm case, it is reasonable to suppose that she occupies a particular role within a practice. In 
                                                 
75 Applbaum, Arthur Isak. Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 1999, 47. 
76 The same would be true for base-runners, particularly in the circumstances of trying to steal a base; for fielders, 
given that the likelihood of being “walked” as opposed to struck out has statistically increased; for coaches 
instructing both batters and pitchers in the context of the changed odds; for scouts seeking a slightly modified skill-
set in promising players; and so on. The point is that the number of expectations held and their import in institutional 
practices are very great indeed. 
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this case, however, her decisions and the predictability (or unpredictability) of her actions have 
profound effects for the welfare of those she represents. Further, and for reasons already alluded 
to, among the expectations constituents are justified in having is that their interests will be 
advocated for by whoever occupies the role of political representative. To clarify, constituents 
are not (all) fools, and will be aware of the possibility of self-serving or simply ineffectual 
political representatives. That such shortcomings are widely taken to be grounds for complaint, 
however, suggests that presupposed standards for representatives are a commonplace—a theme I 
return to in the second chapter. 
 Recalling Searle’s argument that institutional facts endure in virtue of their ongoing 
collective acceptance,77 the relatively wide consensus that representatives ought to competently 
advocate for the interests of those they represent counts as evidence that they have such an 
obligation. To make this claim less abstract, consider again the role of a lifeguard at a public 
swimming pool. Having received no oaths or contracts from the lifeguard, millions of parents 
leave their children in a lifeguard’s care. This act is only explicable because of a widely shared 
belief that the person wearing a red shirt poolside will fulfill the obligations of her role. 
Considering what a violation of this tacit agreement would amount to—suppose the lifeguard got 
drunk and fell asleep, for example—is also instructive. A would-be representative, aware that 
specific obligations obtain for the role she contemplates inhabiting, will be typically be quite 
familiar with the sorts of social expectations that will be upon her in this position. She might in 
turn be thought to enter into a tacit agreement—making something like a promise—to those she 
will represent by voluntarily taking on the role. The suggestion being made is that, within certain 
                                                 
77 See Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life, 87. 
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parameters, political representation often has a promissory character as a consequence of 
collective acceptance that it does.78  
 At last we return to Gaddafi’s minion, Al-Hajjaji, and can ask what to make of Rehfeld’s 
claim that she counts as a representative of Libya based upon her recognition by the United 
Nations. According to the account given above, if she were indeed a representative, it would not 
be because, or not only because, she is so recognized by a selection agent, but because she 
occupies a role within a rule-governed practice, to which are attached particular obligations, at 
least some of which are related to reasonable expectations. As an aside, the extent to which Al-
Hajjaji occupies her role voluntarily might be doubted—her reasons for acting as she does are 
undoubtedly complex, and it is easy to imagine many of her decisions being made under 
duress—and thus the degree to which she can reasonably be expected to uphold relevant 
obligations would likely be lessened.  
 The fact that Al-Hajjaji stands in a chamber before UN council members suggest that her 
action is what it is only within the context of a practice. A question this raises, however, is of 
which practice is she a part? If part of the Gaddafi regime, and if roles are defined strictly by the 
practices that generate them, it might be thought that she meets relevant expectations—namely as 
a Gaddafi apologist. If, however, she is instead viewed as part of a larger practice encompassing 
the UN, a very different set of expectations would apply—namely those concerned with 
promoting the human rights of the Libyan people. In any case the point is moot, because 
although specific roles are determined by particular practices, the obligations and duties of 
political representatives are not. According to the account here, any instance of political 
                                                 
78 This argument, again, should not be construed as utopian, or as suggesting that promises being fulfilled is an apt 
description of political representation. Giving reasons for thinking that something like a promissory context obtains 
is, of course, very different for claiming that promise keeping is the typical outcome in such a context. Defending an 
account of parental obligation is an entirely different project from a descriptive account of observable parenting. 
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representation entails an obligation to advocate for the interests of those represented, based upon 
a widely shared understanding of the concept of representation. Moreover the political mood of 
the oppressed offers evidence for this interpretation. The revolutionary discontent of the Libyan 
people under the Gaddafi regime makes it clear that they have much the same—alas, largely 
aspirational—expectations of their representatives and leaders as the inhabitants of flourishing 
democracies have of theirs. 
 Al-Hajjaji’s obligations to the Libyan people obtain, however badly she has maimed 
them, partially as a consequence of their justified expectations attached to the role she occupies. 
This role cannot be fully characterized only with respect to the Libyan regime, however, but also 
must encompass political representation as practiced (and conceptualized) more broadly. 
Although I will not argue the point here, the popular movements known as the Arab Spring can 
be seen as evidence for these widely shared expectations of political representatives. Obviously 
enough, the absence of any democratic procedures placing Al-Hajjaji in her role further impugns 
her legitimacy as a representative. My emphasis here has been upon her dubious relation to the 
Libyan people and the failure to uphold relevant duties and obligations, but it should be clear that 
the fulfilling of these duties and obligations would be greatly facilitated with the addition of 
democratic procedures. Further, that the lack of popular democratic support for the Gaddafi 
regime and the lack of popular involvement in selecting operatives like Al-Hajjaji suggest that 
her mere taking on of (or being placed in) such a role counts as violation of the interests of the 




3. THE ROLES OF REPRESENTATIVES 
A principal and worthwhile aim for Rehfeld is to distinguish the question of whether one is or is 
not a representative from the question of whether one represents poorly or well—questions he 
treats as “formal” and “substantive,” respectively. His method for doing so, however, generates 
an untenably wide category of representation, as we have seen. These questions can be kept 
distinct in an alternative framework that narrows the category and better respects widely held 
intuitions. In this alternative conception, being a political representative is, paradigmatically, to 
occupy a certain type of practice-defined role, incurring particular sorts of obligations as a 
consequence of being in the role, and engaging in activity informed by these obligations to some 
minimal degree. Being a good political representative is, inter alia, to significantly uphold such 
obligations, while being a poor political representative is to fail to do so. In this case, one might 
be a political representative, whether good or bad, or fail to be a political representative, without 
or in spite of being recognized to be so respectively.79 Being situated within a context where 
obligations are understood to obtain is partially constitutive of acting as a political representative. 
 With this structural apparatus now in place, I will defend the claim that to be a political 
representative with no regard for the interests of those represented would be akin to asking for a 
fourth strike: the defiance of reasonable expectations based on a shared understanding of rule-
governed practice flouts certain obligations attached to the role of representative. Note that one 
can still be a bad representative without flouting such conventions; one can have an abysmal 
batting average but still be playing the game of baseball. But decide you only need touch two 
bases in order to score a run, and you have begun to do something else than play baseball. While 
                                                 
79 The point is again merely that recognition isn’t sufficient to make or unmake a political representative. An 
example of the first case would be a case of mistaken identity, where an actual political representative is mistaken as 
an imposter. An example of the second case would be the previously discussed banker who the legislators 
erroneously take to be one of their own—i.e. an imposter being mistaken for an actual political representative. 
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refusing to play baseball according to the rules would be annoying during an official game, there 
are no obvious moral implications for doing so. The next task, then, is to analyze the moral value 
manifested in political representation and to give an account of its obligations and the 
justification for them. 
 When acting as a representative is understood as inhabiting a practice-defined role, the 
reasonable expectations of those affected by the performance of the role emerge with renewed 
importance. When, in turn, the nature of these expectations is examined closely, there are 
compelling reasons to see them as a source of normative gravity. As Charles Larmore has 
argued, the reliability of such expectations is required for a range of other activities,80and their 
trustworthiness thus has a direct effect upon human agency. Additionally, drawing upon 
Scanlon’s explanation of promissory obligations discussed above, the promissory basis from 
which these expectations derive imbues them with this normativity. This point is familiar but 
crucial. To inhabit certain roles tasks one with novel moral obligations. Perhaps the most familiar 
case is the role of parent, but a great many other social roles imply duties and obligations of 
varying character and magnitude.81  
 The reasons such obligations are taken to obtain are various and complex. The case of 
parental obligation is often treated as paradigmatic given very widely shared beliefs and cultural 
attitudes regarding the duties parents have to their children (despite wide disagreement on the 
ground and content of such duties). If less universally and more problematically, political leaders 
are also generally taken to have (at the very least fiduciary) obligations to those over whom they 
wield power. Little can be directly inferred from the very different case of parenting—with its 
                                                 
80 See Larmore, Charles E. Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987: “…we might even say 
that one of the moral demands we make of government is that it act predictably…to a greater predictability in 
government corresponds a greater freedom of the other spheres of social life” (41, emphasis original). 
81 See, e.g., Goodin, Robert E. "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98.4 (1988): 663-86. 
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justified paternalistic character—to the case of political representation. But what commonality 
they do have should offer evidence that roles very often entail duties and obligations that would 
not exist if one did not inhabit a certain role. 82 In the case of political representation, these duties 
and obligations are often specified within a practice-defined role in way that justifies constituents 
believing that they will be upheld. 
 
III. Obligations Attached to Roles 
The notion advocated here that the role of representative carries with it certain moral obligations 
is to be distinguished from a strong form of what Applbaum defines as role realism—the view 
that there are natural roles akin to natural law, implying that such roles conceptually entail their 
moral dimensions.83 Accepting role realism might imply, for example, that political 
representatives advocate for the interests of constituents by definition—as a logical entailment of 
their being representatives—without any reference socially constructed or institutional facts. 
This cannot be a satisfactory account of political representation, because what counts as political 
representation is partially constituted by collective understanding, as I have already argued.  
 Applbaum argues the related point that practices do not make those operating within 
them immune to evaluation by external moral standards. If this were not the case, Adolf 
Eichmann, for example, could only be evaluated according to the standards internal the practice 
within which he operated as an efficient bureaucrat, and moral evaluation could not go beyond 
this. The point is that moral permissions are not minted by the existence of practices—the lawyer 
arguing the innocence of a client she feels certain is guilty has not magically become honest or 
                                                 
82 There are complications with the idea of “inhabiting” roles and what constitutes doing so knowingly and 
voluntarily. I leave these difficulties aside for another occasion. 
83 Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. 
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been exonerated for dishonesty by virtue of the practice of law, for example84—or at the very 
least such permissions will always be defeasible in the face of overriding moral principles. 
Political representative are permitted—indeed, authorized, in the sense discussed above—to 
make decisions for others that not just anyone can make. They cannot, however, use the special 
powers of their role to side-step more general moral principles. 
 John Simmons has argued, in a distinct but related way, against the normative 
independence thesis—the idea that “…local practices and institutions can impose genuine moral 
obligations simply by virtue of being in force, simply by virtue of the social fact that people 
occupy (by choice or not) roles or stations, with associated role obligations, within these 
schemes.”85 In any such apparent scenario, it is rather the case that external principles either 
require or condemn the action in question. Genuine moral obligations obtain for Simmons only if 
they are either the result of voluntary agreement or if “…performing [non-voluntary] role 
obligations will be the way some of our external moral duties can be most fully discharged.”86  
 While I focus neither on the permissions Applbaum wishes to curtail nor on the 
obligations of citizens Simmons believes to require external justification, both their views 
harmonize with the account of political representation offered here. In the paradigmatic case, 
representatives occupy their roles in ways that are sufficiently voluntary and thus participate in 
contractualist and—in some instances—promissory arrangements. Further, and for distinct 
reasons that will require greater fleshing out, while the permissions attained by political 
representatives are constrained by more general principles, frequently the external moral duties 
belonging to political representatives can be “most fully discharged” by fulfilling the understood 
                                                 
84 I take up the subject of representation in an adversarial law court in chapter 3. 
85 Simmons, A. John. “Associative Political Obligations,” in Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and 
Obligations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2001, 88. 
86 Simmons, “Justifications and Institutional Roles,” in ibid., 101. 
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obligations of their roles. That is, political representatives just are respecting certain general 
moral principles when they sufficiently perform the obligations of their roles. 
 How then do practiced-defined roles in the context of political representation become 
tasked with moral obligations? The gradual formation of expectations on the part of those 
affected by the performance of the role—constituents, paradigmatically—are surely relevant, but 
failure to meet such obligations cannot merely be the failure to meet expectations. The hockey 
goalie having a bad day and thereby not living up to the expectations of teammates and 
spectators has committed no obvious moral transgression. On the other hand, we are—rightly—
scandalized when we learn that the hockey player in question has “thrown” the game, for 
example by deliberately letting the opposing team score as she has clandestinely agreed to do for 
a handsome sum, in spite of competitive athletes not taking oaths. What this rather simplistic 
analogy suggests—accurately, in my view—is that expectations relating to practice-defined roles 
are often justified on the grounds of tacit agreements. Political representatives will not always 
get matters right, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to do so, given both their 
susceptibility to errors of judgment and the complexity of interest advocacy, as discussed above. 
Members of a constituency are, however, justified in the expectation that their representatives 
will genuinely aim to promote their welfare. The obligations of political office are in part 
consequent to a tacit agreement made with those they represent to authentically look out for the 
interests of the represented.87 This leaves open a host of questions such as the nature of the tacit 
agreement made and how to characterize the interests of a constituency. It is enough for the 
                                                 
87 Various oaths of office sometimes make these agreements explicit. No such oath could exhaustively cover all the 
possible ways in which the relevant obligation might be manifested, however, and again, at the risk of wide 
analogizing, parents generally do not take oaths but have obligations nonetheless; practicing doctors who have 
forgone the Hippocratic Oath are reasonably seen as tasked with certain sorts of obligations just the same. 
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moment, however, if I have shown that representatives, having entered into tacit agreements, 
have obligations to uphold them. 
 Before concluding this chapter, one more clarification is in order. The temptation to 
conflate the achievement of developed democratic processes with regard for the interest of those 
represented—to which Rehfeld seems to succumb—should be resisted.88 Fair and effective 
electoral procedures that yield accountability and authorization require many contingent 
variables to be in place and at their best are fraught with well-known difficulties. A demonstrable 
regard for the interests of those represented, on the other hand, requires far fewer prerequisites in 
terms of social structure, as the example of NGOs was intended to illustrate. One can therefore 
concur with Rehfeld when he finds dubious (what he takes to be) the common identification of 
political representation with democratic legitimacy, while still holding—contrary to Rehfeld—
that concern for the interests of those represented is integral to any satisfactory account. 
 To voluntarily accept a representative role with no intention of pursuing the interests of 
those one is representing is to violate a trust of a certain kind, not because representation 
logically entails interest advocacy but because of widespread long-standing expectations that 
political representatives will so advocate.89 It might be worried that reliance upon social 
expectations and an obligation to uphold these will lead to trouble; a populace that has come to 
expect ruthless exploitation has not thereby created an obligation for that nation’s leader to 
maintain the status quo. Although such a populace might be justified in expecting the worst, 
however, they rarely accept their treatment as justifiable, believing they have a right to expect 
                                                 
88 He frames his guiding question: “What could ‘political representation’ be if it does not necessarily depend on 
notions of accountability, authorization, and ‘acting for another’s interests?’” 
89 It is not incidental that “promissory representation” is generally taken to be the classical form of political 
obligation. See Mansbridge, Jane. "Rethinking Representation." The American Political Science Review 97.4 (2003): 
515-28, esp. 525. 
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better. This is to say, they have an expectation of what political representation ought to be. An 
intuitive reason for this is the existence of a widely shared concept of political representation that 
includes an obligation to protect and advocate for the interests of constituents. Moreover, as I 
will discuss in chapter 4, expectations held by constituents, like mandates given by them, can 
only inform the obligations of their political representatives within certain constraints—






The Roles of Deliberation and Participation in Political Representation 
 
I. Introduction 
The preceding chapter focused upon arguments for political representation being irreducibly 
normative. The basic claim was that political representatives have duties and obligations bound 
up with the interests of those they represent. While I argued that a spare but coherent 
understanding of political representation can be given even in the absence of democratic 
procedures, normativity remains because an essential criterion for representation is the right 
kinds of regard for interests of those represented. Such an account is limited, however, by the 
sorts of interests that can be safely assumed to be held by all or nearly all individuals. To move 
beyond these fundamental interests in the context of political representation requires mechanisms 
for the development, refinement, and aggregation of interests, along with more effective means 
for their articulation and ways of conveying these interests to representatives. In this chapter I 
thus argue that the obligations of political representatives are intimately related to democratic 
procedure and more specifically to its participatory and deliberative dimensions. This is because 
the interests for which representatives have an obligation to advocate are best understood and 
realized through such processes. 
 Various strains of political theory have either limited the role of political representation 
to keeping the peace between competing factions or gone further to characterize representation 
as inimical to participation. Both of these interpretations should be resisted, in part for reasons 
relating to the obligations of political representatives. Because political representation entails the 
kinds of obligations on the part of representatives argued for in chapter 1, several leading 
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theories can be criticized for insufficiently regarding the interests of individuals represented, on 
the one hand, or for undervaluing the capacity of representation to develop and,where possible, 
to synthesize these interests, on the other hand. While the threat of domination by representative 
structures and those in positions of power mark important concerns, political representation has 
the capacity to enable greater participation and generate a deliberative space within which the 
interests of both individuals and groups can be further developed and articulated. Although 
recent work in political (and more specifically democratic) theory has ably defended these 
advantages, the role that political representatives ought to have in working for their realization 
and the reasons compelling them to do so have received little attention. Analyzing the 
obligations borne by political representatives to advocate for the interests of those represented 
demonstrates that these representatives should be committed to fostering participation and 
deliberation. It further suggests that representatives are obligated to sufficiently attend to both 
individualist and communal dimensions of these interests. 
 
II. Minimalist Political Representation 
Theoretical accounts that limit or discount entirely the role and value of political representation 
tend to fall in two broad camps. The first of these, epitomized by the pluralism of Schumpeter 
and (early) Dahl, argue for a limited role of political representation based upon their 
understanding of the instrumental role such representation in fact plays in the world. These 
putatively descriptive accounts characterize representation as of little use beyond mediating 
struggles for power between competing interest groups and political elites.90 Importantly, and as 
critics have noted, although these accounts claim to be descriptive, and thus to make no appeals 
                                                 
90 See Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, 8-9. 
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to normativity, their elaboration and redefinition of democracy and representation in purely 
instrumental terms has the effect of reifying their account and insinuating that there is no better 
alternative.91  
 The second camp differs from pluralist theory by defending individual interests as 
paramount, but takes political representation to be inimical to these interests in varying degrees. 
This category is both larger and more motley, including within its ranks characters as diverse as 
Rousseau and (early) Robert Nozick. For the former, representation was taken as an affront to 
autonomy.92 The threat of undue influence and domination led him to revile both the direct 
democracy of Athens—which was quite imperfect in its directness93—and contemporary forms 
of representative democracy, because any mediating of individual judgment was to be deplored; 
any form of delegation entailed a problematic surrender of judgment.94 For the Nozick of 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia what is noteworthy is the absence of any detailed discussion of 
political representation. The main tasks Nozick sets for himself are to justify the minimal state 
(and denigrate anything more than this) and to argue against political obligation as argued for in 
Rawls and Hart. It might have been supposed, however, that his examination of utopias would 
would make reference to a ranking of more and less desirable forms of political representation. 
Instead Nozick is committed to the view that there is no clear way of deciding between 
competing visions of better and worse political arrangements: because not all goods can be 
simultaneously realized, trade-offs will be necessary, and these will always be controversial.95 
                                                 
91 Ibid.; See also Macpherson, C. B. The Life and times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977.   
92 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and Donald A. Cress. On the Social Contract ; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality ; 
Discourse on Political Economy. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983.  
93 See Urbinati, Nadia. "Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation." Political Theory 28.6 
(2000): 764; 768. 
94 Ibid. On the “surrender of judgment,” see Flathman, Richard E. The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and 
the Authoritative. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1980.  
95 Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, 312-13. 
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Even utopian considerations therefore lead to the maximal individual freedom he takes to be 
manifested by the night watchman, a government limited to maintaining a monopoly of force. It 
is thus not clear what, if any, role political representation plays in his brand of libertarianism. 
 
III. Difficulties with Minimalist Political Representation 
From the perspective defended here, both camps—the one conceptualizing representation as 
largley limited to mediating between factions, and which thus has limited regard for individual 
interests, and the other prioritizing individual interests but construing these as inimical to 
political representation—have underestimated the valuable work political representation does 
and its potential to do more. This is true at least in part because both camps rely upon 
understandings of political representation that lack sufficient appreciation of its normative 
dimensions.  
 
1. THE LIMITING OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 
A preliminary difficulty for pluralist or other theories that characterize political representation 
only in instrumental terms is that politics frequently is the subject of normative evaluation, a fact 
that is perhaps most easily explained by political representation being thought—correctly—to be 
bound up with autonomy. Because political representatives make decisions on behalf of their 
constituents, the degree to which the autonomy of constituents is preserved depends upon the 
quality and character of representatives’ decisions.96 This explains in part why the existence of 
political structures brings in its train a host of questions and judgments regarding the character 
                                                 
96 I discuss autonomy further in the context of balancing delegate/trustee dimensions of representation below. Also 
instructive in this regard are McPherson’s arguments, discussed in chapter 3, to the end that insufficient 
representative authority when violence is resorted to compromises the autonomy of those on whose behalf the 
violence is committed. See McPherson, "Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?" 524-46. 
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and functionality of those structures and how they relate to the interests of citizens, many of 
which instrumental accounts like the above-described pluralism lack the resources to explain. As 
Urbinati has argued, in every expression of disappointment with political representatives, “…we 
implicitly allude to some ideal of representation.”97 This suggests that the assumption of (mere) 
instrumentality of political representation is unwarranted, given the normative stakes citizens 
have in it and, when this is recognized, their related intellectual and emotional investment in 
politics. 
 Descriptively framed pluralist theory also leaves a significant range of possibilities out of 
account, proceeding, without argument, as though political arrangements could not be different 
from the status quo. Put differently, descriptive accounts in particular should be sensitive to the 
fact that there are widely varying opinions regarding political structures and either give some 
explanation for this fact or justify their treating it as irrelevant. Moreover, the existence across 
time and space of a range of more and less liberal democracies (to say nothing of other forms of 
government) and associated practices of representation conflict with the notion that political 
arrangements and their mechanics must be as they are or have been. 
 More central to my argument is the fact that within pluralist theory political 
representatives either tend to be pawns of powerful interest groups or for the most part end up 
being the elites controlling power themselves. It is not that representation fails to perform an 
important function within these theories: the mediation it provides between competing interests 
promotes social stability and provides a venue for expressions of various political points of view 
that otherwise would not be heard. However, because pluralism, from that of Madison in the 
Federalist to the theories of (early) Dahl and Schumpeter, conceptualizes the interests of 
                                                 
97 Urbinati, "Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation," 759. 
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individuals as expressions of group membership, the individual variation within these voting 
blocs is insufficiently regarded, and the individual views that are expressed have limited traction 
in the political process. As Carol Gould has argued, relegating the interests of individuals to 
group membership undervalues both individual uniqueness and the relational dynamics between 
individuals at the sub-group level.98 For Gould, the shortcomings of pluralism are also 
ontological: while in some sense signaling an improvement over abstract individualism by 
including the importance of groups in political arrangements, pluralism continues to treat 
individuals as self-interested rational decision-makers, abstracting them from constitutive social 
relations and failing to acknowledge internal variation.99 
 My own criticism of pluralism centers upon the minimalist role it gives to political 
representation and what is required of it, but it takes Gould’s ontology to be a powerful 
framework for understanding the interests which I argue political representatives are obligated to 
pursue. Despite the aim of pluralism to protect the freedom of the individual from the power of 
the state, it fails to provide individuals with the sorts of robust representation required for the 
advocacy of individual interests. As a first point, it is desirable for constituents to be represented 
in a sufficiently nuanced way that is at odds with voting blocs. The negative freedom integral to 
pluralism provides some assurance against interference in individual affairs but can offer little to 
the individual by way of working for change that would address individual concerns. Reasons for 
the inclusion of individuals within particular groups are also problematic: any attempt to 
construct such categories on the basis of shared ideology, ethnic background, or geographical 
                                                 
98 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, 98-9. 
99 Ibid., 98-100. 
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distribution runs roughshod over internal variation and importantly offers little capacity for 
dissent or the internal criticism of one’s “group.”100 
 Pluralism also leaves the obligations of political representatives underspecified more 
generally, rendering their position somewhat paradoxical. Within such a system, individual 
political representatives—assuming they have some form of obligation to citizens—would seem 
to be tasked with pursuing the interests of constituents while knowing that the larger, and 
potentially conflicting, objective of this representation is to achieve balance between competing 
factions. This has two curious consequences. The first is that the purpose of political 
representation is ultimately social stability, rather than genuinely aiming to secure policy change 
that benefits one’s constituents. Political representatives in this scenario are effectively reduced 
to mechanisms within a kind of “invisible hand” arrangement wherein the social good their 
activity is meant to realize is distinct from the goals they pursue on behalf of their constituency. 
An awareness of these matters would make a commitment to fulfill the obligations of a political 
representative as I have explained them disingenuous: while constituents are justified in the 
expectation that representatives advocate for their interests, pluralism suggests that they will 
often act on the basis of ulterior motives. A loss of constituents’ autonomy is again threatened in 
this scenario because the decisions being made on their behalf by their political representatives 
only regard them obliquely. 
 Moreover, in the circumstance that a political representative becomes aware that her 
advocacy of her constituents’ interests will not, for whatever reason, promote social stability—a 
scenario that in principle must surely be possible—which goal is she to choose? Note that this 
difficulty is importantly different from the classic tension between delegate and trustee aspects of 
                                                 
100 Relevant individuation of sub-groups is also problematic: should strongly liberal Austin, home to the University 
of Texas, be included in “the Southern vote” or “the Liberal vote”? Examples could easily be multiplied. 
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political representation, as there the challenge is confined to deciding whether the expressed 
interests of a constituency or the considered judgment of the representative will best achieve the 
constituency’s interests, all things considered. In the case at hand, by contrast, the representative 
would ex hypothesi be choosing whether to pursue constituent interests at all or whether instead 
to act so as to promote social stability.101 The ontology gestured toward above, in conjunction 
with an appeal to human rights, may have the resources to resolve this difficulty: thoroughgoing 
protections for individual human rights might sufficiently include political dimensions that 
would ensure that individual interests were not left out of account in the political process. The 
inclusion of a human right to robust political representation, of the sort that properly 
acknowledged the autonomy of individual constituents, could serve this function. Without the 
inclusion of such an appeal to human rights, the limited regard for individual interest enshrined 
in pluralist theory remains problematic. Individuals can all too easily be ignored or worse by the 
machinations of political structures that do not actively take care to include and advocate for 
them.  
 These worries are deepened by versions of pluralism that take themselves to be 
descriptive and hence value-neutral. The political representative that views the status quo as 
inevitable could often only partly claim to be advocating for the interests of her constituents 
because the machinery of democracy conceived in this way is unlikely to produce change sought 
by individuals not fortunate enough to be included within the most powerful interest groups. The 
point is not merely the likely futility of pursuing the interests of members in an underdog group; 
                                                 
101 Social stability is itself a widely share interest, ceteris paribus, but this overlap is contingent: social stability can 
at times be achieved by the gross violation of individuals and their rights. In chapter 4 I take up Buchanan’s related 
arguments for prioritizing justice over peace in the international domain. See Buchanan, Allen E. Justice, Justice, 




rather, within this theoretical structure, advocacy for individuals is complicated and sometimes 
undermined by the pursuit of social stability. Seeking political stability in a way that tends to 
promote the interests of citizens might succeed in achieving them as an ancillary good, but for 
reasons already suggested, when the goals of political stability and advocacy of constituent 
interests come apart, the former is prioritized in the pluralist framework. 
 An objection at this point might be that, given that the role of political representatives in 
pluralist theory is minimized and perhaps even paradoxical as described, what these observations 
demonstrate is that a more active and robust form of political representation in fact has no place. 
If this is so, the obligations of representatives I am at pains to emphasize are at best overblown, 
and at worst their elaboration is misguided. 
 There are three responses to such an objection. First, as previously mentioned, the 
elaboration of pluralist theories, even while claiming to be descriptive, has the effect of 
presenting them to be without alternative. However, only on a narrowly historically 
circumscribed analysis could such a perspective that claims to describe “the way things are” be 
countenanced. The easy observation that at various times and in various places the interests of 
individuals have been better and worse served by the political structures that they inhabited is 
enough to impugn accounts that imply alternative and better arrangements are unavailable. 
 Second, pluralist theory denies to constituents within one group the benefit of pursuing 
shared interests with members of another group because such interests are assumed to be 
internally univocal and perpetually at odds with the interests of all those external to the group. 
Particularly in our contemporary world of recognized global threats that no particular group or 
individual state is prepared to confront on its own, disregarding such shared interests and their 
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import is a grave error.102 Third, as I shortly explain in greater detail, the benefits of political 
representation are sorely underappreciated in pluralist accounts and still more in political theories 
that see representation as inimical to individual interests. Before arguing for this point, I examine 
one well-known example of a theory that is deeply critical of representation.  
 
2. THE ELIMINATION OF REPRESENTATION 
The second anti-representation camp is constituted by various theoretical approaches that 
explicitly condemn representation or characterize it as opposing participation and hence 
individual interests. Much has been written about Rousseau’s denigration of representation. For 
my purposes, the following considerations are germane. First, Rousseau’s disdain for 
representation is enabled by (what he takes to be) his demonstration that it is not necessary. 
Rousseau’s creation of a general will attempts to solve political philosophy’s great puzzle of 
preserving individual autonomy while giving a place to governance and the rule of law by 
presupposing a shared conception of the common good that is in turn manifested into law. The 
resultant legal obligations are thus (in a sense) self-imposed, and citizens remain free agents, as 
they willingly submit to laws the content of which they themselves have chosen and willed. In 
stark contrast to pluralist theory, where the primary function of political representation is 
mediating competing interests, the absence of competing interests removes the need for 
representation altogether. 
 It is far from incidental that Rousseau envisioned these political arrangements as 
applicable to small bucolic communities where non-representative direct democracy might have 
been a practical possibility. Even in circumstances such as these, however, a “shared conception 
                                                 
102 See Christiano, Thomas. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1996, 74, for a similar, if narrower diagnosis of this problem. 
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of the common good” was not thought to emerge merely from common circumstances and a 
shared way of life but as a consequence of rational thought available to all. It is this feature of 
Rousseau’s account that that makes the mediating forces of representation—and the space for 
deliberation that it provides—hindrances rather than assets. The threat of influence and the 
specter of one individual will coming to be dominated by another not only compromises 
individual autonomous judgment but also risks undermining the generality (and individually 
arrived at rationality) of the general will. 
 The importance of political representation is thus magnified when doubt is cast upon 
rationality as a clear and sufficient guide to governance, available to all—the linchpin of 
Rousseau’s general will. As Urbinati expresses the point, “…representative democracy is a living 
confutation of a rationalist vision of politics.”103 It is worth emphasizing that the normative 
justification for political representation derives significantly from the paramount importance of 
deliberation and the individual regard it allows in the absence of a shared vision of the common 
good or a unitary vision of politics based on rationalism. As a practical matter representation also 
serves the important function of aggregating opinion, though in principle this function might be 
achieved by other means.104  
 Political ideas are frequently contested, and appeals to rationality do little to settle 
disagreements that arise (the results of rational analysis themselves being frequently contested). 
It is for this reason that representation, as a central feature of democratic institutions, is necessary 
                                                 
103 Urbinati, "Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation," 765. 
104 It bears contemplating that with the current capacity of technology to transcend geography there is no real 
obstacle to holding a version of direct democratic vote among many millions of people. The logistics would, of 
course, be tremendous, but in principle doing so is merely an extension of corporate board members abroad voting 
on a motion in real-time via Skype or similar technology: advertisements for Cloud communication boast making 
“450 million people present” at a soccer (futbol) match, with the capacity for real-time voting on player of the game. 
The possibility of this scenario adds weight to the task of demonstrating its undesirability in classic form, but is also 
suggestive of future possibilities that could in principle augment participation and legitimacy. 
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“…to provide fair procedures for adjudicating disputes about public policy when citizens’ 
interests, values, and perspectives conflict.”105 Moreover, as Urbinati has argued, political 
representation creates conditions in which political decision-making is beneficially mediated by 
time, space, and speech.106 Removed from the immediacy and presence of direct democracy, 
citizens are provided with time and solitude to consider options in a calm, collected manner, 
without the many possible forms of interference and potential for domination in the 
circumstances of a direct democratic vote. 
 More importantly still, democratic political representation and the voting procedures it 
typically enshrines allow constituents to deliberate with one another in a way that is impossible 
in direct democracy. When used to their fullest potential, these political processes allow for the 
formation of venues where all ideas, both good and bad, can be heard and scrutinized. In turn, 
the process of ideas being shared, challenged, refined, or abandoned, produces a more competent 
and knowledgeable citizenry, as argued for at length by J.S. Mill.107 It is in this sense that 
political representation increases, rather than decreases, participation relative to direct 
democracy.  
 The direct democracy of ancient Athens, by contrast, routinely gave undue influence to 
orators in practice, regardless of the physical presence of voters. In direct democracy as modified 
by Rousseau, citizens practiced studied silence in the assumption of like-mindedness among 
                                                 
105 Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. The Good Representative: Suzanne Dovi. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 8. See 
Christiano, Thomas. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1996. 
106 Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” 768. See Plotke, David. 
"Representation Is Democracy." Constellations 4.1 (1997): 27. 
107 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, And, Considerations on Representative Government. Ed. Ronald Buchanan 
McCallum. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1946. As I argue below, the (ideal) processes described in the free marketplace of 
ideas is integral to the development of constituents’ interests. 
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themselves, remaining isolated from one another in their political contemplations.108 Noting 
these shortcomings, later liberal democratic theorists have continued to argue that, contrary to all 
elitist/authoritarian governing arrangements, political participation is to be promoted to as great a 
degree as possible.109 Further, it has become commonplace among political theorists writing 
within the last two decades that representation has the capacity—perhaps in adjusted and 
improved form—to foster, rather than restrict, participation.110 Plotke’s clarification—“…the 
opposite of representation is not participation: the opposite of representation is exclusion. And 
the opposite of participation is abstention”111—summarizes this trend.  
 The capacity to foster greater participation is, of course, altogether different from its 
realization. The forgoing is intended to support the theoretical advantages of more robust 
democratic structures over direct democracy, but manifesting these benefits in a practical way 
presents its own set of difficulties. The absence of a politically engaged culture and related low 
voter turn-out are significant factors that are beyond the scope of my arguments here. These 
challenges are closely related, however, to radical inequality, power imbalances, and the 
perception that one is ineffectual in the political process, all of which I take up below or in 
subsequent chapters. The problem of domination, in which political structures evolve into 
repositories of power and in turn impose their will upon constituencies, is touched upon below, 
and discussed further in chapter 4. For a number of theorists domination is a salient concern 
                                                 
108 Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” 758-65; 768.  
109 See, e.g., Macpherson, C. B. The Life and times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977, 98ff; Gould, 
Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, Chapters 8 and 9. 
110 A sampling includes: Mansbridge, Jane. "Rethinking Representation." The American Political Science Review 
97.4 (2003): 515-28; Plotke, "Representation Is Democracy," 19-34; Urbinati, "Representation as Advocacy: A 
Study of Democratic Deliberation," 758-86; Young, Iris Marion. "Deferring Group Representation." Ethnicity and 
Group Rights. Ed. Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro. New York: New York UP, 1997, esp. 352.  
111 Plotke, David. "Representation Is Democracy." Constellations 4.1 (1997): 24. 
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because, contrary to Plotke’s formulation above, representation becomes a means of exclusion 
rather than inclusion. 
 The extent to which political representation itself is desirable, then, seems to be 
controversial only if representation imposes vertical rather than horizontal power relations, 
through the creation and perpetuation of an elite class, for example, or by empowering 
trusteeship over mandate adherence in unwarranted ways.112 To the extent that increased political 
participation and more robust deliberation are crucial for the development and expression of 
citizens’ interests, those tasked with advocating for these interests should in turn be tasked with 
advocating for these processes and their integrity. Legitimate political representation, then, 
entails significant obligations to foster a culture of political awareness and participation. This 
requirement derives both from the importance of the development of interests and from a need to 
guard against representative structures coming to threaten domination. 
 Representation taken this way, in line with the thinking of a number of democratic 
theorists, is thus the conceptual ally to social arrangements, such as increasingly democratic 
workplaces, that are conducive to participation, and it is contrary to socio-economic 
circumstances, like those of gross inequality, demonstrably inimical to it. That lower-level 
participation allows for the development, elaboration and articulation of interests, which in turn 
significantly inform and constitute the content of robust political representation, establishes a 
strong link between participation and representation. Lower-level democratic activity can also be 
empirically shown to instill greater understanding of and interest in politics more generally. 
Political representation, that is, can be strengthened and made more robust through the highly 
                                                 
112 See Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970.  
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ramified participation of constituents beyond periodic democratic elections.113 Further, political 
representation is both enabled by and derives value from the “mutual influence” of deliberative 
practice, which has rightly been characterized as partially constitutive of functioning 
democracy.114  
 Before moving on to consider a robust account of representation in some detail, it is 
worth observing how representation as conceived of in my account relates to the democratic 
procedure of majority rule and some of the concerns it raises. Interpreted one way, the voter 
whose chosen candidate loses an election might also be thought to no longer have her individual 
interests represented. Some theorists, like Mill, advocate for proportional representation in part 
to obviate this conclusion by making it the case that minority views are still given voice 
throughout the political process. With or without proportional representation, however, theorists 
rarely hold that those in a democratic minority are without political representation. Many careful 
arguments have been made both defending and criticizing majority-rule decisions, with some—
though by no means complete—consensus on two points: first, that despite its inherent 
difficulties and especially the challenges associated with putting majority decisions into effect in 
the context of democratic representation, it often remains the best available option for collective 
decision making.115 Second, there may nonetheless be cases in which majoritarianism is 
superseded by some better alternative for contextual reasons, and there need be nothing 
paradoxical or undemocratic about this.116 
                                                 
113 Pateman, Ibid.; Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and 
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114 See Anderson, Elizabeth. "The Epistemology of Democracy." Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3.1 
(2006): 8-22.  
115 See Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society. 
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 Citizens, however, and particularly those within a winner-take-all system and without 
much grounding in political theory, might be forgiven for still thinking this paradoxical: if a 
central part of political legitimacy is to be characterized in terms of robust consultative 
procedures, understood here as circumstances in which constituents are able to freely choose and 
influence their representatives, it is not obvious how one whose chosen candidate lost can still be 
said to have attained legitimate political representation for her. Nor is it clear that, even under 
circumstances of voluntarism, when one agreed to abide by the outcome of popular elections, she 
would stand in the same relation to the representative that others chose, but she did not. Finally it 
does not seem unreasonable to think that this structural difference directly threatens the 
justification for the given representative to hold the power that she does over those who did not 
voluntarily submit to the representative in question. 
 One way of obviating these difficulties is to acknowledge that the sorts of obligations I 
have been pressing for obtain between the elected representative and all constituents, whether or 
not they voted for her. To do so is ameliorative because even the voter who did not get her way 
can, ex hypothesi, rest assured that whoever is chosen as representative will advocate for her 
interests. This normative assumption should be available to constituents and function in a parallel 
fashion to constitutional protections, assuring citizens of crucial aspects of representation in spite 
of eccentric and fluctuating leadership. Such assurances to constituents are paramount given the 
asymmetrical power relationship they occupy in relation to their political representatives. To put 
this point another way, democratic procedures allow the constituent a (varying) degree of 
influence in the choice of her representatives, but she is not free to have no political 
representation at all, even if her candidate of choice does not come to be in power. 
Representatives, for their part, are entirely free in their choice to have constituents (that is, to 
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become political representatives). This asymmetry is in part what justifies an asymmetrical—or 
perhaps even one-sided—obligation, namely that which obtains for the representative with 
regard to their constituents. 
 
IV. Robust Representation, Constrained Participation 
An alternative account that develops a robust role for political representation is offered by 
Thomas Christiano.117 While there are many merits to his seminal account, I focus here on his 
confining citizen participation to particular stages of the political process. Christiano argues for a 
division of political labor, which he sees as necessitated by “...the intellectual labor that politics 
demands.”118 An important upshot of this account is that only ultimate aims should be 
determined by citizens because the means or compromises by which these aims are pursued 
problematically overburdens individual citizens. Further, this overburdening emerges merely 
from assuming that citizens are limited in their capacities.119  
 Because it is important to refute this conclusion, for reasons that should become clear—
namely, that deliberation about the means employed in reaching agreed upon aims should not fall 
to citizens—Christiano’s argument merits explication. His initial premise is the priority of aims 
to means. Because aims are central to an individual’s life plan, and the means or strategies for 
achieving these aims are subservient to them, a chooser of means employed is subservient to the 
chooser of aims. Because a theory of democratic citizenship demands equality among citizens, it 
cannot countenance subservient roles for some, so the choice of aims held by all citizens is a 
necessary condition for democratic citizenship. Further, the choice of aims is also sufficient for 
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118 Ibid., 123. 
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this model of citizenship, because, so long as the aims are not altered, “…it is not clear why 
citizens should be concerned with means or strategies.”120  
 Christiano’s analogies to buttress this claim include a word-processing program, which, 
faithfully renders our thoughts on the page by circuitry most of us cannot fathom, and the human 
physical body, which in general loyally puts into action our mental commands by a process most 
of us typically do not care or need to understand. He concludes, “When members of the 
government or other political institutions do their best to realize the aims citizens choose without 
attempting to insert their own aims or interests, citizens have no ground for complaint.”121 
Additionally, the narrow expertise required for determining means is simply unavailable to a 
majority of the citizenry unless they abandon other life projects in order to achieve such 
expertise. 
 As a first response, the argument regarding the priority of aims to means is sound only if 
deciding aims (the dominant role) is reserved for some individuals and deciding means (the 
subservient role) is left to others. In this case, subservient and dominant relations would be 
introduced, but this is easily avoided by allowing all constituents choice of both aims and means. 
Christiano’s point that, in a democratic society, all must have equal influence upon the choice of 
aims, offers no reason for preventing them from also having influence over means. More 
importantly, contrary to its intended effect, this argument suggests a number of serious concerns 
with taking the means employed or compromises to be made, as well as room to deliberate about 
them, out of the hands of citizens.122 Christiano insists that unequal access to knowledge makes 
placing the means in the hands of citizens a recipe for greater political inequality: the better 
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educated and socially connected will then be in a position to dominate the less fortunately 
positioned.123 But this is strange argument: it claims that the unequal circumstances of citizens 
would be exacerbated if citizens are empowered to deliberate about the means of political action. 
It is more intuitive to argue that background conditions of inequality are problematic and should 
be addressed, for there are independent reasons making it desirable to place the determination of 
political means—to an extent that still respects division of labor—within the hands of citizens. 
 Christiano anticipates this line of objection but rejects it on the basis that particular kinds 
of inequality, and especially unequal access to relevant knowledge, are inevitable even in 
significantly egalitarian circumstances. What this response fails to appreciate is that extending 
deliberation to include means, rather than only aims, is the primary mechanism by which the 
knowledge disparities with which Christiano is concerned can be mediated. Discouraging or 
disallowing citizens to participate in the selection of means has the undesirable effect of ensuring 
that they will remain ill equipped to contribute at this stage—and indeed any stage—of the 
political process. As I discuss further below, it is a commonplace in both our everyday reasoning 
and in political calculation to reform our initial aims when we acquire a greater appreciation for 
the means necessary to achieve them. 
 While Christiano is surely right that various forms of technical expertise need not and 
could not be comprehended by a large swath of a citizenry, it is not only a reasonable but a 
crucial requirement of expert bodies and politicians acting on the behalf of citizens to articulate 
their motivation for policy decisions in a way that can be understood by those citizens. The 
common person does not share an understanding of economics possessed by the likes of Paul 
Krugman and Joseph Stieglitz, but this has not stopped them from introducing summaries of 
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their ideas into the public space for deliberation. The same can be said for arguments intended 
for public consumption offered by biologist and conservationist David Suzuki, and public 
political debates held by Noam Chomsky and Alan Dershowitz, among a great many others. That 
the more approachable arguments of such scholars are not more widely known, understood, and 
deliberated in the democracy of the United States is not the result solely of inequalities in access 
to knowledge but rather of an inadequate education system and of a related cultural undervaluing 
of such deliberation. It is a small step from these observations to parallel arguments that give a 
greater role to public reason in the political process:  
This ideal [of public reason] is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief 
executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act 
from and follow public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting 
fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard 
as the most reasonable.124 
 It is particularly important to include among the obligations of political representatives 
the task of sharing their reasoning on those occasions when they act as trustee and override the 
expressed desires of a constituency. Whether such explanation should include explicit reference 
to the representative’s “political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable” will 
perhaps vary by circumstance, but it does offer a way of justifying instances of political decision-
making that are at variance—or appear to be at variance—with the popular will. 
 The subject of trusteeship points to a second difficulty for Christiano’s argument, which 
is that there appears to be no principled way to differentiate between means and aims, despite his 
reliance upon the contrary. Christiano attempts to do so by defining the “aims of society” as the 
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“…aspects of society that are chosen for their own sake.”125 His own example illustrates the 
difficulty in this approach, however. We are told that citizens may wish for certain rights, such as 
a right to privacy, to be protected in the course of policy being carried out, and when “…such 
restrictions on government activity are desirable in themselves, these are among the basic aims 
of those citizens.”126 This is a promising direction as it provides some parameters within which 
decision-making ought to remain within the purview of a citizenry, but what is missing is an 
explanation of what it means for things to be “chosen for their own sake,” or “desirable in 
themselves.” Rights have an intuitive appeal as belonging in this category, but other cases are 
less clear. A reasonable citizenry might not wish the aim of open-ended economic growth to be 
pursued by means that degrade the environment beyond a certain threshold. Is this concern out of 
their jurisdiction? Or is there another distinct aim regarding an un-degraded environment? 
Consider another case. An enlightened citizenry wants to strengthen their nation’s social safety 
net by the means of increased tax revenues. Can they debate and potentially vote upon how and 
where taxes should be implemented? If so, taxation policy would have to be framed as an aim of 
society. A dilemma seems to emerge: either citizens should concern themselves with the means 
by which aims are pursued after all, or every issue the citizenry is justified taking an active 
interest in will have to be re-described as an “aim,” opening the floodgates to unlimited—and at 
times conflicting—aims. 
 Because it is not clear what counts as aims as opposed to means, it is not clear what 
constraints are to be observed in pursuing socially selected aims. Besides this, as Christiano’s 
argument stands, the propensity for “dirty hands” is greatly increased, as citizens are encouraged 
not to ask how things get done. Many controversial decisions would in turn pass without 
                                                 




scrutiny. This is because each individual objectionable act in which politicians might engage en 
route to pursuing socially determined aims cannot easily be re-described as “aims” or be 
prohibited by other “aims” of society. If, on the other hand, these acts are understood in their 
traditional way as “means,” they remain outside the purview of citizens as a consequence. 
Related concerns are particularly worrisome with regard to foreign policy, as the means 
employed by many nations in pursuing aims of national interest have been very objectionable 
indeed. Allowing citizens to choose only “…how much risk they wish to submit to in foreign 
relations”127 renders them vulnerable to grave moral hazards with regard to the means that might 
be employed in their name—a concern I take up below and in following chapters. One strategy 
for addressing these difficulties, again, might be a more careful elaboration of both civil and 
human rights and the explicit defining of the “aims” of society as constrained by these rights and 
perhaps other central values explained and defended. Without this, however, it is difficult to 
sustain the means/aims distinction as employed by Christiano: a citizenry might have the “aim” 
that a government pursues its interests by means that are effective, morally appropriate, far-
sighted, and so on, but such generalities do little to advance out understanding of the relation 
between citizens and their political representatives. 
 It would be unfair and inaccurate to equate Christiano’s analogy, wherein “…citizens are 
in the position of passengers on a ship, whereas the government is in the position of the 
captain,”128 and wherein being given the destination by the passengers the government does the 
navigating and enforcement of safety rules, with Schumpeter’s (essentially Burkean) position, 
wherein citizens “…must understand that once they have elected an individual, political action is 
                                                 




his business and not theirs.”129 In the latter case, even specifying the aims of society is taken out 
of the hands of the citizenry.130 Christiano’s account still cedes too much, however. By 
disallowing participation in the selection of means, he fails to acknowledge that deliberation 
about means can alter and even produce new aims. His ship analogy, then, is a poor one. The 
discursive nature of vibrant democracy makes it the case that the choice of aims is subject to 
continual revision; the notion of a “destination” connotes a misleading finality. It is thus 
desirable, within certain limits, for participation and deliberation to permeate all aspects of 
political life, and it is an obligation of political representatives to encourage these processes by 
which the interests of a constituency can be developed and refined. To be sure, there are limits to 
the contributions a citizenry will be able to make in judging the appropriateness of means, 
particular those that are technical, employed in the service of a particular aim, just as there are 
limits to what might be expected of individual political representatives with regard to making the 
deliberative process more robust. What should be guarded against, however, is any area of 
policymaking being in principle off limits to public scrutiny and deliberation, and, in parallel, the 
notion that political representation can proceed unencumbered when such areas are 
countenanced.131 
 This last point bears directly upon the often rehearsed tension between mandate and 
independence, or— equivalently, for my purposes—between the delegate and trustee dimensions 
of political representatives. Although I offer little that is novel in this regard and consider some 
concrete instances further along, a few comments are in order here. First, and obviously enough, 
                                                 
129 Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper, 1950, 295. 
130 For discussion of the conservative management of political power see Robin, Corey. The Reactionary Mind: 
Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin. New York: Oxford UP, 2011. 
131 I argue a parallel point in chapter 4—against critics of the notion—with regard to the structure of the United 
Nations and calls from General Assembly members for more deliberation as a feature of proceedings there.  
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aspects of each are needed and appropriate. As I have argued, the official with no regard 
whatsoever for the expressed desires of her constituency, and thus inattentive to the best prima 
facie evidence of their interests, should either be thought a poor representative indeed or at the 
limit no representative at all. Equally clearly, the representative cannot at every moment in her 
role simultaneously internalize and act upon the expressed desires of her constituents and, at the 
limit, merely repeat the cacophony of words that express these desires to the representative body 
within which she functions. The mere acts of interpretation, consolidation, and articulation of 
these desires require independence. Moreover, there will be instances where greater political and 
legal knowledge empower the representative to pursue the interests of her constituents more 
effectively than by heeding their expressed desires “to the letter.” 
 In the preceding, with reference to Christiano’s work, I have argued for greater 
participation and greater public deliberation. It is worth noting, however, that I have not argued 
for the balance to be struck more on the side of delegate rather than trustee. The appropriate 
degree of political participation and the appropriate balance to be struck regarding the 
delegate/trustee tension are logically distinct. Increased political participation and deliberation 
can, and in my view should, preserve space for representatives to act independently in 
appropriate circumstances. The point of a greater role for citizens in the political process is not to 
dissolve the role of representatives functioning as trustees but to give it coherence and to provide 
reasons for some occasions, but not others, to fall within their independent jurisdiction. 
Participation and deliberation can (ideally) refine the interests of constituents and develop their 
political capacities, including their capacity to articulate their interests and concerns to 
representatives. In turn, political representatives would know their constituencies better, and 
could make more enlightened determinations regarding what is important to them, when their 
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priorities are or are not consistent, or when they seem out of character and are likely the result of 
being swayed by demagogues. With this increased knowledge political representatives could 
more ably negotiate the difficult balance between heeding mandates and making decisions 
independently. Another welcome consequence of more deliberation, already mentioned above, 
would be increased political competence of an electorate, and this might in turn justify an 
expanded domain over which mandates given by the people would appropriately hold sway. 
Even with significant progress in this direction, however, the representative as trustee will 
remain essential as a disinterested arbiter between citizens without a shared conception of the 
good life. 
 
V. Deliberation in the Context of Political Violence 
The foregoing examples have all presupposed developed political structures, whether denying or 
radically limiting the role of political representation within them (as with Rousseau and in turn 
the libertarians), largely relegating representation to a role of mediation (as with Schumpeter and 
Dahl), or developing a robust role for political representation but limiting the role of 
participation within it (as with Christiano). It is also instructive, however, to consider 
circumstances of very limited political structure and the role representation plays (or fails to 
play) there.132 In what follows, I focus specifically upon representation in the context of substate 
political violence, as this special case brings a number of salient issues concerning participation 
and deliberation, and the role they play in authorizing acts to light. The representative status of 
actors—the degree to which they can be reasonably thought to act on some group’s behalf—has 
been appealed to as a criterion for justifying (or failing to justify) their resort to the use of force. 
                                                 
132 The example of NGOs briefly discussed in chapter 1 is also relevant in this regard. 
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Considerations along these lines thus bear upon the nature of obligations those in representative 
roles have and suggest limits upon the sorts of actions that can reasonably be thought to be done 
in the name of those ostensibly represented. 
 Scholars of just war theory and political violence more generally have long been at pains 
to provide criteria for permissible and impermissible uses of force, and within this practice a 
great deal has been written with the intent of adequately defining terrorism and differentiating it 
from the “collateral damage” of conventional war.133 An account relevant to my subject here 
makes a moral distinction between terrorism and collateral damage based upon the role 
representation plays in each. According to this account, individuals or groups cannot justifiably 
engage in political violence if they lack “representative authority” to justify their actions. 
Representative authority describes “…adequate license for acting on the behalf of a people 
through their approval.”134 Representative authority does not require state membership and 
manifests a kind of moral authority derived from the fact that contemplated actions have been 
scrutinized and condoned (within some threshold) by a “people” on behalf of whom these actions 
are to be carried out. McPherson ultimately argues that states will typically have a clear 
advantage in this regard, given their more robust political structures and, ideally, democratic 
procedures manifested through these structures. His larger point, however, is that representative 
authority, and not state structures themselves, are doing the justificatory work.  
 This argument is buttressed by the observation that a number of non-state actors engaging 
in political violence do as a matter of fact claim to be acting on the behalf of a (dubiously) large 
group of people: The “People’s Will” envisioned and described themselves as liberators of all 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: 
Basic, 2015.  
134 McPherson, Lionel K. "Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?" Ethics 117.3 (2007): 541. 
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Russian people from the tyranny of Alexander;135 al-Qaeda and ISIS operatives frequently take 
credit (accurately or otherwise) for violent acts that they claimed to have performed on behalf of 
“all Muslims”; Anders Behring Breivik, the lone gunman responsible for over 90 deaths in 
Norway in July, 2011, claimed, at intervals, to be acting for “Norway” and “to save Europe from 
a Muslim takeover.”136 Thus terrorists not acting as members of a state often appeal to a notion 
of representative authority themselves in order to justify their actions. It does not follow from 
this, of course, that even if they possessed the relevant representative authority, it would actually 
justify the particular acts in question without further criteria—such as that of just cause, 
preeminently—being met. Rather, representative authority is, in this account, a necessary though 
not sufficient condition for political violence being justified. McPherson thus makes 
representative authority morally relevant to an analysis of terrorism. That the autonomy of a 
people is significantly bound up with its will being carried out by actors who claim to act on their 
behalf—to represent them—suggests that there is a moral difference between violence 
undertaken by a group that possesses RA and other groups or individuals who do not.  
 While I do not evaluate this provocative line of argument in any depth here, it is 
important to see that for it to succeed, McPherson would need to make a compelling case not 
only that terrorists lack RA but also that state (or other) actors possess it, specifically with regard 
to their use of force. Indeed, only very specific, special kinds of states could in principal have 
RA in this way, namely those with substantial democratic control of their armed forces. 
McPherson expresses his awareness of this worry and offers a partial response as follows: 
                                                 
135 See Matthew Carr, The Infernal Machine: A History of Terrorism, The New Press, New York, NY (2006): 
“Though they claimed to express the will of the population as a whole, their use of violence was a form of political 
warfare by a minority acting on behalf of an absent majority” (15, emphasis original). 




In the ideal scenario, a democratic state functions with a considerable degree of control 
by its people and transparency regarding political processes. This provides no guarantee 
that political decisions will be substantively just. Nor am I suggesting that the ideal 
scenario of decision making in democratic states is closely approximated in real-world 
scenarios. There are no official referenda about decisions to go to war, let alone about 
how a war is fought, and political leaders can shape public opinion through selective 
dissemination of information and appeals to national interest that have a chilling effect on 
public debate. Yet political representatives in a democracy are under pressure from their 
constituents to justify going to war and to maintain support for a war that is already under 
way. Reasonable institutional procedures can provide checks and balances on the exercise 
of political power, presumably with a tendency to yield political decisions that are not 
egregiously unjust.137 
 The argument to the effect that in principle robust democratic arrangements could 
manifest RA in a way unlikely to be available to small groups acting on their own, and that this 
is a significant indictment of violence used by these groups, is well-taken: “Political violence by 
non-state actors is objectionable when they employ it on their own initiative, so that their 
political goals, their violent methods, and, ultimately, their claim to rightful use of force do not 
go through any process of relevant public review and endorsement.”138 Whether such “public 
review and endorsement” would be sufficient to make collateral damage caused in the course of 
conventional war less bad than deaths caused by terrorism is a further question I do not pursue 
here.139  
 The relevant questions are whether political representatives in a democracy are 
sufficiently “under pressure from their constituents to justify going to war” and, non-
equivalently, whether “their claim to rightful use of force…” goes through a sufficient “process 
of relevant public review and endorsement”—a stronger claim. For this to be the case, a 
                                                 
137 McPherson, "Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?" 541. 
138 Ibid., 542. 
139 While the absence of RA is certainly a moral strike against terrorists, it might be thought that so-called first world 
militaries have a greater burden of responsibility given their capacities. It is also noteworthy that the ability to garner 
RA is highly contingent, so that its absence might be the result of a lack of infrastructure and organization rather 
than a consequence that the cause being fought for would not be broadly supported. 
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moderately well-informed, politically engaged electorate is required. To authentically possess 
representative authority with respect to the use of force, the decision to resort to violence could 
only emerge through thoroughgoing deliberation—overcoming the “chilling effect on public 
debate” produced by nationalistic sentiment so often present in the political atmosphere 
surrounding conflict—among the citizens on behalf of whom violence will be enacted. Indeed, it 
is difficult to specify the sorts of knowledge and wherewithal an electorate should be thought to 
have in order for them to be capable of consenting to the performance of political violence in 
their name. This is precisely what is required for their autonomy to be sufficiently regarded by 
political actors, however. 
 It is noteworthy in this regard that the assumption of dubiously strong representative 
authority has been enlisted by those attempting to justify violence against those having 
representative authority. In his “Letter to the American People,” Osama Bin Laden argues that 
US claims to being a free democracy wherein policy is determined by the people impugns the 
innocence of civilians—and therefore their right not to be targeted—who support and finance 
strikes in Afghanistan and, by Israeli proxy, Palestine.140 While there are several other problems 
with this inference—proportionality is left entirely out of account,141 and al-Qaeda profoundly 
lacks just the sort of representative authority under discussion, so even if it were the case that 
targeting (culpable) civilians could be justified, al Qaeda would not be justified in targeting 
them—it also seems clear that the people’s control over the resort to war does not approach the 
threshold that would be required for them to become liable to attack. The question of when, if 
ever, unarmed civilians could be sufficiently culpable to be targeted is beyond the scope of my 
arguments here. The takeaway for my purposes is instead that careful consideration of the resort 
                                                 
140 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver. Accessed 1/1/16. 
141 See McMahan, Jeff. Killing in War. Oxford: Clarendon, 2009, 232-4. 
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to political violence puts into sharp relief the frequent absence of representative authority 
necessary to justify its use, not only by non-state actors but also by states, if typically to a lesser 
degree.  
 In the contemplation of resorting to force, political representatives once again have to 
strike the challenging balance between delegation and trusteeship, and in the contemplation of 
political violence striking such a balance occurs within the context of some of the greatest moral 
hazards human beings can face. In this context, the previously expressed concerns regarding the 
treatment of societal aims but not means as within the jurisdiction of the citizenry re-emerge with 
renewed urgency. For even supposing that it were perfectly clear what sorts of foreign policy 
resulted in greater national security, leaving only the specification of national security as an aim 
of society and deeming the means by which this goal is pursued to be outside the realm 
appropriate to deliberation could not be justified. To do so would without argument either frame 
the interests of citizens as narrowly nationalistic or assume that citizens are not competent to 
contribute to such decision-making.142 I return later to the specific challenges relating to acts of 
violence and other elements of foreign policy committed “in the name of” a constituency in 
chapter 4. Here it will suffice to observe that considering the history of political violence that has 
failed to sufficiently regard and consult the constituency on whose behalf it was purportedly 
committed, representative authority is best viewed as a seldom reached ideal. As a generalization 
regarding political violence and other significant aspects of foreign policy, it remains the case 
that participation and deliberation are least present and effective where they are needed most. 
                                                 
142 These points are readily applicable to the current global refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian conflict (and 
others). The determination of how many refugees the United States has been willing to accept (woefully few) and 
what other sorts of assistance the United States is willing to offer are high-level political and military decisions with 
profound consequences for citizens (to say nothing of the refugees) and about which they have scarce influence. See 
Ignatieff, Michael. “The Refugees and the New War,” The New York Review of Books, Dec. 15, 2015, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war/ accessed 2/16/2016. 
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 The intersection of democratic theory and foreign affairs raises a difficult set of questions 
for political representatives. In this chapter I have emphasized the importance of citizen 
participation and deliberation and concluded by emphasizing their role as a check upon 
representative trusteeship in this domain. I have further suggested, in a preliminary way, how 
human rights should inform and constrain foreign policy, whether this policy arises primarily by 
mandate or by trusteeship—a topic that I take up in more depth in the final chapter. What has 
thus far been left out of account is the relation that political representatives bear toward those 
whom they do not represent but whose lives are significantly affected by the acts and decisions 





Obligations and Duties, Partial and Impartial 
 
I. Introduction 
Political representatives have specific obligations to those they represent, but are also 
constrained in unique ways by general or “impartial” duties, some of which are enhanced as a 
consequence of the roles they occupy. Distinguishing the basis of partial obligations from the 
grounding of impartial duties offers insight into the normative dimensions of political 
representation. Importantly, however, the partial and impartial demands upon political 
representatives bear a complex relation to one another. In what follows I argue that the power 
and influence of political representatives heighten what is demanded of them by general duties. 
Further, while partiality to constituents can be variously justified, in the context of political 
representation it can only be justified by simultaneously undertaking a (general) duty to uphold 
(and not to undermine) frameworks that are required for representation to function. Justified 
partiality thus requires respect for the higher order impartiality needed for political representation 
to endure—a kind of consistency argument—and the promotion of representational forms that 
are efficacious—a pragmatic argument.  
 These additional constraints and demands are further implications of arguments made in 
chapter 1: Because of the promissory relation introduced by the representative/represented 
dynamic and the relation of interests to this dynamic, appropriate regard for the interests of the 
represented is partially constitutive of political representation. I argue, however, that these 
interests are not authentically regarded if their pursuit entails compromising the interests of 
others beyond a certain threshold. This follows from the relation between general duties and 
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interests, an argument for which can be sketched as follows. General duties, as traditionally 
conceived, obtain for all persons and are owed to all persons. They thus form an important part 
of a baseline morality. It is beyond the scope of my arguments here to defend an account of this 
baseline morality, but I take it that the acceptance of certain basic moral principles is a preferable 
alternative—though perhaps not the only one—to moral skepticism. I will also assume, but will 
not argue here, that the acknowledgment of moral principles itself generates a kind of moral 
motivation. This may sound like a conceptual jump in abstraction, but I suspect something like it 
is required for most understandings of morality. If one attributes moral gravity to a principle of 
promise-keeping, for example, this would seem to provide a prima facie reason to not to break 
promises.  
 If I have reasons to uphold general duties, then, and if having reasons to do or to want 
certain things is a reasonable way of framing interests, performing my general duties is among 
my interests. As general duties encompass, at a minimum, the preservation of life, dignity, and 
the basic welfare of others—concerns within almost any account of human rights—it follows 
that all persons have an interest in the well-being of others. Political representatives are thus 
required to regard the interests of non-constituents for two reasons: first, because of the general 
duties belonging to political representatives that they themselves owe to all persons; second, 
because an obligation to advocate for the interests of constituents encompasses a commitment to 
the interests of non-constituents through the general duties of constituents. These claims have 
implications for local, national, and international governmental structures with regard to the sorts 
of actions in which political representatives can justifiably engage.  
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 Before proceeding, a clarification regarding terminology is in order.143 Following 
traditional usage, I take “general duties”—treated here as equivalent to “natural duties”—to be 
those that one has toward any human being whatever, regardless of place or circumstance, and 
“special duties” to obtain in contexts where we have reason to believe something more or 
different from these general duties hold—the cases of family and country have often been treated 
as paradigmatic, though I characterize such special duties as contingent and ultimately 
defeasible. “Obligation” as used here, unlike either general or special duties, requires some 
activity on the part of the holder of obligations. Paradigmatically, voluntary contracts, promises 
(or “covenants”), and perhaps certain tacit agreements are the ground for such obligations. As I 
have argued in chapter 1, however, obligations can sometimes arise as a consequence of 
voluntarily inhabiting a role with justifiable expectations of performance attached to it, 
particularly if the expectations are of such a nature to justify the implication of tacit agreement 
and thereby introduce a promissory context. 
 In these particular cases, the relation between duties, which obtain regardless of one’s 
choosing them, and obligations, requiring a degree of voluntarism, will often be complex, as 
entering into obligatory contexts might change the relation in which one stands to duties. 
Because the activities of those in positions of power have a greater than normal effect on the 
lives of others, the obligatory context they inhabit (as a consequence of voluntarily taking on that 
role) often magnifies their general duties: a head of state has obligations to her citizens but is 
also in a highly charged position with regard to upholding or failing to uphold her general duties, 
given the extent to which the lives of non-citizens are also affected by her decisions. Political 
representatives who are not also commanders-in-chief of armed forces, for example, typically 
                                                 
143 The following account roughly follows that of Rawls: Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap of Harvard UP, 1971, 98-9. 
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possess (degrees of) the relevant sorts of power nonetheless, as their activities in the role of 
representative influence not only the chances of constituents’ interests being realized, but also 
the integrity of representational practices and, if less directly, the welfare of those whom they do 
not represent but are affected by policy decisions nonetheless.144 
 
II. The Distinctness of Obligations and Duties for Political Representatives 
It has often been thought that there is a tension between universalist and particularist moral 
demands. The so-called special duties of particularism are often thought to require justification 
because they appear prima facie at odds with the general duties of universalism familiar in 
different forms from both utilitarian and Kantian traditions.145 Whether understood as exceptions 
to general duties or somehow as derivative of them, the acknowledgment of particularist 
obligations and special duties call for explanation and need to be situated within a moral 
framework.146 Political representatives are faced with this tension in unique ways. In addition to 
the obligations they have to those they represent directly, certain special and general duties 
obtain for them in especially salient and elevated ways. 
                                                 
144The driver of a vehicle is responsible not only for the safety of her passengers but also for the safety of other 
drivers on the road at that time. Indeed, many roles we occupy task us with responsibilities, obligations, and duties 
of varying weight. The role of political representative is a special case. 
145 See Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" 664-5. I will say little here about 
utilitarianism, Kantianism, or other major strands of moral theory, and their invocation here should not, of course, 
suggest that these are unproblematic or are to be accepted wholesale. Only in chapter 4, in my appeal to human 
rights theory, do I offer some preliminary comments regarding moral systems and, in turn, potentially fertile moral 
principles. Here I simply assume, without argument, that there are general and special duties in the way other 
theorists rely upon the presupposition of “external moral principles,” and I take it that these can be fruitfully 
analyzed as features of an account defined, ultimately, by contrast to moral skepticism. Even if the use of the terms 
“obligations” and “duties” are objected to on the ground that they are out of step with contemporary moral 
psychology, a case paralleling my account of partial and impartial regard could be made in the language of “in 
groups” and “out groups,” though I do not pursue such a task here. In any case, theorists who take such a line often 
appeal ultimately to long-existing moral traditions and to utilitarianism in particular. See Greene, Joshua David. 
Moral Tribes. Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. New York: Penguin, 2013. 
146 For a useful account of some prominent interpretations of this tension, see Almond, Brenda. "Reasonable 
Partiality in Professional Relationships." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8.1/2, Papers Presented at a Conference 
on Reasonable Partiality, (Amsterdam, October 2003) (2005): 155-68. JSTOR. Web. 05 Mar. 2015. 
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 With these distinctions and arguments in hand, I further argue that there is a kind of 
limited normative continuity from legal (substate) representation to domestic representation and 
then to representation in the international domain. My aim in doing so is to stoke the intuition 
that the representation of persons has impartiality, understood in a certain way, as a built-in 
constraint grounded by general duties. Impartiality is not, of course, the only relevant constraint, 
and there are other moral dimensions to representation,147 Nonetheless, I argue that if partiality 
on the part of political representatives is to be justified, a simultaneous regard for the impartiality 
of the relevant procedures and frameworks is an important and frequently underappreciated 
constraint, the recognition of which would signal an advance in our political concepts. If I am 
correct, political representatives have a prima facie obligation to respect—and refrain from 
actions that would undermine—representation generally, or structures that are necessary for 
representation. I then offer preliminary arguments showing that the promotion of democratic 
norms is among the principal obligations of political representation, as the upholding of these 
norms is required for representation to be efficacious. 
 I begin with a sketch of representation in three distinct circumstances by way of 
introducing the consistency argument. 
 
1. THREE CASES 
Though it is correct to say that the prosecutor in a US domestic legal trial is in one sense rightly 
partial to a plaintiff, and a defense attorney is rightly partial to a defendant, the practice of a trial 
taken as a whole is meant to realize impartiality, perhaps in this context equivalent to a kind of 
fairness: That is, the legal process within which both attorneys operate is intended to be impartial 
                                                 
147 Chapter 4 explores the relationship between political representation and human rights theory. 
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between defendant and plaintiff, so that argumentation and the evaluation of evidence as opposed 
to mere inclination decide the day. The representational obligations of both attorneys include 
acting in a partial way in the sense of withholding their own judgments about guilt or innocence 
(or perhaps making positive assumptions about their clients) and serving the interests of their 
respective clients to the best of their abilities, but all with the background assumption of an 
overarching impartiality manifested in the legal system.  
 To be sure, it is generally not taken to be the responsibility of individual lawyers to 
ensure the fairness of the legal system; equally clearly, however, lawyers and others involved in 
the legal process are required to abide by parameters so as not to compromise the integrity of the 
system. It is in part for this reason that—again, within the US legal court system—if failures of 
due process can be demonstrated, the case might be thrown out; it is also for this reason that, if 
the defense attorney learns that the jury is made up of the client’s “cousins” or has been paid off, 
etc., she should feel hesitant to participate.148 My claim is that the partiality the defense attorney 
affords her client requires justification that cannot simply be conferred by “doing her job.”149 
When she is justified in affording her client partiality, that justification must be grounded in and 
constrained by the fairness of the legal practice. If the relevant procedures are insufficiently 
                                                 
148 Some uphold the justified partiality of a lawyer in circumstances where she is defending one she “knows” to be 
guilty, but I take a central feature of the adversarial US trial process to be the acknowledgment of individual 
fallibility. Jury decisions are meant to embody impartiality/fairness more reliably than individual beliefs of attorneys 
regarding guilt or innocence. See Almond, “Reasonable Partiality in Professional Relationships,” Ibid., 164; See 
Estlund’s “Jury Analogy” in his Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2008, for a balanced review of “the wisdom of numbers” and its pitfalls. If the defense attorney actually (believes 
she) witnessed her client commit the crime for which he is on trial in broad daylight—if she deems the innocence of 
her client to be something that she is incapable of defending—it seems the correct course of action would rather be 
for her to recuse herself.  




impartial overall, the justification for her partiality in representing her client is significantly 
undermined.150  
 Though not often framed in these terms, the point is not intended to be controversial. 
Consider the well-known show trials of supposed “capitalists” by those colluding with Joseph 
Stalin after his meteoric rise to power. When there was anyone occupying the role of advocate 
for the accused, they were often woefully inconsequential or, more commonly, were happy to be 
ineffectual in defending the subject of Stalin’s ire.151 An intuitive reason for not taking the 
outcomes of such proceedings seriously—and for labeling them “show trials”—is that those on 
trial for their lives were not being represented. The deliberate absence of impartiality in these 
trials should be seen as undermining the (justification for) partiality of the prosecution, in 
addition to impugning the disingenuous advocacy of those responsible for defense.  
 In a related way, the International Criminal Court has been criticized for manifesting 
biases that track the preoccupations of the UN Security Council (which in turn is well known for 
disproportionately tracking the interests of its most powerful member states), thus potentially 
drawing the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court into question. Legitimate 
international justice, the thought goes, requires independence from political will.152 While 
representation as it occurs in the International Criminal Court differs substantially from that of a 
US domestic trial setting, the relevant difficulty is the same: failures of impartiality undermine 
the legitimacy of the decision-making apparatus involved and the legitimacy of particular 
decisions handed down by it—and in the case of the International Criminal Court, additionally 
                                                 
150 It does not follow from this, of course, that a given lawyer or representative understands or acknowledges these 
obligations; indeed, a substantial conclusion of my argument is that in circumstances of representation there are 
often little-recognized obligations that nonetheless obtain. 
151 See Judt, Tony, “The Coming Cold War,” in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. New York: Penguin, 
2005. 
152 Aloisi, Rosa, “A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court,” International Criminal Law Review, vol. 13:1, 2103, 147-68. 
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the legitimacy of decisions resulting in some but not other cases being brought before it.153 The 
wider point, beyond domestic or international criminal trials, is that when the impartiality of the 
relevant representative structures is insufficiently regarded, this impugns representation within 
these structures and draws into question decisions made there. 
 Aspects of domestic political representation, for all its many and important differences 
from (domestic or international) legal contexts, can be conceptualized as sharing certain 
normative features. A representative or representative body is justifiably partial to a given 
constituency and has certain fiduciary obligations to it (and must be so and must have such 
obligations to uphold its mandate and be sufficiently responsive to those represented). The 
justification for such partiality, however, should again be seen as grounded in overarching 
impartiality being realized in the governing structures as a whole. Consciously pursuing (some 
of) the interests of one’s constituency in a way that undermines the overall framework where the 
interests of anyone at all can be represented and pursued flouts a principal obligation of 
representatives.  
 The actions of several senators faced with difficult choices after the passage of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s “New Deal” legislation illustrate the normative stakes I have in mind here. 
Given his own tremendous popularity, and a wide Democratic majority in both the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, Roosevelt attempted to further press his advantage by 
restructuring the Supreme Court in his favor, particularly as there were seated justices who had 
opposed New Deal legislation. Initially, support was garnered in familiar ways—Senator Logan 
of Kentucky, who was dubious about the restructuring, was mollified with guarantees for well-
                                                 
153 Ibid. I discuss these issues further in chapter 4. 
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funded flood control projects demanded by constituents in his home state—but as deliberation 
went on for weeks, the mood shifted. 154  
 A growing number of senators “…began to believe that the issue was too big for them to 
be influenced by customary political considerations.”155 Despite being keenly aware of 
Executive control over sugar bills—hence over significant interests in his sugar beet state of 
Wyoming—Senator Mahoney came to express his opposition to the restructuring “…no matter 
what the political cost.”156 The notion of “customary political considerations” here can be 
variously interpreted, but clearly a number of senators risked their political careers, with little 
hope of any immediate favorable outcome for themselves, in order to uphold the values they 
accorded to the balance of power manifested in the Constitution. To have done otherwise—to 
have accepted the offered benefits for one’s constituency in these circumstances—would have 
been to fall short of a political representative’s duty to promote the integrity of representation 
generally. It is worth noting again that the moral requirement being pointed to has obligatory 
features, as it is consequent to the voluntary inhabiting of the role of political representative, but 
the moral requirement also contains elements of duty, given that misconduct here would threaten 
the opportunity of even those that the representative does not directly represent, as well as the 
viability of the structure of representation as a whole.  
 Perhaps the senator from Wyoming in this example is to be credited with enough 
foresight to work for the balance of power on consequentialist grounds, believing that the 
ultimate welfare (interest) of his constituency is made most secure in this way. If so there 
perhaps would no longer be a conflict between pursuing the interests of his constituency and 
                                                 
154 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate (v.3). Knopf: New York, 2002. 56-65. 
155 Ibid., 61. 
156 Ibid., 61. 
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respecting the wider representational structures within which he is an actor. Note, however, that 
this would very likely have required going against the stated desires of his constituency, who 
might simply prefer to receive the injection of federal funds. Such a case illustrates one way in 
which a mandate from a constituency might conflict with the justified independent judgment of a 
representative. The domain of judgment of representatives will thus—as is well known—often 
involve balancing difficult considerations of mandate and independence (or equivalently, for my 
purposes, acting as delegate and acting as trustee). To this extent, there is merit in the notion that 
the representative owes not only his “industry” but also his considered judgment to a 
constituency, and that sacrificing it entirely to popular opinion would not be to serve them.157  
 The case being considered thus suggests that one parameter of the obligation of the 
representative is to accommodate the mandate given by one’s constituency only to the extent that 
it does not threaten the integrity of the framework required for representation to exist and 
flourish. Particular representational frameworks are not sacrosanct, however; the absence (and 
undesirability) of a Burkean “natural aristocracy” implies that at a certain threshold any such 
requirement to uphold representative frameworks is defeasible.158 Though I say little about 
justified revolution or legitimate secession, the mere existence of a representational framework—
particularly one that does not in fact provide sufficient representation—cannot on its own ground 
an obligation to uphold it.159  
 It remains conceivable, however, that duty must at times override obligation, particularly 
when upholding obligations to constituents imperils the human rights of non-constituents. The 
                                                 
157 Burke, Edmund. “Speech to the Electors of Bristol,” in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. 6 
vols. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854—56: 1:446--48 
158 Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France: 1968. Ed. Charles Posner. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1970. 
159 See Buchanan, Allen E. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 
 
102 
tension between the demands of constituents and non-constituents might be dissolved, in 
principle, by simply stipulating that the interests of others are equivalent to constituent interests. 
In this case, a political representative’s obligations to citizens could not come into conflict with 
her duties to non-citizens. Such an approach, however, leaves no room for the prioritization of 
citizens’ interests over the interests of distant others, and would overburden citizens, framing too 
many of their interests as other-regarding to an unreasonable degree. Although I have argued that 
the fundamental interests—here understood as human rights—of all persons figure among the 
interest of any constituency because of their general duties, it does not follow from this that 
conflicts between the interests of constituents and non-constituents cannot arise. Nor does it 
follow that political representatives have moral demands of equal weight imposed by their 
obligations to constituents and duties to non-constituents. Respect for human rights thus serves 
as the threshold beyond which the interests of a constituency that do compete with the interests 
of non-citizens cannot be pursued without injustice. 
 It is noteworthy, however, that examples of inadequate regard for the interests of non-
citizens—those outside a political representative’s constituency—that fall well short of a human 
rights violation might still be both morally depraved and understood as poor political 
representation when general duties are taken into consideration. A politician or a candidate 
running for major office who denigrates entire cultures with his comments does his constituency 
(or potential constituency) a great disservice by unnecessarily fomenting hostility.160 So while 
human rights set crucial limits to political representation, they signal an outer limit in the criteria 
for evaluating the activity of political representatives. I return to the challenging task of 
                                                 
160 Widely circulated comments of Donald Trump during his candidacy for the US presidency regarding Muslims 
and Mexicans arguably undermines—invites new threats to—the security of those he is running for the right to 
represent and certainly paints this constituency in a poor light. 
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analyzing obligations and duties specifically regarding human rights in chapter 4. Here it will 
suffice to observe that the trusteeship required of a political representative includes the right kind 
and magnitude of regard for the harms that her actions will visit upon non-constituents, as well 
as the related moral hazards her actions will visit upon her constituency. This is most obvious in 
cases such as “unjust wars” being waged “in the name” of a people,161 but it is also true of less 
dramatic and in many ways more insidious cases as well. 
 One implication of the forgoing is that if a senator were to make political bargains that 
benefitted her constituency but excluded others from being represented, or damaged existing 
representative structures, she would have failed to uphold her political duty even if her actions 
were “selfless” in the relevant sense. Acting on behalf of one’s constituency and advocating for 
their (immediate) interests might fulfill one obligation belonging to the political representative, 
whether it brings her great unpopularity or cements her political career. However, the 
representative in question might simultaneously fail the duty to appropriately promote and not to 
undermine representation more generally. Such examples are highly specific in many of their 
details, but they harmonize with the view that the justification for partiality toward constituents 
is threatened by the higher order failure to act impartially. 
 Representation in the domain of international relations, despite its very different 
structure, is amenable to a parallel analysis regarding its normative features. Representatives of a 
given state or other political entity are justified in their being partial to national interests to the 
extent that their actions are constrained by, inter alia, overarching impartiality realized at the 
level of the procedures in which they participate. Should the state’s representative realize, for 
example, that international trade policy being considered, while beneficial to her country, was to 
                                                 
161 See Beerbohm, Eric Anthony. In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. 
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be pushed through while suppressing the votes (or the equivalent) of the countries that it would 
affect most, she should be dubious about the role she plays in securing its passage. The 
representative of the state would be wrong to pursue national interests in a manner that excluded 
the possibility of similar pursuit by (the representatives of) other nation-states.  
 The delegate/trustee tension remerges at the international level with greater force, for at 
least two distinct reasons: first, the likely disparity of relevant knowledge between 
representatives and those they represent is very high—higher even than that internal to a large 
nation-state, and several orders of magnitude higher than the disparities between a local 
dairyman’s union and their chosen representative. The range and complexity of global issues 
with which representatives in the international domain must contend suggest that if they are 
remotely competent, their relevant knowledge base will far outstrip that of average citizens from 
a given nation-state. Second, while there is plenty of entrenched partisanship within many 
nations (the contemporary United States being exemplary in this regard), the divisions between 
nation-states are often deeper, in many cases (though by no means all) are older, and have to a 
much greater extent been historically condoned and enshrined. The disdain with which early 
Greeks referred to hoi barbaroi has long since been cast as politically incorrect but analogous 
nationalistic sentiment continues to abound, sometimes appearing under the banner of 
“Realism.” Those responsible for international policymaking thus face challenges of cultural 
difference and historical antagonisms significantly greater than anything encountered in domestic 
contexts. Far from weakening the general duties of such representatives, however, their enhanced 
trusteeship should instead be seen as intensifying such duties. 
 There is, then, prima facie motivation for the balance to be struck with greater weight on 
trusteeship in this context. This recognition and consequent affording of power also, however, 
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introduce familiar worries of domination:162 greater power in the hands of political 
representatives—and less in the hands of those they represent—not only offers the potential of 
greater damage being inflicted in terms of detrimental policy decisions being made, but threatens 
to leave the interests of constituents behind.  
 Two points can be made in response to these concerns. First, as I have already argued, a 
substantial trustee role for representatives does not entail limiting participation or public 
deliberation. Because deliberation provides the opportunity to better understand when trusteeship 
is appropriate and when it is not, the precise extent to which a representative goes beyond her 
mandate and the justification for this might be more readily comprehended when adequate 
deliberation occurs. Political representatives are also obliged, as I have argued, to explain the 
motivation for policy decisions, particularly when these decisions substantially depart from the 
mandate representatives are given by their constituencies. A more politically engaged citizenry 
does not entirely obviate problems associated with trusteeship, but can provide important checks 
upon its use and extent. 
 Second, trusteeship in foreign policy as in domestic policy is better seen as an extension 
of a mandate rather than its counterpoint. Because the central obligation of political 
representatives is to pursue the interests of constituents whether acting principally as delegate or 
trustee—in most circumstances, of course, their activities will be a composite of these—
appropriate occasions for increased trusteeship emerge when their mandate offers little to go on, 
is cacophonous and difficult to interpret, or is at odds with constraints set by human rights. In 
short, while I have suggested that political activity in the international domain occasions a 
greater role for trusteeship, it would be misguided to infer from this that political representatives’ 
                                                 
162 See Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, further 
discussed below.  
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obligations to their constituents are somehow lessened in these circumstances. Taken generally, 
of course, this point is central to my overall argument: the power wielded by political 
representatives imposes burdens upon them, including duties and obligations, in unique ways. 
The foregoing considerations further suggest that—for contingent reasons—political 
representatives in the international domain bear the burden of these moral demands especially 
keenly, given the profound consequences of unjust or simply bad policy decisions at this level.  
 For good reason, it is often the effects of such inequitable or otherwise detrimental 
policymaking in the international domain that receive attention. Thomas Pogge’s well-known 
indictment of the WTO for enshrining inequalities at the international level remains a compelling 
case .163 A subtler point is that deliberate exclusion of other state or substate representatives from 
the processes of representation and consequent policymaking may render those very processes 
conceptually akin to the above-mentioned “show trials.” As I have argued above, show trials are 
best seen as not constituting legal proceedings at all but as mere simulacra of legal proceedings, 
in part because there is no legal representation taking place. In parallel fashion, international 
policymaking procedures that exclude—in sufficient numbers and to a sufficient degree—those 
whose interests are explicitly understood to be influenced by the proceedings in question may not 
meet a threshold needed to count as political representation at all. More typically, those 
satisfying the conceptual requirements to be considered political representatives can be criticized 
for construing the interests of those they represent too narrowly by focusing upon their (partial) 
obligations and insufficiently regarding their (impartial) duties to outsiders and the representative 
structures essential to them. 
                                                 
163 Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002. Discussed further below. 
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 The examples given above of representation in a US court of law, within domestic 
governance, and in foreign affairs contain important disanalogies. Most glaring, perhaps, is the 
extent to which a courtroom trial constitutes genuinely adversarial circumstances, while it is 
typical to ascribe common national interests to different constituencies within particular nations. 
Oversimplifying, the defense attorney might see her task solely as preventing her client from 
being charged with a crime. A member of the US House of Representatives, however, while 
given a mandate by a constituency that might compete with other mandates given to other 
representatives by other constituencies, would be badly remiss in thinking that winning such 
competitions was the ultimate purpose of his activity. Further, in meting out punishments for 
trespasses of law, a criminal court’s concern for retribution, deterrence, reform, or some 
composite of these might seem far removed from the representative’s task of influencing national 
policy—and, a fortiori, international policy—more broadly. 
 These differences should not be minimized, but the examples of the “thrown” jury in the 
legal context, the “bought” passage of a bill in the context of domestic representation, and 
forcibly imposed policy in the international arena are intended to imply that at a quite general 
level they share one crucial feature: In each case the representative fails to uphold the 
impartiality required for the legitimate functioning of the wider structural apparatus within which 
she is operating. Although the nature of obligations the representative owes to her client or 
constituent varies significantly across the three cases, a duty to act so as to preserve the integrity 
of representation is held in common. My intent is thus not to model the political upon the legal, 




 The extent to which international relations are intrinsically adversarial or should be 
viewed as such is, of course, a question of much debate, and one that will become central to my 
inquiry here. In suggesting that representation at the international level does share important 
normative features with domestic representation, I offer something of a promissory note to show 
that certain characteristics of international relations that are treated as adversarial cannot be 
normatively supported as such. Duties and obligations associated with representation set limits to 
adversarial conduct in the international domain just as they do in the domestic domain. 
Arguments to this end must be postponed until my discussion of human rights in chapter 4. At 
present, I will further examine partiality in one of its most pervasive guises and argue for specific 
constraints that general duties impose upon it. 
 
III. Patriotism: a Special Case of Special Duties? 
It might be thought that the discussion thus far has failed to take account of a special duty 
belonging to domestic political representatives, and one that rightly inclines them to be more 
partial to their constituents than I have suggested. If it could be shown that a strong form of 
patriotic duty obtains for political representatives, this might offer independent justification for 
shifting the balance of emphasis more in the direction of national interest. Arguments to this end 
would not necessarily negate concern for non-citizens and might still preserve a lesser 
requirement to maintain or even enhance the impartiality of overarching representative 
structures. They would, however, offer distinct reasons for prioritizing the interests of citizens 
over those of non-citizens. To explore this possibility, I begin with a brief analysis of patriotism 




1. PATRIOTISM WEAK & STRONG 
The normatively rich notion of patriotism illustrates the contentiousness of purported obligations 
and duties: certain universalists have singled out patriotism as indicative of grave 
misunderstanding or worse,164 while others with particularist commitments—and 
communitarians in particular—have argued for it to rank highly in the order of virtues.165 I 
understand patriotism to include an asymmetrical commitment or set of commitments to the 
people and institutions of one’s “fatherland.” Clearly a great deal more could be included in even 
a provisional definition,166 but for the present this narrow characterization suits my purposes of 
considering patriotism as a candidate instance of justified partiality. 
 Alasdair MacIntyre nicely summarizes certain difficulties for both patriotic and 
cosmopolitan positions.167 A central—and well-known—difficulty for patriotism is to be had in 
justifying the above-mentioned asymmetry. It is a nontrivial task to justify greater regard for or 
commitment to one’s countrypersons once all the relevant contingencies are acknowledged. The 
contingent nature of political boundaries, who happens to reside within them at a given time, and 
the extent to which one does or does not benefit as a consequence of being so located make these 
facts problematic grounds for affording one’s countryman special treatment. The best strategies 
for providing such grounding appeal to particular relations between citizens and between citizens 
and their representatives. 
                                                 
164 See Tolstoy, 1894, “On Patriotism,” in Tolstoy, Leo, David Stephens trans. Government Is Violence: Essays on 
Anarchism and Pacifism. London: Phoenix, 1990, where he links patriotism to the “subordination of the will.” 
familiar from later challenges to political obligation. See Flathman, Richard E. The Practice of Political Authority: 
Authority and the Authoritative. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1980; Pateman, Carole. The Problem of Political 
Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory. Chichester: Wiley, 1979; Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles 
and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1979.  
165 MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame, 1984. 
166 See Nathanson, Stephen. Patriotism, Morality, and Peace. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993.  
167 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 
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 On one reading of (early) Rawls, we might think that aspects of patriotism are included 
within the justification of political obligation, as classically understood. Since on Rawls’s 
account a duty to obey the law, while grounded in the benefits one has received and expects to 
continue to receive, is ultimately owed to one’s fellow citizens, there is, after all, a kind of 
special obligation owed to countrypersons that is not owed to outsiders.168 While this strategy, if 
successful, would obviate many of the just-mentioned problems of contingency, other well-
known difficulties remain. The most important of these challenges can be summarized as 
problems of voluntarism: the sorts of freedom of choice and the kind of consent needed to 
ground a duty to obey the law are notoriously difficult to demonstrate. 169 Rawls would later, of 
course, more carefully argue that there are further conditions upon such obligations, including at 
a minimum that any law one is obligated to obey must be publicly known and, at least in 
principle, be justifiable on the basis of public reason.170  
 MacIntyre, however, offers no such justifications for patriotism, going so far as to say 
that it has no rational basis given that whatever duties we have to other human beings we have 
them, ceteris paribus, to all in the same measure. While some are tempted to claim shared 
origins as an exception to other things being equal, making this case turns out to be difficult. 
Particularly in the context of contemporary heterogeneous societies, there is both tremendous 
internal diversity and often significant insularity between diverse groups within a given society. 
                                                 
168 Rawls, John. "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," Law and Philosophy, ed. S. Hook: New York: New 
York University Press, I964. See Simmons, A. John. "The Principle of Fair Play." Essays on Rights and Obligations 
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The requisite ethnic and cultural commonalities needed for such an argument are lacking. 
Indeed, their absence in pluralist societies serves as one motivation for just the sort of “fair play” 
arguments formulated by Rawls. Given the well-known difficulties with fair play arguments as a 
ground for a duty to obey the law,171 however, we should not expect them to fare much better as 
a basis for patriotism that includes an exclusionary component within it. 
 What then of the cosmopolitan point of view specifically as a counterpoint to patriotism? 
For MacIntyre, a cosmopolitan view is the only rational position in terms of moral theory, as it is 
demanded by consistency. He argues, however, that there are reasons to consider the merits of 
irrationality in this particular regard. His position appears to be in part motivated by his 
observation that liberal states within which aspirations to universalism are most common have 
nonetheless required defense by standing armies, populated by individuals possessing 
unquestioned patriotism, at all times—a fact that is meant to give us pause before eschewing a 
patriotic stance on the basis of its irrationality.172 I say little of this odd conclusion here, other 
than that there seems nothing in principle inconsistent about arriving at moral conclusions that 
challenge the political and cultural circumstances in which they were arrived at. Quite the 
contrary, to the extent education has had anything to do with moral progress, just such 
mechanisms have undoubtedly been at work. More to the point, the “irrationality” of patriotism 
as here employed rests upon an account of rationality understood as acknowledgment of 
available reasons. That is, if there were reasons to afford strangers at a distance the same moral 
consideration as intimates nearby, and these reasons were ignored, this would constitute 
irrationality. MacIntyre acknowledges there to be such reasons and thus has little ground left 
from which to justify patriotism. 
                                                 
171 See Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, and Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation. 
172 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 
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 A more nuanced and useful consideration of patriotism is to be had in Robert Goodin, 
who focuses on the observation that frequently one’s countrypersons are held to a higher, rather 
than lower, standard than non-nationals, and that compatriots can receive more, rather than less, 
severe treatment as a consequence of violating these standards.173 This interesting result is 
ultimately explained in terms of a special relation being understood to hold between compatriots. 
By way of analogy, my holding a door open for a stranger is perhaps best thought of as 
supererogatory—whatever the stranger’s view of the matter might be—while my holding the 
door open for my mother falls somewhere much closer to a (manifestation of a) special duty. The 
stranger who fails to hold the door for my mother might receive a glance askance, but my failing 
to do so would result in much more severe (and deserved) chastisement. 
 A difficulty here is that the foregoing analogy gets much of its intuitive force from an 
assumption of something like a conventional mother-child relationship, in which many of the 
obligations typically taken to belong to a mother have been upheld.174 At the limit, when such a 
person has been “no mother at all,” it might well be argued that the relationship scarcely exists, 
at least in requisite form, in which case the relevant duties will be substantially lessened. The 
relevant questions to be asked, it seems, will once again turn on the sense of “mother” being 
used. I take it that in cases of surrogacy and, a fortiori, egg donation—i.e., cases in which one 
might be a mother in a strictly biological sense only, perhaps never meeting the child—any 
obligations or duties obtaining over and above general duties will be minimal.  
                                                 
173 Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" 663-86. 
174 The following discussion borrows significantly, with my own twists upon it, from Simmons, "The Obligations of 
Citizens." Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, 43-64, esp. 52-55. My use of 
“obligation,” as opposed to duty, is deliberate in this context, based on the notion that parenthood is at least to some 
significant extent voluntary. This is an oversimplification and a generalization to which there will be exceptions, but 
it points to a distinction to which Goodin does not pay close enough attention, as I elaborate below. 
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 In the context of patriotism, this suggests that the relation between countrypersons is 
required, in a certain form and up to a certain threshold, for the special duties they purportedly 
owe one another to obtain. As Hume long ago pithily illustrated with regard to the governing 
structure one finds oneself under, it will not do claim that citizens of a particular state enter into 
relations with compatriots voluntarily, though of course sometimes they may; the absence of 
alternatives to merely having particular compatriots mirrors that of Hume’s man taken aboard a 
ship while sleeping, and, once at sea, being told he is free to leave if he likes.175 
 For contrast, we might consider the case of the police officer and the duties and 
obligations that belong to her. At least as far as administering the law is concerned, the officer is 
indeed obliged to treat all equally. Reading a person his or her rights as they are being taken into 
custody is required of the officer regardless of whether the perpetrator is congenial and 
accommodating or insulting and vulgar, up to some particular threshold, and whatever the 
officer’s feelings about the individual; whether she knows and likes, does not know, or knows 
and actively dislikes the perpetrator, this obligation remains. These considerations remind us that 
the relation the officer has to the person being taken into custody has no bearing on her 
obligations, as these are consequent to her (again, voluntarily) inhabiting an obligation-bearing 
role, nor to her general duties with regard to other individuals, as their generality makes renders 
them owed to all equally. 
 The challenge for explicating and justifying patriotism among citizens thus becomes 
apparent, as the various familiar grounds for obligations, special duties, and general duties do not 
neatly apply: Obligation is lacking because agreements or promises were not voluntarily entered 
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into nor were roles to which such obligations are attached voluntarily assumed.176 The kind of 
substantially reciprocal relations grounding special duties (as I have explained them) do not 
necessarily obtain, and general duties are owed to non-nationals in the same degree as they are to 
one’s compatriots.177 This interpretation leaves intact, of course, the possibility of robust 
patriotic sentiment based on shared geography, a sense of community, shared aspirations as a 
function of existing under the same political system, and the like. Any further linkages between 
these factors and patriotic duties or obligations, however, remain problematic. 
 The issue can be framed differently: two possible accounts of patriotism might be 
considered. In its weaker form, patriotism constitutes a shared sentiment and fits a description of 
when the carrying out of one’s particular obligations and more general moral duties aligns with 
this sentiment in a thoroughgoing way. A stronger form—the one likely associated with the 
intuitive notion of “patriotic duty” and which would be required for the kinds of justified 
partiality considered in this chapter—treats patriotic duty as something above and beyond both 
these particular obligations and more general moral duties. As it is not clear what else could play 
this further grounding role, only the weaker version, which treats patriotic duties as derivative of 
other prior duties, can be maintained. By way of analogy, there is wide agreement that there is 
typically a moral requirement to obey the law, but this requirement is—arguably—best seen as 
obtaining not because the law has been dictated by legitimate authority or because it constitutes 
an authoritative command one is obliged to obey,178 but because of more general moral 
principles. That is, in such cases there is an all-things-considered moral justification to act in 
                                                 
176 As acknowledged by Hart; See Hart, H. L. A. "Are There Any Natural Rights?" The Philosophical Review 64.2 
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accordance with law, as in the given context such action constitutes the best way of rendering 
one’s duties to general moral principles.179 
 Further, for it to be the case that legitimate political authority obtains, there must be at 
least one instance—the set cannot be empty—where one’s moral duties are overridden by one’s 
obligation to obey. As John Simmons has persuasively argued, authority cannot merely 
command one to act according to general moral principles and at the same time offer 
independent reasons for acting.180 Authority framed this way would be redundant since one 
already has reasons to heed general moral principles in its absence. A parallel point can be made 
with regard to patriotism. For it to be the case that (strong) patriotic duty obtains, there must be 
at least one instance—the set cannot be empty—where patriotism requires other than what is 
already morally required. Patriotism cannot merely require one to act according to general moral 
principles and at the same time offer independent reasons for acting.  
 To be clear, according to the above explanation one will still most often have an 
obligation to obey the law and to follow the dictates that come from positions of authority. The 
point is that the source of this obligation derives not from authority per se, but from the fact that 
acting in accordance with the law will very often be the best way to uphold general moral 
principles. Again the parallel holds for patriotism: There will likely often be an obligation to act 
in patriotic ways, by supporting one’s countrypersons and working to improve one’s political 
system, for example. Any obligation to do so, however, derives not from patriotism per se, but 
from the fact that in the context of one’s social and political circumstances, general moral 
principles are best upheld in this way. 
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 It is well beyond the scope of my arguments here to fully assess the notion legitimate 
political authority or to engage with rigorous attempts to justify it.181 With regard to strong 
patriotic duty, however, the typical candidate notions meant to justify it cannot offer the support 
they are invoked to provide. In the absence of justification for the belief that strong patriotism 
can offer independent reasons for acting over and above reasons given by general moral 
principles, only the weak understanding of patriotism can be countenanced. As I shall argue next, 
the unavailability of patriotism as a justification for partiality limits the degree to which political 
representatives can privilege the interests of constituents over those of outsiders. 
 
IV. Some Thresholds for Justified Partiality 
Now a defining characteristic of political representatives, as I have explicated them and the 
normative dimensions of their role, is that they hold such positions voluntarily—understood in a 
commonsense way. Were this not the case, the promissory relation they bear their constituents 
would be undermined, with the result that obligations to these constituents would be significantly 
compromised.182 Further, in the preceding arguments I have pointed specifically to problems of 
voluntarism and suggested that, given its typical absence in the context of a state within which 
one finds herself a citizen there is limited ground for special obligation or duty. It might be 
thought, then, that unlike other citizens, political representatives have a certain kind of patriotic 
duty after all, as they have voluntarily entered into these relations that are necessarily particular 
in their political and cultural settings. Further, it might be worried that the invocation of 
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promissory relations has as a direct consequence a narrowing of concern on the part of political 
representatives to the interests of only those citizens they are understood to directly represent. 
 These concerns are largely illusory, however, for the following reasons. First, if the 
foregoing account of patriotism is granted, constituents are only justified in supporting its weaker 
non-exclusionary form. Because citizens are not justified in advocating strong patriotism, those 
representing these citizens cannot be required to advocate for it, justice being a constraint upon 
citizen mandates. Even in the context of strong nationalist sentiment, where something like 
strong patriotism is embraced, the “People…[have]…given to their Governors no power to do an 
unjust thing…for they never had such a Power in themselves.”183 Locke, of course, had more 
concrete cases of “unjust things”—in particular, the prosecution of unjust wars—in mind. As an 
unjustified disposition, however, and one likely to have precisely the sorts of unjust 
consequences with which Locke was concerned, strong patriotism can appropriately be 
consigned to this category.  
 Second, as previously mentioned and as I further elaborate in the next chapter, the narrow 
understanding of interests typically associated with strong patriotism cannot be supported. Too 
much is ceded to game theory and to (certain forms of) contractualism when citizens, conceived 
as self-interested rational actors, are treated as necessarily in opposition to the interests of non-
citizens, factors to be calculated in a zero-sum game. Not only are examples of widely shared 
interests demonstrable—minimally, the shared interest in a relatively stable, just, and peaceful 
global order, and a planet with environmental conditions conducive to long healthy lives—but 
also citizens of a given state have substantial interests in being perceived abroad as willing 
collaborators in pursuing these goals, in not having injustices committed in their names, and in 
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openness to enriching encounters with peoples beyond their political borders, to name a few. 
When interests are analyzed in this way, the distinction between partial and impartial 
considerations must be drawn less sharply. Far from being in unavoidable conflict, requirements 
for respecting impartiality that are enhanced for those acting as political representatives will at 
times overlap with the (partial) obligations political representatives have to their constituents. 
 To be sure, tension between pursuing the interests of constituents, even construing these 
interests broadly, and regarding the interests of outsiders will persist for the near term: The 
competitive nature of global capitalism, inter alia, instantiates such tensions at quite a 
fundamental level. Related and deeper concerns regarding inequality, both domestic and global, 
(although I cannot treat them in any depth here) are germane. As C.B. Macpherson has argued 
critically responding to Rawls, even a small degree of inequality can often enshrine hierarchical 
power relations that are detrimental to all conceptions of authentically shared governance.184 
While working ardently for greater global equality is a task with which it would be unreasonable 
to burden individual political representatives, they are constrained by consistency to act in ways 
that do not undermine opportunities for representation generally.  
 Putting this last point in this way might make the requirement sound both vague and 
grandiose. Two profound failures to uphold this directive—one domestic and one international 
example—illustrate that it need not be so, however. The United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Citizens United vs. The Federal Election Commission of September 9, 2012 effectively gave 
corporations the status of persons and consequently empowered them to make unlimited 
campaign contributions to political candidates (through “super PACS”). Writing for the dissent, 
Justice Stevens concluded, 
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At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American 
people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-
government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting 
potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange 
time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few 
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of 
corporate money in politics. 
 A bright spot amidst this darkness is that at the time of this writing, 180 sitting members 
of Congress support a constitutional amendment overturning the ruling.185 It is they, on the basis 
of the foregoing analysis, who with respect to this specific case are engaging their obligations as 
political representatives. Such a position is virtually required for those in representative roles 
tasked, as I have argued they are, with preserving the representative capacity of the system in 
which they function. 
 The well-known work of Thomas Pogge illustrates the relevance of these issues at the 
global scale. An important argument in his World Poverty and Human Rights aims at deriving a 
duty to bring about the restructuring of economic institutions, given their systematic contribution 
to and reinforcement of radical economic inequality on a global scale. Central to his argument is 
the claim that real-world harm is being done to the poor by the current global institutional 
structure, and this fact implicates those who uphold and participate in this structure, imposing a 
negative duty upon them (us) to desist.186  
 While much has been written questioning the purportedly “negative” character of this 
duty,187 a more practical and urgent criticism can be made regarding on whom such a duty falls. 
As Carol Gould argues, affluent individuals and powerful corporations in various nations are 
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responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of the harms resulting from radical economic 
disparity, implying that it is an unreasonable generalization to hold “Western nations,” as does 
Pogge, accountable for these harms. Gould writes, “While he is right to be critical of the WTO, 
his focus on state actors leads to an overly narrow diagnosis of the problems with globalization 
and the concomitant responsibility to rectify its impacts in developing countries.”188  
 Conditions allowing for and perpetuating severe poverty are perpetrated by large 
multinational corporations, financial institutions with vast resources, and political actors who 
enable them far more than by average individuals, and hence these prominent actors bear the 
brunt of the responsibility for ceasing these practices and making restitutions.189 These 
observations emphasize that the circumstances of those on the losing side of increasing 
inequality—both domestically within the United States and internationally—significantly derive 
from specific political arrangements. The disturbing process of money infecting the political 
process at all levels continues to render the economically downtrodden politically marginalized, 
and the responsibility for reversing this trend must be seen as significantly lying with political 
representatives. 
 In summary, the central aim of this chapter has been to further explore the nature of 
obligations and duties belonging to political representatives, specifically with reference to what 
is owed to both constituents and non-constituents. I argued that, while political representatives 
have obligations to those they represent directly, the performance of these obligations does not 
occur “in a vacuum.” Representatives are the bearers of general duties themselves, and are thus 
responsible for the ways in which their actions and decisions affect non-constituents. More 
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importantly, representatives have obligations to constituents, who are also the bearers of general 
duties; these constituents are not represented well if decisions made in their name conflict with 
their general duties. For these and other reasons, taking normative dimensions of political 
representation seriously often requires thinking globally. I next take up challenging questions 
regarding domestic representation in the international system, and argue for a circumspect 





Representation in the International Domain 
 
I. Introduction 
The role that political representation should play in the international domain courts controversy 
for a number of reasons. Preeminently, an analysis of representation in the context of interstate 
relations broaches long-standing debates over the status of states and the degree of their ongoing 
importance relative to the influence of multiplying international organizations (IOs) and in the 
face of accelerating globalization. It also forefronts a much discussed and related tension 
between sovereignty and sufficient regard for human rights and ultimately raises challenging 
questions about the role citizens should or should not have in international governance. While 
each of these subjects is vast, I focus here upon the obligations political representatives have to 
those who they represent in these contexts. A central theme of this chapter is that because 
political representatives are obligated to pursue the interests of citizens, the difficult task of 
interpreting these interests in increasingly globalized circumstances also substantially falls to 
these representatives. Even domestic political representatives cannot fulfill their obligations in 
the same degree of isolation that they once could, because the interests of their constituents are 
increasingly affected by global forces from world economic trends and climate change to forms 
of political violence on a global scale.190 Furthermore, they cannot fulfill their (general) duties as 
it once was (and continues, in some quarters, to be) believed they could with little regard for 
outsiders by essentially denying that they have such duties. 
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 The notion of legitimate political representation will also be analyzed and redefined en 
route: Although it has become a commonplace in the philosophy of international law to view the 
legitimacy of the international system as a function of the legitimacy of state actors within this 
system, I argue that the regard state actors—and their relevant representatives in particular—
have for non-citizens or “outsiders” in the international system affects both their domestic and 
international legitimacy. This reciprocal, rather than bottom-up, account, in which justice is 
substantially constitutive of legitimacy, undermines a complete separation between how a 
government regards its constituents and how it interfaces with non-citizens, treating both sets of 
activities as relevant to the legitimacy of its political institutions.  
 It will be important for what follows to bear in mind the distinction between descriptive 
and prescriptive concerns in mind will be important for what follows. There is one sense in 
which the practical considerations of international politics might be thought ancillary to the main 
thrust of my arguments here. To take the example of sovereignty, the question of whether it is 
desirable to “move beyond” state sovereignty191 or instead to strengthen and more ably defend 
state sovereignty is to be answered in the context of this project by first and foremost choosing 
whichever better facilitates the advocacy of the interests of constituents, robustly construed, and 
thereby permits political representatives to fulfill the obligations to those they represent. If 
sufficient data were available or if the relevant counterfactuals were known, the answer to such a 
question might be better addressed only through quantitative analysis aimed at demonstrating 
which model better promotes interests. What such an approach would lack—or would have to 
presuppose—however, is an account of interests that appreciates the complexity of relations 
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between individual citizens, their governments, and rest of the world. Indeed, I make the case 
that tendency has been to erroneously assume definitions for such variables, to the detriment of 
our understanding and the meeting of moral demands. 
 
II. Representation and Self-Determination 
Long-standing debates regarding self-determination, human rights, and intervention can be 
usefully analyzed in terms of the account of political representation being developed here. While 
it might be thought that any theory significantly invested in the import of representation is bound 
to favor self-determination and, subsequently, sovereignty, even at the cost of tolerating (within 
some threshold) human rights violations, this need not follow on my account. As Carol Gould 
has shown, a right to self-determination can accrue only to the members of a state, not to the 
state itself, since the very values a right to self-determination is meant to uphold would be 
undermined in a tyrannical or autocratic state that was in some sense self-determining. Further, 
because the strong consent of members typically relied upon in arguments for state self-
determination is implausible, the locus of a right to self-determination must be the individual 
people themselves.192 Here as elsewhere, the relevant political institutions are a necessary 
condition for the realization of a right—in this case to self-determination—but the presence of 
these political institutions should not be mistaken as sufficient for these rights. 
 A parallel argument can be made regarding political representation. I have argued in 
preceding chapters that the moral gravity of political representation results, ultimately, from its 
accountability to persons. Political representatives have the obligations they do as a consequence 
of relations with constituents they have voluntarily entered into. Such obligations are owed 
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primarily to individuals, who are justified in believing that their interests are being pursued by 
their representatives. This account does not rule out notions of group interests and correlated 
obligations held by political representatives to pursue these. Rather, group interests, even if they 
can be characterized distinctly, derive their moral weight from the interests of individuals within 
them. In the case that the interests of a group were pursued in a way that undermined rather than 
furthered the interests of individual group members, representation would have failed its central 
task. Because the value of a representative state derives from the value of individuals and the 
recognition representation affords them, it is this latter relation that has moral priority. These 
observations do little to settle specific scenarios in which, for example, humanitarian intervention 
is being contemplated or other complex questions of foreign relations are concerned, but suggest 
that considerations of political representation bolster individual regard and in turn harmonize 
with the protection of fundamental human rights. 
 The impartial duties of political representatives argued for here point toward a similar 
conclusion. As I have argued previously, failures to uphold impartiality at one level can 
undermine the justification for partiality. Given the absence of the kind and extent of consent 
historically appealed to in order to ground legitimacy, political legitimacy is best seen as 
substantially—though not entirely—constituted by sufficient regard for the interests of a relevant 
constituency. A would-be (domestic) representative body that fails to be impartial among the 
constituents it is meant to represent might fail this sufficiency criterion, since some interests are 
simply ignored, and since artificially reducing the scope of those represented or prioritizing the 
interests of some constituents over others will compromise the interests of those not picked out 
for special treatment. It would follow, then, that when a governing body violates impartiality 
beyond a certain threshold, it loses a degree of its legitimacy. In severe cases this might 
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constitute grounds for justifiable secession of internal groups.193 At the limit, when such failures 
of impartiality can be shown to violate citizens’ human rights, it might justify intervention, 
though the form such intervention can justifiably take and the appropriate limits are crucial 
considerations.194  
 While the normative dimensions of political representation are not reducible to regard for 
human rights, a robust conception of political representation and human rights theory should be 
seen as mutually supportive. Briefly, human rights figure into the obligations and duties of 
political representatives in at least the following way. In the previously invoked premise 
articulated in early form by Locke—“People…[have]…given to their Governors no power to do 
an unjust thing…for they never had such a Power in themselves,”195—the mandate political 
representatives can be given by their constituents is constrained by justice. For Buchanan, if the 
“core of justice” substantially consists in regarding and promoting human rights,196 it follows 
that human rights constrain the activities of political representatives.  
 Because occasions of appropriate trusteeship on the part of political representatives are 
best seen as a guided elaboration of their mandate rather than as a set of actions entirely 
independent from or—a fortiori—in opposition to their mandate from constituents, the trustee is 
similarly constrained by human rights. Expressing this point only in terms of constraints, 
however, might suggest that human rights impose only “negative duties” upon political 
representatives to avoid their violation. Enough has been said impugning the distinction between 
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so-call negative and positive duties.197 It should be clear in any case that making “pursuing the 
interests of citizens” constitutive of political representation, as I have argued that it must be, 
requires a broad range of activities that go beyond avoiding harms, and human rights will be 
counted among the interests of citizens on almost any account of either “human rights” or 
“interests.” It follows that political representatives are directly tasked with realizing the human 
rights of their constituents and, given their duties of impartiality, are indirectly tasked with doing 
the same for outsiders.  
 There is a further point connecting self-determination and the obligations and duties of 
representatives more directly. To build on previous suggestions, self-determination presupposes 
a form of partiality on the part of nascent political representatives that is justified only so long as 
overarching impartiality is respected. At a certain threshold, violation of this impartiality either 
internally (insufficiently attending to the individual interests within the group) or with regard to 
inter-state relations (in the case, for example, where the coming-into-being of one state was 
accomplished through aggression against or unjustifiable diminution of another) places limits 
upon the right to self-determination. A parallel analysis applies to the sovereignty of states, in 
that its value, while profound, is ultimately subservient to the rights and welfare of individuals 
within states. In this regard one need not take a position on whether self-determination and 
sovereignty are of instrumental value, given the benefits they offer to citizens,198 or are 
intrinsically valuable, in the sense that they are required for self-governing autonomous peoples. 
In either case, it is with reference to individuals (and their interests) that their value is ultimately 
grounded. The role to be played by sovereignty nevertheless remains a central issue in 
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contemporary international relations, and has profound effects upon the fulfilment of obligations 
and duties held by political representatives. It is thus worth analyzing its relation to political 
representation in some detail. 
 
III. Sovereignty, Humanitarian Intervention, and Reasonable Limits 
Inasmuch as political representatives are tasked with the protection and promotion of human 
rights, as argued for above, they are directly concerned with sovereignty and the ways in which it 
either contributes to or undermines the promotion of these rights. In what follows I provide a 
brief overview of the historical and political backdrop to the formation of sovereign states. I 
argue that the seeds were sown within this process for many of the shortcomings of political 
representation as it is currently practiced. In particular, reasons for the insufficient regard 
representatives frequently have for those outside their constituency can be traced from 
Westphalia through to the formation of the United Nations. I further argue that this 
understanding is crucial to formulating the ways in which political representation can be 
improved. 
 While there are many points of entry into the subject of sovereignty, one particularly 
relevant to political representation is an analysis of the reach and power of international 
organizations—particularly those focused on the global advocacy of human rights—and their 
complex relations to states. The United Nations, as the world’s preeminent IO, illustrates the 
inherent tensions in such relationships, as sovereignty has been a frequent obstacle to its goals. 
Thomas Weiss has diagnosed the United Nations as being significantly mired in an anachronistic 
Westphalian conception of sovereignty.199 The achievement of significant sovereignty in this 
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earlier context—particularly as a palliative to the violence of the Thirty Years’ War—limited 
aggression and created a degree of stability, providing an early context for self-determination, 
but at the cost of enshrining hermetic political borders and generating a tailor-made obstacle to 
later international cooperation, in particular to the cooperation necessary for monitoring and 
appropriately responding to violations of human rights.  
 Two pitfalls to the nearly four-centuries-old conception of Westphalian sovereignty are 
well known: First, the kind and magnitude of troubles being encountered today do not seem 
likely to be solved unilaterally or even multilaterally without sophisticated mechanisms for 
global coordination and regulation. Second, much of the injustice in the modern world occurs 
within states rather than between them—whether as a consequence of tyrannical rule or 
unchecked internal strife—and Westphalian sovereignty leaves all such injustice comfortably 
insulated from redress. The very notion of “redress,” of course, invites questions about who or 
what sort of body might legitimately take up this task, as defenders of sovereignty are quick to 
point out. One task going forward—though one beyond the scope of what can be fully addressed 
here—is thus to determine what sort of legitimacy can be realized by an institution like the 
United Nations in principle and to distinguish these theoretical questions from those of current 
applicability. As I will argue below, the short shrift powerful nations have given the United 
Nations in its contemporary form, thus limiting the likelihood of its realizing greater legitimacy 
and thereby its capacity to further human rights, is an indictment of the political representatives 
responsible in those nations. 
 Less frequently commented upon in this connection is the fact that the achievement of 
greater state sovereignty allowed and likely perpetuated the categorizing of persons into superior 
and inferior groups. Westphalia was a détente between powerful leaders, clarifying laws and 
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edicts to which citizens in their respective nations were subject, but also making the authority 
over these citizens more absolute, and enshrining whatever internal biases and injustices existed 
internally in respective states. As Allan Buchanan has argued, peace can come—and can be 
preserved—at too high a price, if such peace is maintained by allowing egregious injustice.200 
Whatever might be said regarding the historical circumstances of Westphalia and the tradeoffs 
made in the interest of establishing peace in this context, the subsequent centuries have on 
numerous occasions offered the prospect of international stability only at the cost of severe 
injustice. 
 The example of slavery—rampant and growing in popularity at the time of the 
Westphalian treaties, and more recently the subject of universal moratorium (though, of course, 
by no means an entirely effective one)—is illustrative. The inappropriateness of the Westphalian 
conception of international relations to the contemporary world is highlighted by how 
comfortably the ownership of human beings harmonized with that framework, allowing as it did 
for the assumption of inferior peoples and conceptual space for hoi barbaroi. The less-than-fully-
human designation of many persons at the time lent a certain credence to absolute and insular 
sovereignty, as even the mistreatment of citizens by a particular government could be attributed 
to nothing more than misidentification. As subhuman denizens were owed little to nothing, 
inadvertently brutalizing a full-fledged human being might make one guilty of nothing more than 
getting the “facts” wrong with regard to the category of individual concerned.  
 It has been argued that contemporary ethnic violence continues to be justified in terms of 
subhuman categorization, so that the main difficulty faced is not a failure to recognize human 
                                                 




rights but a failure (or unwillingness) to ascribe humanity to all persons.201 Arguments to this 
end are buttressed by contemporary examples of political violence, and notably—a central point 
of Rorty’s—not only by the circumstances of peoples remote or alien to “us,” as entrenched 
inequalities and assumptions of inferiority continue to pervade developed nations. Further, 
similar sentiments informed the establishment of institutions typically thought to combat just 
such ranking of human beings. Even as the United Nations was being formed and, three years 
later, as the seminal Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was being formulated, 
significant actuaries in the process took self-determination to be both a right and an admirable 
goal to pursue—but for European countries, not for the peoples of Africa or Asia. These, it was 
held, would require the benevolent guidance of their colonizers to endure and prosper, in the 
view of some for the foreseeable future.202 As the British foreign labor secretary expressed the 
sentiment still widespread in 1951, the independence of the colonies in Africa would be 
analogous to “…giving a child of ten a latch-key, and bank account, and a shotgun.”203  
 One clear implication of these facts is that the obligations and duties of political 
representatives are badly distorted when assumptions of inferior and superior human beings are 
countenanced. As the attitude of the labor secretary illustrates, presupposing the existence of 
sub-humans limits the kinds of interests members of this inferior category can have. Those 
inhabiting representative roles in these circumstances can claim to fulfill their obligation to 
represent the interests of constituents simply by denying that these constituents have any 
interests beyond those deemed appropriate by their representatives. This characterization stands 
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as a rather superficial description of the politics of colonialism, of course; the relevant point to 
my arguments here is that limiting the attribution of certain interests to particular groups of 
persons achieves similar results to refusing to advocate for those persons (even if the motive for 
the former were benevolent, and the latter vindictive). Given the continued pervasiveness of 
assumed justification for the ranking of peoples, the sentimental education prescribed by Rorty 
seems an urgent need for political representatives and their constituents.204 In any case, a more 
thorough recognition of these problems and the role representatives should have in addressing 
them would count as progress. 
 The context in which the United Nations was formed, then, included not only a backdrop 
of historical colonialism perpetrated by founding members, but the clear intention held by some 
of the Charter’s principle architects to enshrine colonialism as a civilizing force in the world. 
These facts suggest that at the time when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
was declared, powerful voices continued to qualify, whether explicitly or otherwise, the very 
universality of these rights, or to understand such rights as applying in unequal ways. Crucially, 
these acts and discriminatory attitudes were paired with increased sovereignty, as specified in the 
United Nations Charter. Russian representatives in particular only became signatories to the 
UDHR under pressure and because the Charter language guaranteed matters within their political 
borders would be left in Russian hands—to the peril of many Eastern Europeans within these 
borders at the conclusion of the war.205 
 These historical observations show that sovereignty as traditionally enshrined 
dramatically inhibits the capacity of political representatives to engage their duty to promote 
human rights. Most conspicuously, the ability to influence the treatment of people abroad is 
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made largely unavailable to them in circumstances of strict sovereignty. This fact also has 
repercussions for the constituents of the political representative in question, however. The 
prospect of their general duties to outsiders being realized is clearly curtailed, given that a 
principal conduit for their doing so is typically their representative, who is now impotent in this 
regard. More than this, the value ascribed to general duties and the care for distant others they 
require are bound to diminish in the absence of a culture where this value is supported and acted 
upon. In turn, it should be expected that the mandate representatives are given by their 
constituents will increasingly treat the interests of distant others as less of a priority in 
circumstances of strict sovereignty. 
 In part for these reasons, the long-held interpretation of sovereignty that prohibits 
interference in a state’s affairs—even in the face of human rights violations being committed—
and sets limits to cooperative engagement with the international community has been challenged 
on a number of fronts. There is a growing body of work now calling for appropriately redefined 
sovereignty. Several of these new definitions integrate the notion of responsibility for those 
within the state—characterized as “the Responsibility to Protect,” or “R2P,” as enshrined by UN 
doctrine in 2005206—over which a leader or leaders are sovereign, moving beyond the classical 
formulation of merely protecting citizens from external threats. Much has been written for and 
against R2P specifically, with some touting it as “the most important shift in our conception of 
sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,”207 with others describing it as a debacle, 
and with more cautious observers noting that its application remains vexed, for example as a 
“dead letter” with regard to the current Syrian conflict.208  
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 A subtlety frequently lost in both positive and negative characterizations of R2P is a 
radical shift from its original form. The world summit version of the resolution passed by the 
General Assembly had substantial democratic backing and, given its requirement for consensus 
to be applied, was a sincere attempt to manifest neutrality in its application. As modified by the 
Evans commission a short time later, however, R2P came to include a (dubious) time-limit 
clause, imposing a duration that, if surpassed without a formal decision rendered, empowered 
interested states to apply R2P with largely undefined jurisdiction.  
 On the one hand, then, these facts illustrate that genuine attempts at more democratic and 
equitable application of human rights norms are being made—and that there is significant will to 
improve representation as it occurs in global governance. Crucially, R2P came into being 
through endorsement by all 193 member states of the United Nations, thus indicating a rare 
degree of collaboration and consensus between representatives at the international level. R2P 
effectively says that the human rights of all persons are concerns of the international community. 
While primarily aimed at prevention, R2P provides for intervention as a last resort in the 
circumstance that a country’s leaders have shown themselves unable to represent the 
fundamental interests of their citizens. At least in its original conception, then, features of R2P 
approximate a number of the virtues of good political representation, as I have framed these. On 
the other hand, however, the later modification of R2P with minimal input from the 
representatives of member states shows that the international apparatus for both more 
representative global governance and human rights promotion remains prone to being 
commandeered by established world powers. 
 Both advocates and critics of sovereignty have reasonable concerns. The weakening of 
sovereignty by, for example, promoting universal human rights risks domination by imposing 
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what some will claim are not, in fact, universal norms. In this regard circumstances of weakened 
sovereignty conjoined with an imposed human rights agenda might threaten the autonomy of a 
people, as they are now obliged to heed standards they did not choose for themselves. More 
generally, any diminution of sovereignty extends the reach of global hegemons, and more 
specifically the United States, and likely with predictable results: those in positions to do so will 
extend and solidify their power, secure their access to ever-greater resources, and, to complete 
the realist prediction, those in less powerful positions will endure what they must.209  
 Strengthening (classical) sovereignty in contrast risks enshrining whatever inequalities 
and injustices exist within states (or peoples) for the indefinite future, as I have argued. More 
generally, sovereignty might be thought to facilitate, rather than to interrupt and to discourage 
the sorts of long-standing hierarchical distributions of power and entrenched discriminatory 
practices within states as well as between them. Global elites, cooperative dictators included, are 
empowered to maintain the status quo and indeed to do as they like within their own political 
borders so long as they play their part in international markets and other aspects of the global 
system. 
 On balance, for all the difficulties of doing so, there a number of distinct advantages to 
adopting and developing nascent conceptions of sovereignty that do not treat it as absolute. A 
salient point is that the project of widening of the category of humans and better regarding the 
human rights of all requires facing historical shortcomings and working for change moving 
forward—change that appears less likely to be realized in circumstances of isolated states than 
through international mechanisms. One reason for this, as recent global events continue to 
demonstrate, is that persons in positions of national political power evidently continue to 
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disregard or under-regard the interests of outsiders. As I have already suggested, mandates 
allowing or even encouraging political representatives to be isolationist and unconcerned with 
the interests of others abroad should be unsurprising when the concerns of sovereignty receive 
more emphasis than the interests of persons. While the factors involved are too extensive and 
complex to be analyzed in any depth here, the example of the US handling of the Syrian Refugee 
crisis, for example, and specifically its unwillingness to accommodate even a fraction of the 
refugees many other nations accepted, has been a great disservice to Americans and Europeans, 
to say nothing of the refugees themselves.210  
 Moreover, historical evidence suggests that entrenched modes of exclusion have often 
changed only when this change was imposed. Within the United States, southern states did not 
voluntarily shift their position regarding slavery prior to the civil war. The end of apartheid in 
South Africa did not come about because of a change of heart on the part of those responsible for 
apartheid. These observations are not meant to undermine the value of important grassroots 
movements in these and similar cases that were catalysts for change but to remind us that 
movements toward greater justice have always met with resistance and that, frequently, great 
political power was required to consolidate such change. It should be unsurprising if the prospect 
of a more just international system similarly meets with resistance and similarly requires 
imposed changes. For all its unsavory history, a body like the United Nations, in improved form, 
remains the only kind of entity with the institutional capacity to effect such change.  
 There is, of course, a great deal of work to be done in improving the respectability of the 
United Nations, not only in terms of increasing the implementation and effectiveness of desirable 
resolutions and of avoiding those that are disastrously misguided (the state-level sanctions 
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imposed upon Iraq prior to the US invasion being a case in point), but also in terms of continuing 
to make its operation much more democratic. As is frequently noted, the tremendous power 
entrenched in the Security Council threatens the representative status of the institution as whole. 
This is a particularly profound problem according the account of political representation 
developed here, because those occupying roles in institutions of global governance have not just 
indirect general duties of impartiality, but direct obligations to advocate for the interests of the 
global citizenry. When these interests are regarded unequally because of structural biases, the 
inequalities enshrined by classical sovereignty are re-instantiated at the level of global 
governance.  
 While these are large and legitimate concerns, it is an exaggeration to suggest that UN 
resolutions neatly track national interests of the United States or other powerful nations, even 
while undue influence remains problematic.211 It is a noteworthy example of entrenched power 
being contested by increasingly democratic procedures that the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court went ahead with overwhelming support from representatives of the member 
states despite resistance from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Further, 
the trajectory of greater inclusion in the UN General Assembly, and the demonstrable effects this 
has had,212 whatever structural problems remain in the Security Council, justify a degree of 
optimism.  
 When and if interference in external sovereignty becomes appropriate, however, and 
what form it should take in such cases, are naturally extremely complex and weighty matters. 
The use of military intervention, while advocated by a number of cosmopolitan theorists with 
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certain conditions met,213 has rightly been cautioned against on several grounds. The greatest of 
these is the consequent threats to basic human rights—including the right to life—posed by 
military operations.214 Given the miserable track record of military operations with regard to 
noncombatant deaths—deaths that have far exceeded those of combatants, and with a ratio of 
noncombatant casualties to combatant casualties that has rapidly increased rather than decreased 
since the end of WWII215—political representatives cognizant of their duty to uphold human 
rights might reasonably conclude that other forms of political and economic intervention are the 
only justifiable forms of redress.  
 It is worth noting with regard to military intervention that the justifications offered for 
much of today’s most salient political violence is couched in terms of reciprocity, and more 
specifically in terms of reprisals, familiar from their formulation in just war theory.216 In Osama 
Bin Laden’s “Open Letter to America” referred to previously, this language is invoked explicitly: 
Those killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were no more than a fair 
exchange for the ones killed in the al-Amiriya shelter in Iraq, and are but a tiny part of 
the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia, 
Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan…We have not reached parity with them. We have 
the right to kill four million Americans, two million of them children, and to exile twice 
as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.217 
 Whatever one makes of the numbers here related or the notion of a “right of reprisal” by 
which these acts are meant to be justified, Bin Laden’s commentary points to a grave difficulty 
that the West—and more specifically the United States—has created for itself: namely, that 
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humanitarian intervention has become to many observers synonymous with invasion. To take a 
highly salient example, when the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) became 
manifest early in Iraq conflict, the United States quickly pivoted to defend their actions in terms 
of deposing the regime of Saddam Hussein who had been massacring the Kurds.218 This dubious 
latter argument was unpersuasive, but it did encourage the inference that the long, bloody, and 
yet unresolved Iraqi debacle was characteristic of what the West referred to as humanitarian 
intervention; after all, the United States framed it as such. From such a perspective, it is an easy 
move to the familiar argument that humanitarian intervention is merely the masked continuance 
of imperialism, with the corollary that absolute state sovereignty remains a value all reasonable 
states must hope for as a defensible norm in international law. 
 There are, however, two further points worth noting. First, intervention that manifested 
broad international consensus and was carried out by a democratic coalition of forces acting 
under the banner of respected international bodies—the sort of action that the original 
formulation of R2P, prior to its corruption, was intended to support—would at least obviate the 
inherently controversial scenario of the Iraq war, with one state unilaterally intervening in 
another’s affairs. Further, political representatives should welcome the shift of emphasis 
manifested in R2P from the concerns of states—typically the focus of intervention—to the plight 
of individuals whose human rights are threatened. In addition to making the interventionist 
aspects of R2P a last resort, this shift of emphasis condones only what actions are necessary to 
protect the welfare of persons, and does not authorize additional political goals such as regime 
change. 
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 A second response to the strong sovereigntist is that the permissibility of compromises to 
sovereignty and the determination of acceptable use of such permission are independent of one 
another. One might adopt a definition of sovereignty including “the responsibility to protect,” 
thereby increasing state vulnerability to interference219 while maintaining a principled stance 
against military intervention. Taking such a position would allow political representatives to 
advocate for greater international cooperation while avoiding the moral hazards to which she 
would subject her constituents in the course of traditional intervention. In tandem, greater 
reliance upon the International Criminal Court and international tribunals in rendering individual 
criminal accountability for war crimes and human rights violations, with increased powers and 
efficiency of extradition, might provide a means of pursuing justice that is far less invasive and 
less sovereignty-diminishing than “boots on the ground” interventions—a project in its infancy, 
but which shows substantial promise.220 
 Enshrining such an understanding of sovereignty in international law would “…generate 
a revolution in consciousness in international relations.”221 Again, a skeptical response might be 
that agreement to an “updated” conception of sovereignty in the international community is far 
from likely, if there is no motivation for states to accept such a norm that increases their 
vulnerability to outside influence. To this it can be responded that when and if the international 
culture shifts toward a greater sensitivity to human rights,222 those states that remain unwilling to 
abide by emerging norms will risk isolation and their legitimacy in the international domain will 
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be threatened.223 Moreover, the inability of individual states to protect the interests of their 
citizens from global threats is increasingly apparent. 
 Although the dire warnings of climate science thus far largely remain an abstraction—
only the most vulnerable and least able to voice their concerns are thus far being affected in 
noticeable ways—its effects will pose unprecedented challenges to sovereignty. In this regard, 
classical sovereignty, as well as more contemporary but still thoroughgoing conceptions of 
sovereignty reinstate the nightmare of the global commons, wherein states conceived of as 
isolated self-interested actors are likely to pursue the “rational” course of action that hastens their 
own demise.224 The political representative in this circumstance will lack the resources to 
advocate for the interests of their constituents, because those resources require a degree of 
international regulation and coordination that cannot be marshalled unilaterally. 
 The relevant contrast to be drawn here is between two possible future scenarios. In one, 
with states having continued to act largely independently of one another with predictable results, 
each state does its best to relocate its coastal peoples in the face of rapidly rising seas and 
superstorms, while continuing the very practices that are generating and accelerating the threats, 
but which they cannot cease pursuing for reasons of competitiveness even in the context of 
diminishing returns. In another, states have authentically collaborated under the auspices and 
organization of global institutions on preventive and damage-minimizing efforts so that—
perhaps—sufficient accommodations can be made for the most vulnerable global populations as 
less dire consequences reach them at a slower rate.225 Current geopolitical circumstances, and 
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specifically the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis alongside Britain’s bid to exit the European Union, 
provide a sharp and sobering preview of what is to come as a consequence of climate crises, 
when refugees number not in the hundreds of thousands but the hundreds of millions. 
 To this it must be added that critics are correct to observe that Western powers—and 
more particularly the United States—are simultaneously among the most vocal about the need 
for climate and environmental regulation and by far the worst perpetrators.226 The track record of 
those representing developed nations on issues relating to climate change continues to be a 
travesty in this regard. Because the mechanisms of global governance are clearly needed here, 
the opposition of the US and other world powers to climate covenants with broad global support 
stands as a grave indictment of their representative duties. Moreover this intransigence does not 
support a reversion to a less integrated international order, but lays bare they need for such in 
more democratic, robust form. There is, again, little reason to think isolated states (or their 
representatives) can or will take the necessary steps to address these problems. As I have argued 
throughout, political representatives, as they are accountable to the robustly construed interests 
of those they represent, bear a much greater responsibility for these matters than they have taken, 
or than they have been assumed to be responsible for.  
 When sovereignty is understood to include the responsibility to protect citizens, the 
obligations held by those occupying the role of political representatives mirror and—in some 
cases—overlap with these responsibilities of sovereignty, given the intimate connection both 
have to the interests of constituents. Sovereignty thus interpreted requires that the fundamental 
interests of all citizens are protected against just the sorts of threats that classical sovereignty 
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failed to defend these citizens from. It specifically forbids regarding these basic interests 
according to any ranking of persons, for example. Political representatives, for their part, are 
obligated to advocate for these same basic interests, but also for various non-basic interests of 
their constituents—those interests that are largely unrelated to constituents’ human rights.  
 The obligations and duties of representatives also go beyond the responsibilities of R2P 
sovereignty, on my account, in their requirement to promote general duties toward outsiders. 
However, such a notion of sovereignty further prompts reevaluation of the relations between 
sovereign states, for it suggests new ways in which they might be mutually supportive of one 
another. The framing of related ideas by Francis M. Deng, representative of the secretary-general 
on internally displaced persons from 1992 to 2004, is particularly germane to my larger 
arguments here: 
Sovereignty is not a way of closing doors against the international community. In this 
world of intense interaction and interdependence, sovereignty is to me a positive concept, 
which stipulates state responsibility to provide protection and assistance for its 
people…Given an appropriate level of comfort, one can even add that the best way to 
protect sovereignty is to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty and to call on the 
international community to assist in carrying out these responsibilities.227 
 To this I would add that “discharging the responsibilities of sovereignty” should be 
framed within a normative conception of political representation, as this account can explain and 
justify these responsibilities and the reasons for the relevant agents holding them. The additional 
duties of impartiality held by political representatives offer a normative grounding for members 
of the international community to offer such assistance above and beyond the clear practical 
advantages of promoting stability through such measures. 
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IV. Global Democracy and International Law 
Acknowledging an evolution in the concept of sovereignty leaves many questions unanswered 
regarding the structure of the international system, including to what degree that system can be 
made more democratic and, if this goal is desirable, how it is most likely to be achieved. In 
particular, whether the international order should be conceived of as a “global democracy” or 
instead a “system of fair democratic association” turns on a number of additional challenging 
issues. In what follows I critique two accounts that argue against the need for global democracy. 
I argue that the concerns registered within these accounts fail to show that greater individual 
participation in global governance is undesirable. I then make preliminary arguments to the 
effect that at least in some cases the interests of persons would be better regarded through global 
democratic structures, and thus that political representatives should work toward the 
development of these structures. I further argue that, other things equal, political representatives 
who work to undermine democratically established international institutions fail their duty to 
uphold frameworks required for representation. 
 Given particular examples of conflation, it is again crucial to separate questions of 
feasibility and (normative) desirability. In terms of feasibility, it has been argued that the 
international order lacks anything like the institutional capacities, possessed in a robust 
democratic state, to allow democratic procedures to function. Lacking, among other things, “A 
system of political parties, interest group associations, and other types of associations...necessary 
to give ordinary citizens an orientation among the vast array of issues that arise in a democratic 
polity,”228 such arguments conclude that the international order does not have the requisite 
structure for legitimate democracy to function. It is further argued that the interdependence of 
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persons at the global level is exaggerated, given that “...the set of international laws and 
institutions...play a fairly small role in the lives of people throughout the world.”229 The truth of 
this latter claim would significantly undermine the urgency and import of restructuring 
international laws and institutions, as the motivations to do so derive from their purported effects 
on individuals. I criticize both these views in turn. 
 
1. HUMAN RIGHTS, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
In terms of feasibility, if the question is “...whether or not global democracy can be 
legitimate,”230 the answer turns not on whether this is taken to mean 1.) given current 
circumstances (a feasibility question) or 2.) in principle (a possibility question). Rather, it turns 
on whether it is taken to mean 1.) given current circumstances or 2a.) given permutations within 
a tolerable probability range of current circumstances. If one responds that only the first question 
is of any interest, and that the normative is always constrained by immediate feasibility, it should 
be pointed out that the legitimacy—again understood in terms of robust representation—of the 
United States, for example, has been infeasible at various historical moments. Quick recourse to 
the notion that ought implies can oversimplifies this issue, since what can be done remains a 
matter of significant debate, and because there is evidence that the system has significantly, if far 
from adequately, become more democratic and more politically equitable at the close of the 20th 
century and the beginning of the 21st century. 
 Were there good reasons to think that global democracy cannot be legitimate in principle 
there would indeed be normative reasons to argue against attempting its implementation. But 
contingent obstacles to its realization do not demonstrate this on their own. Rather, the case 
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would have to be made that the magnitude of such obstacles and the related degree of 
infeasibility are decisive and will be so for some significant span of time. This is a much harder 
case to make, particularly given salient examples of radical social change at both the domestic 
and the international level. Moreover, the matter is complicated by the fact that feasibility is 
dynamic, for it is significantly determined by current efforts being made. For example, the 
feasibility of universal suffrage in the United States improved drastically with concerted efforts 
by activists and other sympathizers. All of this suggests that the objection to global democracy 
being considered addresses only the immediate feasibility question, or normativity constrained 
by current institutional capacities, a circumstance that also frames feasibility too narrowly to be 
regarded as decisive. As questions of feasibility are not (indeed, are far from) insoluble in 
principle and clearly admit of matters of degree in practice, I instead focus upon questions of 
desirability in terms of the conditions best allowing political representatives to promote the 
interests of persons. 
 Philip Pettit’s well-known republicanism offers substantive reasons for thinking global 
democracy should be resisted.231 A central worry for Pettit is that the lack of civic structure at the 
international level implies that global democracy would invite rampant abuse and allow the very 
sort of domination that his republicanism rightly cautions against. Additionally, if individual 
states function in nondominating ways, avoiding arbitrary uses of power, Pettit argues, a desire 
for citizens to control the international order individually rather than by the states that they 
control seems unmotivated.232 While it is reasonable to think that “...the legitimacy of the 
international order turns in good part on the domestic legitimacy of the states that constitute 
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it,”233 there is theoretical room to further explore a reciprocal relationship between domestic and 
international legitimacy, instead of the “bottom-up” account here described by Pettit.  
 Pettit’s view can be criticized on two fronts. First, nondomination as a relation between 
states is also meant to characterize international legitimacy, but Pettit says little about how, if at 
all, domestic legitimacy is affected when a state clearly exercises domination in the international 
arena. My argument going forward is that compromised international legitimacy should be seen 
as placing domestic legitimacy in doubt or at least as diminishing (domestic) legitimacy. An 
openly expansionist superpower’s violation of others’ interests and human rights discredits the 
representative entities responsible for such policies, not merely with regard to those they aggress 
against but also with regard to those whom they ostensibly represent.  
 An argument for this view can be given along both prudential and normative lines. 
Prudentially, a dictator’s violation of the sovereignty of neighboring nations, for example, 
simultaneously imperils his own people in various ways: by isolating them from the international 
community; bringing economic sanctions down upon them; or making them members of a nation 
with undermined moral authority. While such acts have become less common, the example of 
Vladimir Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea is illustrative. These facts contribute to the 
appropriate dubiousness that typically meets claims by such an individual that he is representing 
the interests of “his people.”  
 Normatively, such actions express disdain for a system within which representation can 
authentically occur, and which political representatives are duty-bound to uphold. They fail to 
respect not just sovereignty and the tenets of international law—for all its current limitations—
but also the impartiality essential to a concept of law. Framed in traditional (Hobbesian) 
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language, such actors reinstitute the state of nature by undermining any covenants—expressed or 
implied—between nations, and in so doing color the character of international relations more 
broadly. It is noteworthy in this regard that even if circumstances were less dictatorial, and a 
leader in fact had a clear mandate for aggression from his people, he would be a very poor 
representative indeed in the normative sense of representation used here. In such a case the 
obligation a representative has to promote the general duties of his constituents and the 
constraints human rights impose upon legitimate mandates would both have been flouted.  
 Given Pettit’s above qualifications, these observations do not constitute a 
counterargument to his position; they do, however, suggest that both domestic and international 
representation are reflexively relevant to legitimacy.234 As it has very often been the case 
historically that relative nondomination in one domain has been mixed with severe domination in 
another, there is more motivation for direct citizen control, for all its difficulties, than appears to 
be allowed when domestic legitimacy and international legitimacy are considered independently 
of one another. Citizens have significant interests in the international legitimacy of their state, 
understood both in terms of nondomination and in terms of promoting justice informed by 
human rights.  
 The relationship of the United States with the International Criminal Court (ICC) offers a 
case in point. As previously mentioned, the ICC came into being as the result of remarkable 
democratic consensus within the United Nations General Assembly, and despite the pressure 
against its development by the US and the other permanent members of the Security Council. 
This resistance by the political representatives of the US is deeply problematic; it constitutes an 
attempt to undermine one of the largest global, democratically supported policy decisions ever 
                                                 




made on dubious grounds, threatening the integrity of a representative framework that, in 
principle, answers to billions of people. In so doing these political representatives also denied the 
value of the premiere institution aimed at bring violators of human rights to justice.  
 Because the US is not a signatory, it remains outside the jurisdiction of the ICC, and thus 
high-profile contributors to human rights violations and war crimes from within the US remain 
immune. The political representatives who condoned torture in the wake of 9/11, for example, 
failed in their obligations to constituents and duties to non-constituents not only in the obvious 
way—by condoning human rights violations—but also by actively promoting a system wherein 
justice for these types of acts could not be sought. The foreign policy decisions by these 
representatives and their activities abroad thus significantly impugned both domestic and 
international US legitimacy.  
 A second criticism of Pettit’s approach is that it is not clear how to frame some forms of 
political conflict strictly in terms of international nondomination. A military strike aimed 
narrowly at a “terrorist” cell in a foreign land with the complicity of that country’s government 
might meet criteria of nondomination, but still fail a principle of impartiality and other moral 
criteria, in particular by imposing unwarranted risks to noncombatants (and specifically their 
human rights) there.235 This suggests there is important linkage missing between the idea of 
political nondomination and the protections of individuals. If in our geopolitical moment robust 
representation is best realized through the intermediary of states, then Pettit’s program for 
progress—working simultaneously on the dual fronts of improving the international order and 
working to improve the domestic legitimacy of independent states—might be the course that best 
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realizes (the moral demands of) legitimacy. What seems to be missing from this account is the 
connection between domestic and international legitimacy I am pressing, viz., including within 
domestic legitimacy extra-domestic moral concern through regard for a principle of impartiality. 
It thus seems that nondomination, while an important conceptual guideline, is insufficient on its 
own to bear the full moral weight of legitimacy. 
 
2. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE BASIC GLOBAL STRUCTURE 
The second argument mentioned above was that international laws have a “fairly small” role in 
the lives of global peoples, and hence that there are radically different stakes in the global system 
held by the would-be world citizenry. In response, I will argue that international laws and a basic 
global structure have immense impact upon the welfare of global peoples. It follows that the 
stakes people have in how the international system is organized are equal in the relevant sense, 
and this sets an agenda for political representatives to organize this system in ways that better 
regard human rights. 
 First, however, a word must be said about the notion of stakes, what they are, who holds 
them, and why. Christiano defines the relevant sense of stake as “…the susceptibility of a 
person’s interests or well-being to be advanced or set back by realistically possible ways of 
organizing the interdependent group.”236 If this definition of “stakes” is interpreted to imply 
merely that a small, poorly-positioned nation can do little to affect policy in its favor, and this 
gave its citizens less “stake” in the international order, this might be easily granted. Christiano’s 
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own example237 suggests this is not the point, however, and hence—as suggested in the above 
discussion of feasibility—his discussion seems to muddle the descriptive with the prescriptive.  
 In explaining that visiting faculty ought to have less influence over long-term 
departmental decisions than tenured faculty, Christiano plausibly claims that treating both groups 
as though they had equal stakes in the matter would not be fair. The consequences of those 
decisions will be borne more heavily and for longer by permanent faculty, and it is—
increasingly—likely that visiting faculty will soon have no stake in those consequences. But here 
the stakes held are described in normative terms of fairness and what ought (or ought not) to be 
the case. For the cases to be analogous, Christiano would have to argue that citizens of the 
ineffectual marginalized nation ought not to have influence equivalent to that possessed by 
citizens of powerful well-positioned states because they are less affected by international policy. 
This view would also appear to entail, in turn, the view that such states ought to be or remain 
marginalized, with the corollary that they are substantially responsible for their ineffectual status. 
The confusion that seems to have taken place is one of comparing internal and external cases: 
with regard to the faculty example, only internal questions are addressed, in the sense that what 
counts as fair can be analyzed without asking who deserves to be visiting and whom tenured. 
There is a background assumption of something like overarching fairness. With regard to the 
international system, however, external questions are relevant, because few would claim a 
parallel background assumption of overarching fairness here. To do so would be to imply any 
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marginalized countries deserve to be so.238 One suspects that Christiano did not see these 
entailments of his argument, but in any case they cannot be supported, as I argue below. 
 Interdependence and rough equality of stakes—or indeed greater stakes held by those in 
vulnerable positions—in both the descriptive and normative senses are important to my overall 
argument. Descriptively, if it could be shown that our domestic affairs had little bearing on the 
welfare of others abroad, and vice versa, this would significantly limit what impartiality entails; 
if both my actions as an individual and the policies of my government had minimal impact at the 
global level, the duties required in light of such recognition could after all be largely discharged 
through appropriate participation in a democratic state, and the duties of the state could be 
largely discharged in domestic, fiduciary terms. As I will argue going forward, the 
interdependence of states is significant, and more importantly—given that it is often a 
contributing factor to their being marginalized—global peoples have profound stakes in the 
organization of the international order. 
 Briefly, biased international monetary policy, dubious regulation of environmental 
threats, and laws pertaining to the use of force strongly cut against Christiano’s interpretation of 
matters. Furthermore, the increase in and increasing rate of globalization in its many facets 
portend a future of more rather than less interdependence.239 There is good reason to think that 
international law will continue to affect ever more people ever more deeply. Normatively, as 
Christiano’s own arguments unwittingly suggest, the idea of international law and the possibility 
of representation in international relations require a stance of impartiality—and hence one kind 
of equality of stakes—among global actors. 
                                                 
238 Such an argument could be made, of course, with reference to specific countries—the case of North Korea comes 
to mind. One cannot infer from the fact a country has been marginalized that it deserves to be, however, as many 
countries in the Global South demonstrate. 
239 See Gould, Carol C. Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004, 160ff. 
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 An important argument offering support for this view is to be had in Allen Buchanan’s 
critical analysis of Rawls’s Law of Peoples.240 These points are all the more biting because in the 
seminal work of Charles Beitz two decades earlier,241 Beitz criticized Rawls for not seeing the 
applicability of his principles of justice to the international domain, given the presence of an 
international society. A central line of Buchanan’s criticism derives from the fact that, while 
even the later Rawls goes to great lengths to demonstrate the significance of a state’s “basic 
structure,” he leaves the existence of an analogous global basic structure completely out of 
account in determining international principles of justice. “Basic structures” are defined by 
Rawls as ‘‘…the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and 
duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”242 Thus understood, 
the basic structure 
 …is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from 
the start. The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions 
and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, 
in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this 
way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are 
especially deep inequalities.243 
 As Buchanan goes on to explain, there is a very substantial literature that, under the 
headings of political economy, globalization studies, dependence theory, and others, takes as its 
subject a global basic structure for which Rawls’s description of domestic basic structures—and 
the import he attributes it—is profoundly apt. Yet Rawls writes as though the political and 
                                                 
240 Buchanan, Allen. "Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World." Ethics 110.4 (2000): 697-
721. See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples; With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 
1999.  
241 Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1979. 




economic fates of peoples are entirely of their own making. This perspective leads him to 
conclude that 
… the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture 
and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of 
their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative 
talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues. I would conjecture that 
there is no society anywhere in the world—except for the marginal cases—with resources 
so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally organized and governed, 
become well-ordered.244 
 Absent here is any consideration of how a global basic structure affects the prospects of 
peoples and their individual members, in much the same way as domestic basic structures affect 
the prospects of individuals within a People. Rawls thus fails to acknowledge the profound 
economic consequences of the structural inequalities enshrined in the Bretton Woods bodies (the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization),245 the 
parallel political disadvantages enshrined in the UN Security Council,246 and the injustices of an 
international law heavily tilted in favor of powerful states in their resort to political violence,247 
to name only three of the most highly visible examples.  
 The principles of international justice Rawls adumbrates in Law of Peoples thus 
harmonize with Christiano’s above-mentioned view that international law plays a “fairly small 
role” in the lives of average citizens, and share the myopia of that perspective. The above-
discussion notwithstanding, international law persists in advocating nonintervention and in 
giving established states greater latitude in the use of political violence, both of which continue 
to have profound consequences for many millions of people across the globe. 
                                                 
244 Rawls, The Law of Peoples ; With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 108. 
245 As seminally criticized by Thomas Pogge, in Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge: Polity, 2002.  
246 As elaborated in Weiss, What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It.  
247 See, e.g. Rodin, David. "Terrorism without Intention." Ethics 114.4 (2004): 752-71, esp. 754. 
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 Whether now is the moment pragmatically to push for greater mediated individual control 
over the international order might be doubted. As argued for above, the ideal form of 
representation called for, while constrained by impartiality, will vary according to evolving 
background social conditions. Deciding when (and if) such a moment is upon us, however, 
should only partially be influenced by immediate feasibility and can safely assume profound 
interdependence. Rather than interpreting such interdependence as merely grounds for the pursuit 
of mutual advantage, however, it is better regarded in the first instance as raising the moral 
stakes. One aspect of this heightened normativity can be better responded to when our 
understanding of political representation takes fuller account of its normative dimensions and the 
duties it entails.  
 Individuals, whether construed as constituents within a specific country or as global 
citizens, have justified expectations that those in representative roles will advocate for their 
interests. For the reasons I have suggested, strict forms of sovereignty have inhibited political 
representatives from realizing this obligation. These points, among others, imply a motivation for 
evolved sovereignty and greater global governance, but not necessarily greater individual 
participation within it. The desirability of greater participation instead stems from the profound 
effects of the international order upon individuals, whatever their domestic political 
circumstances may be, and also from the normative requirement for global governance to be 
more democratic. Indeed, many of the concerns associated with weakened sovereignty and 
global governance can in principle be overcome, when the forms of political representation 
available to persons give them greater control over the political systems within which they 
reside. The obligations and duties of an individual political representative are thus reticulate and 
challenging. They include not only advocating for the broadly construed interests of their 
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constituents, according to which general duties and regard for human rights are promoted, but 
also endeavoring to support representative political structures at all levels that heed and advocate 
for the interests of persons. The office of political representative is thus a position that should 





My central claim has been that the activity of political representatives is irreducibly normative in 
character. If the foregoing arguments to this end are successful, they show that it is difficult to 
make sense of political representation without reference to the moral frameworks that political 
representatives inhabit. I have spelled out what I take to be the moral demands pertaining to 
political representatives in terms of obligations and duties, borrowing language familiar from 
traditional moral philosophy. I have not given an independent defense of the existence of 
obligations and duties, however, but instead have treated them as elements of a baseline morality 
with reasonably broad intuitive appeal.  
 The nature of this baseline morality is, of course, a deep and difficult subject in its own 
right, and one to which I have paid scant attention here. My hope has been that readers unwilling 
to embrace moral skepticism will find the use to which I put moral arguments relatively 
uncontroversial. Even if one accepts my appeals to morality and the role it should play in 
political contexts, questions might remain about whether a promissory relation is the right way of 
thinking about the relationship between representative and constituent. It might also be objected, 
for example, that I impose more rigorous moral demands upon representatives than is reasonable 
and say little about such demands upon constituents.  
 A significant novel contribution intended here, of course, is a shift in focus from the 
obligations of citizens to the obligations of political representatives. Citizens, too, however, are 
the bearers of profound moral demands not only as individuals but as political agents. The 
character of mandates citizens press upon their representatives, and the ways in which regard for 
the interests of others are or are not manifested there, are one example of how these demands 
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apply. In this regard a complimentary account of the obligations and duties of citizens would be 
valuable, but I have not had the space to provide such an account. 
 A fuller treatment would also say much more about different categories of representation, 
and how they compare with one another. One approach to doing so, although one I have not 
taken here, would be to offer a taxonomy of different forms of representation, including legal, 
political, and perhaps informal representation, treating democratic representation as a species of 
political representation. I have instead focused on (what I take to be) the normative features of 
political representation in more and less robust forms in various political settings. My aim has 
thus been not to provide an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for political 
representation but to shed light upon the kinds of moral demands pertaining to political 
representation in some of its salient guises. 
 The complexity of many issues relevant to my subject recommends that conclusions 
remain tentative. My discussion of sovereignty and global governance in particular is largely 
conditional, as the proper role for political representation to play in these contexts is contingent 
upon a vast number of real-world considerations. It will be enough if I have shown that 
representatives are required to authentically grapple with these contingencies by way of 
advocating for those they represent. More generally, I hope to have shown that political 
representatives are underestimated in terms of their capacities but at the same time are 
insufficiently held to account morally for their actions. I thus hope that the forgoing arguments 
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